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The purpose of this thesis is to carry out an empirical investigation into 
whether membership of monetary union matter in the determination of bank net 
interest margin. Bank net interest margin is the difference in bank borrowing 
and lending rates relative to the total interest-earning assets.  
We operationalise this study by comparing panels of commercial banks 
within and outside economic and monetary unions in Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For our European analysis we use bank-level data from nine Euro Area 
countries and seven non-Euro Area economies, in a dynamic empirical model, 
employing Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM 
estimation method. We find that stronger competition and efficiency, as well as 
greater macroeconomic stability in the Euro Area reduce bank net interest 
margins more than in the non-Euro Area. We attribute this to the well-developed 
single market with a strong socio-economic cohesion underpinning rather than 
the economic and monetary union 
We extend the same level of analysis to the Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
we contrast our findings in the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) with those of twenty non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African 
economies. Our findings in the Sub-Saharan African context reveal a rather 
different scenario. While the WAEMU enjoys relatively lower net interest 
margins than its non-monetary union counterparts, this is attributable to the 
union’s ability to pursue vigorously its primary objective of maintaining price 
stability by maintaining lower interest rates. Unlike in the Euro Area we do not 
observe a reducing impact of bank competition and efficiency on bank net 
interest margin in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) as 
we do in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa. We find these results for 
the Sub-Saharan African analysis puzzling, and attribute it to the absence of a 
well-developed single/common market which is supposed to drive competition 
and efficiency with the effect of reducing net interest margins, as it obtains in 
the Euro Area. 
Our conclusion is that it is rather the presence of a well-developed single 
market that engenders competition and efficiency effects to reduce bank net 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The functions of a banking firm may be varied and complex (Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008), nonetheless, the definition of what role a bank plays in an 
economy, often found in the banking literature, consists of the core 
intermediation function of banks in channelling funds from savers to borrowers. 
And indeed, while modern banks increasingly engage in other activities such as 
off-balance sheet and fee for service business it is the core intermediation 
activity of banks which distinguishes a bank from other financial institutions. For 
example, Freixas and Rochet (2008) note that the definition used by regulators 
to determine whether a financial intermediary should submit to the prevailing 
prudential regulations for banks is: ‘a bank is an institution whose current 
operations consist in granting loans and receiving deposits from the public’. 
Also in a cross-country study of the role of banks Allen and Carletti (2011) in 
Berger et al (2014) note that the total amount of intermediation is significant in 
all economies except the US which has a somewhat less intermediation. This 
definition of what constitutes a bank in Freixas and Rochet (2008) presupposes 
that the efficiency with which this function is discharged has economic growth 
and consumer welfare implications. As a result, the efficiency implications have 
spawned a lot of studies investigating the factors that are likely to impact the 
efficiency outcomes of this primary function of a bank, specifically net interest 
margins. The focus on net interest margin may be justifiably so where for 
example Heffernan (2005) find in a cross-country study of the US, Japan and 
the major Western European countries that for most of them at least two-thirds 
of bank’s gross income derive from net interest income from their intermediation 
role rather than non-interest income. This therefore forms the basis of our 
motivation in this thesis to also focus on the bank net interest margin than to 
include non-interest income, which comprises of fees and commissions, from 
off-balance sheet business like derivatives and letters of credit, for instance.  
In focusing on bank intermediation and on bank net interest margins it is 
also important that we understand them in the context of which of the two 
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approaches to commercial banking in the economic literature we follow in the 
thesis. 
Two approaches are known in the financial economics literature, by 
which banks create deposit money. Lipsey and Chrystal (2004) note that while 
the two approaches offer different ways of looking at the banking industry they 
both are compatible and therefore necessary for understanding modern 
monetary control techniques. These are the ratios approach and the competitive 
model of banking. The first is the ratios approach which shows how, given an 
amount of reserves, banks create a large volume of deposit money. The 
weakness of this approach however is that it does not give an accurate picture 
of how modern banks do operate (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2004). The other is the 
competitive approach to banking which shows how banks operate in a 
competitive environment to attract the reserves they need to be able to create 
deposit money. This model is the modern world view of approach to banking, 
and gives insights into the competitive forces that are at work between banks 
themselves on one hand and between banks and other financial intermediation 
channels like the securities market on the other (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2004). A 
key assumption of the competitive model is that modern banks do not wait 
passively to receive deposits before they lend some money as a multiple of the 
deposit. Rather in the world of the competitive banking model banks wait to find 
a lucrative loan business opportunity, and then ensure funds are made available 
to be able to make the loan. The task of looking for the requisite amount of 
funds to be able to meet a loan opportunity entails either by offering higher 
interest to depositors, or by borrowing from other banks on the interbank 
markets.  
Under the competitive model of banking which gives an understanding of 
the way modern banks work, banks strategically make business model choices 
according to how they structure their balance sheets. We identify three business 
models which commercial banks strategically adopt to serve the market. These 
are a retail-funded commercial bank, a wholesale-funded commercial bank, and 
a capital market-oriented bank. The retail-funded commercial bank is 
characterised by high share of loans funded by stable funding sources such as 
deposits. Roengpitya et al (2014) put the proportion of customer deposits to the 
overall liabilities of the average bank in this category of their sample at two-
thirds. The second business model is the wholesale-funded commercial banks, 
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where banks have asset profile similar to the retail-funded category but are 
funded predominantly by inter-bank liabilities. And the last category which is the 
capital markets-funded have half of their assets in the form of tradable 
securities and funding from the more non-traditional sources of wholesale 
markets. We would like to state here that in both continental Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa, where we draw our samples the bulk of the commercial banks 
operate the retail-funded business model. Hence our analyses follow a model 
where the bank uses customer deposits as the primary means of funding in a 
competitive market (Ayadi et al, 2011)   
  One of the factors widely acknowledged in the literature on bank net 
interest margin as a key determinant is the role played by a bank market 
structure. Within a monetary union, we anticipate that the dynamics of these 
impacting factors, particularly the structure of the bank market, may be different 
from the dynamics in a non-monetary union jurisdiction, particularly as 
competition and efficiency outcomes may differ between them. Nevertheless, 
this has never been studied. Within the context of the European Union the 
establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union served to intensify the 
competitive conditions1 and efficiency in the banking industry that had already 
been set in motion by such strategic drivers as deregulation and technological 
change that had already altered the face of the banking industry in the 
European union (Goddard et al, 2001).  
While the empirical banking literature which focuses on the European 
banking sectors have some studies which investigate the effects of the 
economic and monetary union on different aspects of banking none of them 
directly investigates the direct effects of monetary union on net interest margins 
and its determinants. For example, Leroy and Lucotte (2014) examine the 
implications of banking competition for the interest rate channel in the Eurozone 
over the period 2003 to 2010. Utrero-González (2007) studies the effects of the 
adoption of the Single currency on banking market conditions by making a 
comparative analysis of the market conditions for banking sectors in Spain and 
France who are members of the Euro Area, and the UK and Denmark as non-
Euro Area countries. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge this thesis is the 
first to directly study the impact of monetary union on the determination of bank 




Our main aim in this thesis is to contribute to the banking literature by 
looking at whether membership of a monetary union does matter in explaining 
variation in net interest margin (NIM). Particularly as we anticipate that the 
competition and efficiency forces in the banking industry typically generated by 
the establishment of an economic and monetary union have implications for the 
level of intermediation costs. We therefore set out in this thesis to look at their 
impact on net interest margins alongside the other determinants of net interest 
margins documented in both the theoretical and empirical literature. The EMU 
being the benchmark monetary union which is mimicked by many prospective 
monetary unions around the world, naturally becomes our laboratory for such a 
study, where we elect to limit ourselves to panels of commercial banks as 
opposed to other bank categorisations. A commercial bank is one whose 
primary business lies in deposit-taking and making loans. This contrasts with 
the business of investment banking which consists in securities writing, mergers 
and acquisitions advisory, asset management and securities trading. Although 
commercial banks do some investment banking, this is on a limited scale as it is 
not considered the primary business.  
1.2 Problem Definition 
Given that the banking industry provides the channel for economic 
growth, in the sense that it channels funds from lenders to borrowers (Zhuang 
et al, 2009), it is important that this intermediation role is executed at the lowest 
possible cost for the realisation of greater social welfare, as the lower the bank 
net interest margins, the lower the social costs of financial intermediation. It 
must however be noted that in the European economic and monetary union the 
lack of a common deposit insurance scheme could negate any lower social 
costs of financial intermediation that could be afforded by the union.  As the 
establishment of the EMU brought with it heightened competition, 
disintermediation and consolidation to the European banking landscape, 
European banking industry authorities and policy makers would be interested to 
know the quantified effects of the EMU, especially as it impacts cost of financial 
intermediation. It therefore becomes more compelling to look at how the forces 
generated by the EMU have shaped competition and efficiency, as well as other 
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determinants of this all-important intermediation efficiency measure, NIM. Our 
problem therefore is to investigate whether the dynamics of the determinants of 
NIM in a monetary union environment particularly as it regards the effects of 
competition on NIM, are different from those in a non-monetary union 
environment. 
A bank’s net interest margin, hereafter referred to as NIM, is defined as a 
bank’s total interest income minus the total interest expense over its total 
earning assets, and represented in the following equation:  
 
 
𝑁𝐼𝑀 =  






While net interest margin is computed as in equation 1.1 above a simple 
model of it can be constructed following Barrell et al (2011) where we 
demonstrate that banks in the course of the discharge of their intermediation 
function incorporate in the spread between borrowing and lending rates some 
additional payments they make. These payments are the payment for the risk 
they take on when they hold capital to absorb the risk inherent in all their 
potential loans (𝑟𝑝), the expected default rate on the loans they make (𝑏) which 
over time fluctuates, depending on the prevailing economic conditions, and 
finally the administrative costs (𝑎𝑑), encompassing staff costs and all other 
overheads. To give an algebraic expression to this we represent the lending 
rate (𝑟𝑙) as: 
 𝑟𝑙 = 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑏 + 𝑎𝑑 + 𝑟𝑝 (1.2) 
Where 𝑟𝑙 is the lending rate, 𝑟𝑑, the deposit rate, 𝑏, the expected default rate on 
the loans the bank makes, 𝑎𝑑, the administrative costs incurred for the bank’s 
operations, and 𝑟𝑝, is the capital the bank holds to absorb the risk inherent in all 
their potential loans. 
 
Therefore, re-writing the above equation for 𝑁𝐼𝑀, expressed as the lending rate 
(𝑟𝑙) minus the deposit rate (𝑟𝑑) is: 
 





This perspective is also shared by Haruna (2011) who notes that there 
are other additional payments for the services offered by banks in the course of 
the intermediation process. Such other costs may be incurred for example 
through loan screening and monitoring, savings processing and management, 
payment services; as well as information asymmetry. And that when these costs 
are higher in a bank it puts up the net interest margin, and the bank in question 
is deemed to be inefficient 
1.3 Background 
During the 1990s a global trend towards financial markets globalisation 
and disintermediation, intense cross-border financial mergers and acquisitions 
activity, and financial markets consolidation, afforded by financial liberalisation, 
and advances in new technological innovations was observed. Within the 
European Union, this trend was further amplified by the single market 
programme in 1992, and the coming into force in1993 of the Single Banking 
Licence. The Single Banking Licence derived from the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive which was adopted in December 1989; and fostered a 
progressively more integrated European financial market with the harmonisation 
of financial legislation and regulation across member countries. Subsequent to 
the foregoing developments was the establishment of the economic and 
monetary union (EMU) in 1999 with the introduction of the Euro purported to 
eliminate currency risk. This indeed was another catalyst to the whole process 
of disintermediation, intense cross-border financial mergers and acquisitions 
activity, and financial markets consolidation. When the European banking sector 
during this period of cross-border activity in the 1990s could be said to be 
characterised by consolidation and concentration, what appeared to be an 
observed phenomenon was that the concentrated nature of the market did not 
impair the competitive environment. One such observations was made by 
Goddard et al (2001) who point to the overall decline in net interest margins1 as 
an indication of the resilience of the competitive European banking environment 
in the face of intense banking market consolidation and concentration during 
this period. Possible explanation to this market development could be attributed 
to the presence of industry contestability. Contestability is a notion in reference 
                                            
1
 They note that net interest margins and earnings for that matter were so depressed to the 
point that banks resorted to other streams of non-interest income in their bid to achieve growth. 
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to a market where as a result of relatively lower exit and entry barriers new 
entrants can withdraw from the market and recover their costs. This threat 
posed by new entrants forces monopolists to set prices as if they were 
operating in a highly competitive market. And under such conditions the number 
of firms in a market has no effect on whether prices are set at perfectly 
competitive levels (Goddard et al, 2001).  
The unfolding disintermediation which also contributed to the heightened 
competitive conditions in the European banking sector, particularly in the Euro 
area. manifested itself in the redirection of business away from the banks in 
terms of savings and surplus from the non-financial sector to non-bank financial 
firms like pension funds, insurance firms, investment funds, and the capital 
markets. Again, all of this had the ramifications of thinning net interest margins 
(NIM)2.   
In addition to these trends in falling net interest margins, rising 
competition, disintermediation and other classic factors empirically proven in the 
banking literature as having an impact on net interest margins (NIM) were also 
impacted by the advent of the EMU. For example, the ECB at the inception of 
the single currency anticipated that the EMU would impact on credit risk, among 
the risks banks would ordinarily incur in the course of their business. It was 
expected that due to the positive macroeconomic impact deriving from the EMU 
credit risk in the Euro area for example will be moderated or mitigated. 
Specifically, it might be expected that as the macroeconomic environment 
improves businesses flourish and are therefore able to keep up with the 
repayments on business credits and loans. It must also be said that due to 
deeper and more liquid markets that come with EMU, banks’ liquidity risk, as 
well as markets’ liquidity risks were expected to reduce. Also, while the low 
interest rate environment induced by the EMU may have served as a 
disincentive to depositors who might have sought alternative investment 
products for their funds this may also have forced banks to source funding at 
rather higher interest rates, and thereby putting up banks’ NIM with negative 
effect on social welfare. Furthermore, with the single currency there was no 
longer a place for currency exchange between different currencies within the 
                                            
2
 Bikker and Bos (2008) however argue that to the extent that the Euro area economy continue 
to be predominantly small and medium scale-based bank loans and other bank-based products 
continue to be preferred to market-based financing. 
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EMU. This was expected to eliminate the loss of funds that would normally 
come through margins of currency dealers in a competitive market3, save 
individuals and businesses money and help them to flourish and expand. An 
added effect of the elimination of exchange rate risk was a reduction of 
systemic risk through the lowering of real interest rate (De Grauwe, 2012). This 
is because the elimination of exchange rate risk makes the economic 
environment within a monetary union less risky, in which case investors 
demand lower risk premium for the same investment, and a lower discount rate 
for that matter. A ripple effect of this will then be a reduction in systematic risk 
by way of a perceived sound investment environment, leading to an eventual 
economic growth and stability. It must, however, be mentioned that the 
expectation that bank lending business might flourish and credit risk mitigated 
due to a positive macroeconomic environment afforded by the economic and 
monetary union, could not be fully realised due to cross-border lending to 
countries like Greece (ECB, 1999). At this juncture we distinguish between 
systemic risk and systematic risk. Systematic risk, also called market risk, refers 
to a situation where all investments are equally affected by an underlying 
adverse economic factor or external shocks, rendering the full benefits of any 
diversification unachievable. On the other hand, systemic risk is related to 
specific problems with a company or industry and therefore idiosyncratic in 
nature. It is the risk that an event, like financial problems in a particular firm 
could adversely affect financial markets. For example, a cascading failure in the 
financial sector, caused by interconnectedness within the financial system, as 
was the case of Lehman Brothers sparking the 2007/2008 global financial and 
economic crisis.  
The observation by Goddard et al (2001) which suggests an inverse 
relationship between competition and net interest margin, coupled with its use in 
the banking literature and in practice as one of the simple proxies for banking 
competition (Bikker and Bos, 2008) motivates us to investigate if indeed the 
dynamics of competition as well as other actors known to conventionally explain 
variations in net interest margins are different in a monetary union from those in 
                                            
3
 The EU commission (EU, 1990) projected an average savings in dealers’ margins of 0.4%; 
quite a smaller percentage (0.1%) was however was registered in countries with advanced 
banking systems like the UK where the bulk of currency exchange transaction are through the 
banking system where the IT resources required to convert currencies are not as costly as 
involving human contact like small tourist transactions. 
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a non-monetary union. Specifically, our question is whether monetary union 
membership does matter in the determination of net interest margins. To the 
best of our knowledge we are the first to test these dynamics and hence our 
contribution to knowledge.  
As aforementioned, within the European banking literature, there have 
been a few studies into what factors do cause variation in net interest margins 
however none of these has specifically investigated the impact of the 
establishment of the economic and monetary union (EMU), nor has any of them 
covered to any appreciable extent the period following the EMU, nor studied the 
Euro Area exclusively. For example, Maudos and De Guevara (2004) studied 
the factors that explain interest margins in the banking sectors of the European 
Union, covering Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, while 
there was no attempt to distinctly make any comparative analysis between 
countries of the Euro Area and non-Euro Area, the studied period was 1993 – 
2000 when the Euro was not in circulation even though it was introduced in 
1999. The same could also be said of the study by Claeys and Vennet (2008) 
comparing Western European countries with the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) over 1994 – 2001; and Saunders and Schumacher (2000) 
whose study covered the pre-EMU period, 1988 – 1995, focusing on Germany, 
Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Switzerland and the United States of 
America (USA). 
More recent studies include Louri and Migiakis (2016) who study the 
determinants of bank margins in the Euro and non-Euro Areas. 
1.4 Tested Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1 
We hypothesize that the two efficient structure hypotheses, that is, the X-
efficiency, proxied by bank cost-to-income ratio (BMQCI) and S-efficiency, also 
proxied by bank total assets (BSIZE), both have a reducing impact on NIM in 
the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area. The X-efficiency refers to 
management efficiency, and the S-efficiency also refers to scale efficiency 
effects. We would however like to note that because the possible collapse of 
some large and complex banks could generate negative externalities that could 
cascade into the real economy, for which reason governments and regulatory 
authorities endeavour to prevent always, S-efficiency could have a positive 
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impact on NIM. This problem with large and complex financial institutions is 
what is often referred to in the banking literature as ‘too-big-to-fail’ (Dudley, 
2012) 
Hypothesis 2 
The degree of banking competition measured by the Boone indicator, the 
Lerner index and the Herfindhal-Hirschmann index (HHI), has a larger reducing 
impact on NIM in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area because of the 
effects of the EMU. While the H-statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model is the most 
widely applied competition measure in the banking literature, particularly for its 
simplicity, we do not include it in our analysis (Leon, 2014). This is because of 
the unsolved controversy surrounding the continuous nature of the H-statistic. 
Leon (2014) notes that, although in empirical studies the H-statistic is often 
considered as a continuum value the question remains unresolved. 
Hypothesis 3 
We hypothesize that percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC) 
has a more reducing effect on NIM in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area. 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
 For the foregoing purposes and as our laboratory for the tested 
hypotheses we deem the European Monetary Union (EMU) the natural choice 
where we contrast the dynamics in the Euro Area with the non-Euro Area. Our 
choice of the European EMU at this stage of our analysis is motivated by the 
fact that it has become the benchmark which all Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
monetary union endeavours mimic and are evaluated (Oshikoya et al, 2010). 
For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in their monetary union 
project agreed on five convergence criteria which mimic those employed by the 
EU in their adoption of the Euro (Oshikoya et al, 2010).  Given the general 
perception of the European monetary union, having been beneficial for its 
members, it has stimulated interest in monetary unions in regions outside 
Europe, including in Africa (Masson and Pattillo, 2005; Jefferis, 2007,). In this 
connection we extend our analysis of the European experience or monetary 
union project to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where we contrast our findings in the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) with the rest of non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in a pretty similar fashion. The 
remainder of the thesis is therefore structured as follows: 
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Chapter Two reviews the extant theoretical and empirical literature on 
the determinants of net interest margin. The two theoretical frameworks 
commonly used in investigating the determinants of net interest margin are the 
Ho and Saunders (1981) Dealer model, and Monti-Klein (1972) monopoly 
model.  Of the two models we review the Ho and Saunders (1981) dealer model 
since it is the most popular in empirical application, and in the empirical 
literature section review studies that have extended the model in investigating 
the determinants of net interest margins. 
Chapter Three considers that the theory of optimum currency areas 
(OCA), pioneered by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969), is 
the relevant theory that underpins any discussion on monetary integration in the 
context of articulating the conditions under which a monetary union thrives, and 
therefore discuss this and how it did help in shaping the EMU. We as well 
discuss the costs and benefits of the EMU, particularly in respect of the banking 
industry. 
 Recognizing that non-macroeconomic convergence has risk implications 
for the determination of NIMs, to the extent that the Euro and the non-Euro 
zones’ respective abilities to deal with economic shocks harmoniously will 
impact on the manner in which the respective macroeconomic environments will 
impact on the cost of financial intermediation, in this chapter we use the 
techniques of panel unit root and sigma convergence to test the extent to which 
the Euro and non-Euro Areas are converged on our selected macroeconomic 
variables. As a preliminary approach to testing convergence we employ the 
methods of graphical analyses and pairwise correlation matrices. We observe 
that while our macroeconomic variables are broadly converged in both zones, 
their average speed of convergence as measured by β is higher in the Non-
Euro Area than in the Euro Area, with the exception of GDP growth rate 
(GDPRGR) which average speed is higher in the Euro Area than in the Non-
Euro Area. 
We extend the same analysis to our Sub-Saharan African sample, but 
here only using the more robust test of panel unit root technique. The result 
indicate macroeconomic convergence in both the WAEMU and the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, but a higher speed of convergence in the 
non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa than in the WAEMU. 
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Chapter Four is our first and main empirical chapter aimed at testing the 
effect of monetary union environment on the determination of bank net interest 
margins. To this effect we use a total sample of 361 banks from the European 
Union, made up of 290 banks from the Euro Area, and 71 banks from the non-
Euro Area for the period 2002 - 2013, from across 16 countries, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
for the Euro Area; and Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania for the non-Euro Area. Our choice of the EU 
was motivated by the fact that the EU has become the model of monetary union 
arrangements on which all SSA monetary union endeavours are modelled. We 
use the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator which is robust to 
endogeneity problems and allows for the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable, and to control for unobserved heterogeneity between banks. We 
contrast our findings in the Euro Area with the non-Euro Area. Overall, while our 
hypotheses of a reducing impact on net interest margin from the presence of S-
efficiency, X-efficiency, our competition proxies (the Boone indicator, the Lerner 
index and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index) as well as our exchange rate 
stability proxy, are supported in both the Euro and Non-Euro Areas, we find the 
magnitude of the impact from these proxies, greater in the Euro Area than in the 
non-Euro Area. For the rest of our control variables which have a positive 
impact on NIM the results point to the more competitive environment of the Euro 
Area which facilitates a more moderating effect on NIM than in the non-
monetary union environment, that is, the Non-Euro Area. We find that the 
competition and efficiency effects that reduce net interest margins in the Euro 
Area derive from there being a well-developed single market with a strong 
socio-economic cohesion underpinning rather than the economic and monetary 
union which was found to be incomplete, because it lacked a fiscal and a 
political union, and therefore contributed to the European sovereign debt crisis. 
In chapter five our objective is to use our analysis for the European 
Union as a benchmark to extend the same level of analysis to evaluate the 
determination of net interest margins in a monetary union environment versus a 
non-monetary union environment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). We use a total 
sample of 185 banks, made up of 45 banks from the WAEMU and 140 banks 
from the non-monetary union SSA, from across 7 countries of the WAEMU and 
20 non-monetary union SSA countries. These are Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote 
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D’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo for the WAEMU; and Burundi, 
Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa for the non-monetary union 
SSA. Unexpectedly our tested hypotheses of a reducing impact from 
competition and percentage change in exchange rate on NIM, the presence of 
S-efficiency and X-efficiency are rather supported in the non-monetary SSA 
than in the WAEMU. This is puzzling and we attempt to provide answers. We 
find that it is the absence of a well-developed single market in the WAEMU 
which explains the unexpected effect of competition and efficiency on net 
interest margins in the region.   
Chapter Six summarises our findings in the entire thesis, makes policy 
recommendations, and sets the agenda for future research. In the final analysis 
conclude that it is rather the presence of a well-developed single market that 
engenders competition and efficiency effects to reduce bank net interest 
































2 CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Theoretical Background on Net Interest Margins 
When comparing a bank to an industrial organisation firm we are 
confronted with conceptual difficulties. For example, Klein (1971) notes that 
difficulty in being able to appropriately define bank input or output makes it 
presumptuous to speak of a production function relating the two. Given that, 
analyses by most models of the bank at the micro-level have solely focused on 
its intermediation role of allocating funds among competing stocks of assets in 
an environment characterised by risk or uncertainty (Klein, 1971). This is further 
reinforced by how regulators define what constitutes a bank when assessing 
which financial intermediaries need to abide by the prevailing prudential 
regulations for banks: “a bank is an institution whose current operations consist 
in granting loans and receiving deposits from the public” (Freixas and Rochet, 
2008). In this context it is in the interest of social welfare and bank regulators 
that this intermediation role is discharged with all the efficiency it requires. And 
one of the commonly used measures to gauge bank efficiency is the ratio of net 
interest margin (NIM), which underpinning theoretical and empirical modelling 
we now review. 
The theoretical literature on net interest margins (NIM) postulates two 
major approaches to modelling it. These are: the work of Ho and Saunders 
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(1981), who model the intermediation function of the bank as a passive dealer 
who is assumed to demand one type of deposit and supplies one type of loan, 
between providers and users of funds. The bank is assumed to make what the 
model calls “pure spread” which is determined by: (i) the level of risk aversion of 
bank management; (ii) the market structure of the operating environment of the 
bank; (iii) the average size of transactions carried out by the bank; and (iv) the 
variance of interest rates. The alternative model is the Monti-Klein (1972) model 
which applies standard theory from industrial organization, and uses a 
monopoly bank in which scenario it can be demonstrated that in the absence of 
default risk interest rates on loans and deposits can be determined separately 
(Monti, 1972, and Klein, 1971). In this model the banking firm is viewed in a 
static setting where demand for loans and supply of deposits are assumed to 
clear at the same time in the loan and deposits markets. This model was 
subsequently expounded by Zarruk (1989), Wong (1997) and Barajas, et al 
(1999). 
Of the two models the most widely used in empirical studies on the 
determinants of NIM which we also use in this thesis has tended to be the Ho 
and Saunders’ (1981) dealership model, but before we explore it in any further 
detail we look at the Monti-Klein (1972) monopoly model first.  
2.2 The Klein-Monti (1972) model 
The Klein-Monti (1972) model of bank behaviour is a prototype model of 
the so-called Industrial Organization approach to banking, and looks at the way 
banking firms react to their environment in an optimum fashion. Adapting from 
Freixas and Rochet (2008) the starting point of the Monti-Klein Model is the 
assumption that perfect competition may not be seen to be really appropriate for 
the banking industry given the existence of important entry barriers like 
regulatory/structural regulation, reputation, required expertise and sunk costs 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008). The model considers a representative, profit-
maximizing monopolistic bank facing a demand curve for loans L (rL) which 
slopes downward and a supply curve for deposits D (rD) with an upward slope. 
Taking the bank’s level of equity as given, it determines the amount of loans (L) 
and the amount of deposits (D), making them the bank’s decision variables. To 
derive the profit maximisation conditions of the bank its profit function is as 
follows, assuming the bank takes r as given, either as issuing from the central 
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bank or predetermined by the equilibrium rate prevailing on international capital 
markets:  
 𝜋 =  𝜋(𝐿, 𝐷) = (𝑟𝐿(𝐿) − 𝑟)𝐿 + (𝑟(1 −  𝛼) − 𝑟𝐷 (𝐷))𝐷 − 𝐶(𝐷, 𝐿) (2.1) 
 
The bank’s profit can be calculated as the sum of the intermediation 
margins on loans and on deposits minus management costs. Assuming 𝜋 is 
concave, so that the maximum of profits can be characterised by first order 
conditions, the first order conditions which equate marginal revenue and 
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 By way of introduction we write the elasticities of the demand for loans 
and the supply of deposits as: 
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The solution of (2.2) and (2.3), that is, rearranging can be characterised by: 
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Equations (2.5) and (2.6) state that the banking firm, having its 
operations in monopoly competition conditions, determines the prices of its loan 
and deposit services in such a manner that equates the Lerner indices to the 
inverse of the interest elasticity of the functions of loan demand and deposit 
supply. In that way, the less sensitive the functions of loan demand and deposit 
supply are to variations in interest rate, the greater the bank’s margin will be in 
both loan and deposit-taking operations and, therefore, the greater the bank’s 
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spread. The foregoing equations are just the adaptation of the familiar equalities 
between Lerner indices, computed as price minus cost divided by price, and 
inverse elasticities to the banking industry (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). This is 
such that the elasticity becomes smaller and the Lerner index higher when the 
bank wields market power in the deposits/loans market. This will mean a 
monopolistic bank will set the volumes of its loans and deposit in a manner that 
will equate the Lerner indices to their inverse elasticities. if, nonetheless, on 
financial markets other banks produce substitutes then intermediation margins 
will be adversely affected. For example, if households are able to access funds 
from the money market as substitutes to bank deposits, or similarly when firms 
are able to access the capital markets instead of contracting bank loans for their 
operations intermediation margins will be adversely affected.  
2.3 Ho and Saunders (1981) Dealer Model 
The mechanics of the Ho and Saunders (1981) dealership model were 
demonstrated in a seminal paper which was born out of the inadequacies of the 
models at the time in explaining bank behaviour when growing concerns by 
bankers and regulators over trends in interest rate volatility that harmed banks’ 
interest margins were rife; and as well only a few theoretical models that had 
been put forward to explicitly analyse the determination of bank interest margins 
existed4.  The starting point of the Ho and Saunders (1981) dealer model is that 
in exercising the function of a dealer, that is, demanding one type of deposit and 
supplying one type of loan the bank faces a huge uncertainty and therefore 
cost. This cost derives from the fact that in providing immediacy of loan supply 
and deposit-taking the bank faces uncertainty engendered by deposit-taking 
and loan demands that come at different times. Therefore, it becomes 
necessary that the bank is compensated for this cost by charging an interest 
spread which is positive for the price of immediacy provision on loan and 
deposit services. And that even in a highly competitive environment this positive 
spread would exist for as long as transactions uncertainty exists. Central to the 
model is the proposition that the interest spread which they call pure spread or 
margin is the optimal sum of fees or mark-up on deposit-taking and loan supply, 
and depends on the following four factors: (i) the degree of risk aversion of bank 
                                            
4
 The hedging hypothesis and those models with its roots in the microeconomics of the banking 
firm and reviewed by Pyle (1972) and Baltensperger (1980) were some of such models. 
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management; (ii) the structure of the market in which the bank operates; (iii) the 
average size of bank transactions; and (iv) the variance of interest rates (Ho 
and Saunders,1981). The dealer model consists of a two-step approach 
whereby Ho and Saunders (1981) estimate the size of the pure margin by 
taking account of a number of market imperfections and regulatory restrictions, 
not explicitly considered in the theoretical model, which are, nonetheless, 
deemed likely to affect the true spread derived from the bank balance sheet and 
income statement. These factors are the probability of loan defaults, the cost of 
implicit interest payments on deposits and the opportunity cost of required 
reserves. These idiosyncratic factors unique to an individual bank are then used 
to derive the ‘pure’ spread or interest margin which is constant across all banks 
and represented by the intercept of a cross-sectional regression. In the second 
step using the pure spread as the dependent variable the empirical relationship 
between the pure spread and (i) the degree of risk aversion of bank 
management; (ii) the structure of the market in which the bank operates; (iii) the 
average size of bank transactions; and (iv) the variance of interest rates (Ho 
and Saunders, 1981) is then tested.  
The basic assumption in the derivation of the intermediation margin in 
this model is that the bank is considered viewed as a risk-averse dealer in the 
credit market with the function of intermediating between the provision of loan 
and deposit-taking. A further assumption is a one-period planning horizon 
whereby the bank is deemed to sets interest rates at the beginning of the 
period, to remain constant for the whole period, before any deposit or loan 
business is transacted. The bank is also assumed to aim at maximizing the 
expected utility of terminal wealth. The risk averse bank has to solve the 
problem of asynchronous outflow of loans, and inflow of deposits in time and 
must set interest rates on loans 𝑟𝐿 and deposits 𝑟𝐷 optimally in order to 
minimise the risk issuing from interest rates uncertainty in the money markets 
from where funds need to be obtained should there be excessive loan demand 
or inadequate supply of deposits. The risk of interest rate uncertainty manifests 
itself as follows: supposing a deposit is made at the bank at some long-term 
rate 𝑟𝐷 , if this deposit arrival does not meet an instant demand for loans, the 
bank will need to temporarily invest the funds in the money market at the short-
term risk-free rate 𝑟, in which case the bank faces a reinvestment risk at the 
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end of the decision period should the short-rate fall. Conversely, if a new loan 
demand is not met by a corresponding deposit flow, the bank would need to fall 
on to short-term borrowings in the money market at rate 𝑟 to fund the loan 
demand. In this particular instance should the short-term rate 𝑟 rise the bank will 
be facing a refinancing risk at the end of the decision period. Given the two 
scenarios they as a result set their interest rates as a margin in relation to the 
money market interest rate 𝑟, that is the expected risk-free or market interest 
rate, as follows: 
 
 𝑟𝐷 = 𝑟 − 𝑎 (2.7) 
 
 𝑟𝐿 = 𝑟 + 𝑏 (2.8) 
 
where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the margins set by the banks in relation to the money 
market interest rate for deposits and loans respectively, indeed the risk premia 
charged to compensate for the transaction risk involved in financial 
intermediation. In this case the optimal, expected utility-maximizing, deposit and 
loan rates or deposit-loan interest spread(s) or margin can be written as5: 
 
 𝑠 =  𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 (2.9) 
 
In the final analysis Ho and Saunders (1981) demonstrate that the 
deposit-loan interest spread(s) or margin where the risk-averse profit-
maximizing bank maximizes its utility of terminal wealth is a function of the 
competitive conditions and a risk-adjustment term and can be expressed as: 
 
 









The first term or α/β is the ratio of the intercept (α) and slope (β) of the 
symmetric deposit and loan arrival functions and measures the monopoly rent 
element in bank spreads or margins. The size of the risk-adjustment term 
                                            
5
 Both the Monti-Klein and Ho & Saunders models assume that banks exercise market power in 
determining the interest rates on loans and on deposits, which is a feature both models share in 
common (Costa Da Silva et al., 2007) 
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, interest rate volatility; and (iii) 𝑄, transaction size. Increased 
competition or lower market power (α/β) lowers net interest margin s. Degree of 
risk aversion 𝑅 determines the size of the risk premium charged. If risk appetite 
increases, that is, 𝑅 decreases, the risk premium charged is smaller and net 
interest margins decrease. 
In sum the model assumes that the most important determinants of bank 
interest margins are the degree of risk aversion, the market structure, the 
average size of bank transactions and the variance on the interest rate on loans 
and deposits.  
The Ho and Saunders (1981) model unlike the Monti-Klein (1972) one, 
assumes that the bank is a risk-averse agent. In other words, the bank’s 
ultimate goal is to maximise the expected utility of profit rather than to maximise 
expected profit (Costa da Silva et al, 2007). Using Taylor series expansion to 
obtain the bank’s expected utility of wealth (U(w)) the first order conditions yield 
the intermediation margin as demonstrated by Ho and Saunders (1981). We 
follow Maudos and De Guevara (2004) who rather incorporate the influence of 
credit risk and operating costs to demonstrate the mechanics although we do 
not demonstrate the full derivation here. Maudos and De Guevara (2004) 
demonstrate that the optimum spread (s*) is given by:  
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+ (𝐿 + 𝐷) 𝜎𝑀




where 𝛼𝐷 is the linear intercept of a possibility of a deposit at the bank 
probability function; 𝛽𝐷 is the sensitivity of the probability that a deposit is being 
made at the bank to variations in the deposit interest rate; 𝛼𝐿 is the linear 
intercept of the probability function of 𝑎; 𝛽𝐿 is loan application sensitivity to 
variations in the credit operation interest rate; 𝐶(𝐿)/𝐿 is the average cost of 
credit operation; 𝐶(𝐷)/𝐷 is the mean cost of deposit-taking operations; 𝑊 is 
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the bank’s final stock of wealth; - [
𝑈"(?̅̅̅̅?)
𝑈′(?̅̅̅̅?)
] is the bank’s absolute degree of risk 
aversion; 𝜎𝐿
2 is the standard deviation of the yield on loans (a measure of the 
bank’s credit risk); 𝜎𝑀
2  is the standard deviation of the yield on 
applications/loans on the inter-bank market (a measure of the bank’s interest 
rate risk); 𝜎𝐿𝑀 is the co-variance between credit risk and interest rate risk; 𝐿0 is 
the bank’s starting stock of loans; and 𝑀0 is the bank’s initial net position on the 
inter-bank market. 
In conclusion, as per the theoretical model employed by Maudos and De 
Guevara (2004), and abstracting from equation 2.1 the determinants of interest 
margins are as follows: 






). The logic is that 
banks will require a positive margin to be able to cover operating costs. 
 The competitive structure of the market, which depends on the interest 
elasticity of the demand for loans, and the supply of deposits. In which 
case the less elastic the demand for loans or supply of deposits, the less 
the value of 𝛽 will be. And the bank will be able to charge high interest 
margin in the case of the exercise of monopoly power. This explains the 
inclusion of 𝛼 𝛽⁄  as a proxy for possible monopoly profits implicit in 
margins  
 The assumption that the bank is risk averse: - [
𝑈"(?̅̅̅̅?)
𝑈′(?̅̅̅̅?)
], and that the more 
risk-averse banks will charge higher margins.  
 The volatility of money market interest rates: 𝜎𝑀
2 . Obviously the more 
volatile they are the greater the market risk which will reflect in higher 
margins. 
 The credit risk: 𝜎𝐿
2. The higher the risk of default on loans the higher will 
be the margin charged by the bank. 
 The covariance or interaction between loan risk and interest rate risk 
captured by the variable 𝜎𝐿𝑀.  
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 The average size of the credit and deposit operations undertaken by the 
bank, also captured by the term 𝐿 + 𝐷, and the total volume of 
credits:𝐿 + 2𝐿0 . 
The model postulates that the unit margins are an increasing function of 
the average size of operations. This is because for any value of credit risk as 
well as market risk, a greater size operation would imply a greater potential loss 
and hence the need for a greater margin. Similarly, for banks with greater 
volume of loans the potential loss will be greater. 
As can be appreciated the Ho and Saunders (1981) model provides a 
simple, yet formidable theoretical framework that explains the interest rate 
spread and readily lends itself to application. This notwithstanding it is fraught 
with some important limitations (Brissimis and Vlassopoulos, 2007). In 
particular, this model takes no account of the credit risk inherent in loans or the 
production cost associated with the intermediation process. It also assumes that 
the bank accepts only one type of deposit and offers only one type of loan. 
Claeys and Vennet (2008) also state that one drawback of the Ho and 
Saunders approach is that, although bank-specific variables are used to 
determine pure bank margins, it does not take into account the possible 
heterogeneity across banks, both within the same market and over different 
countries. Subsequent empirical studies address these limitations of the original 
model, as demonstrated in Maudos and De Guevara (2003) in the foregoing 
theoretical application, through more comprehensive variations of the dealer 
model (Brissimis and Vlassopoulos, 2007) which we now turn to in the next 
section. 
2.4 Empirical Literature on Net Interest Margins 
Empirical literature on NIM abound and we do not attempt to cover it in 
full. We will instead focus on results of typical studies which made more 
comprehensive variations to the dealer model and are relevant to the variables 
we intend to employ in our study.  
Following on from Ho and Saunders’s (1981) the intuition that extending 
their dealership model from a structure with one kind of loan and deposit to 
loans and deposits with many maturities would lead to further interesting 
insights into margin determination especially as 'portfolio' effects may become 
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apparent Allen (1988) presents an extension of the model in which the bank 
offers numerous types of deposits and loans. Her model shows that the 
dispersion of the uncertainty-associated risk across more banking products 
reduces the interest rate spread that such uncertainty can justify. She 
demonstrated that pure interest spreads may be reduced when cross-
elasticities of demand between bank products are considered. And that the 
resulting diversification benefits may come from a type of portfolio effect 
whereby there is an interdependence of demands across bank products.  
Mcshane and Sharpe (1984) empirically test the dealership model of Ho 
and Saunders (1981) in the context of Australian trading banks. They find that a 
non-linear relationship exists between Australian trading bank net loan/deposit 
interest margins and market power measures, degree of absolute risk aversion, 
and interest rate uncertainty. This may be due to the fact that when banks 
become very large, the effect of size could be negative beyond a certain point of 
initial enjoyment of scale economies, due to bureaucratic or other reasons like 
agency problems, control problems and all the difficulties and costs associated 
with managing large institutions. 
Employing data for different classes of banks in the US over the period 
1989 – 1993 Angbazo (1997) extends the Ho and Saunders (1981) dealership 
model by incorporating credit risk, interest rate risk and the interaction between 
these risks into the model to analyse the empirical determinants of bank net 
interest margins by testing the hypothesis that banks with poor loans quality, as 
well as exposed to higher interest-rate risk would charge higher net interest 
margins. Overall, his findings are that bank interest margins are related 
positively with credit default risk, interest rate risk, core capital, non-interest 
bearing reserves, and management quality, and negatively related to liquidity. 
The negative relationship between NIM and liquidity may be due to the fact that 
as the proportion of funds invested in cash or cash equivalents increases, a 
bank's liquidity risk declines, thereby warranting a lower liquidity premium in the 
net interest margins and hence a negative relationship with NIM.  
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) also extend the dealership model to a 
multi-country setting where they find that bank interest margins are made up of 
regulatory, market structure, and a risk premium components, where they 
classify the regulatory components as the form of interest-rate restrictions on 
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deposits, reserve requirements and capital-to-asset ratios and find that they 
have a significant impact on banks NIMs.  
Brock & Saurez (2000) embark on a multi-country study of five Latin 
American countries made up of Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Argentina and Columbia, 
over the period 1991 to 1996, employing the Ho and Saunders (1981) two-step 
framework, and find that for Latin America, interest margins are determined by 
capital and liquidity risk, at the bank level, and at the macroeconomic level by, 
inflation, GDP growth and interest rate risk. While they observe differences 
between the results of the Latin American study and the benchmark results of 
Western Europe and the United States, they attribute the disparities to 
distortions caused by regulatory systems which are inadequate and allow weak 
banks to remain in operation, financial reporting standards which could not be 
trusted and result in misstated bank capital, and excessive risk-taking on the 
part of banks motivated by massive government guarantees.  
Maudos and Guevara (2004) in a single-stage study of the determinants 
of net interest income in the banking sectors of Germany, France, UK, Italy and 
Spain, over the period 1993 to 2000, employ the dealer model where they 
incorporate operating costs. They find that the “pure” interest margin is 
impacted by competitive market conditions, the credit default risk, the interest 
rate risk, the average operating expenses and banks’ risk aversion. They also 
observe that other determinants not included explicitly in the estimation, such as 
opportunity cost of reserves, implicit interest payment and management quality 
also caused variations in interest margin. A distinguishing feature of the study is 
the incorporation into the modelling of the interest margin the Lerner index as a 
direct measure of the degree of competition, the influence of operating costs, as 
well as default risk. 
Peria and Mody (2004) also include foreign participation and 
concentration in a study of bank spreads in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru during the late 1990s, employing bank-level data from. They find the 
spread of foreign banks, particularly the de novo foreign banks to be lower than 
those that entered through acquisitions, and that the overall influence was 
achieved via foreign bank participation effect on administrative cost. Again bank 
concentration was found to have a positive relationship with higher spreads as 
well as costs. 
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Again in Latin America Gelos (2006) examine intermediation spreads 
which he finds are high by international standards. Using bank and country-level 
data from 85 countries, including 14 Latin American economies he examines 
the determinants of bank interest margins in that region. Their results point to 
higher interest rates, less efficient banks, and larger reserve requirements in 
Latin American banks, having a significant impact on bank spreads, than their 
peers in other regions. In other areas like inflation and bank profit taxation that 
are important in the determination of cost of financial intermediation they do not 
find that Latin American banks differ significantly from their peers. 
Valverde and Rodríguez (2007) study the determinants of bank margins 
in the banking sectors of Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden using a sample of 19,322 banks over the period 
1994-2001; extending the model using a multi-output model. With the objective 
of analysing the relationship between bank margins and specialization, thereby 
underscoring the importance of non-traditional activities they find a significant 
relationship between specialization and bank interest margins. Nonetheless this 
finding is only fully observed when considering such New Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (NEIO) indicators as the Lerner index proxy for bank margins.  
Claeys and Vennet (2008) study the effect of low degree of efficiency, 
non-competitive market behaviour, controlling for the influences of 
macroeconomic environment, foreign bank ownership as well as state bank 
ownership in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). They also do 
a comparative analysis with the banking sectors of the Western European 
countries to ascertain whether the determinants of the CEEC economies were 
converging to those in the Western European economies. The single most 
important finding in Claeys and Vennet (2008) noted by Chortareas et al. (2011) 
is that changes in regulation, that is via increased capital requirements, for 
example, result in banks engaging in riskier activities which increase their 
margins before the effects of competition reduce them. 
Maudos and Solis (2009) model the Mexican net interest margins 
simultaneously including operating costs and diversification and specialization 
as determinants. Their results show that in the Mexican context high margins 
can be mainly attributed to average operating costs and market power, 
measured by the Lerner index for total banking activity. 
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 From the foregoing studies which extend the Ho and Saunder’s (1981) 
dealership model it could be said that in the literature on bank efficiency and for 
that matter NIM, it is normally expressed as a function of internal and external 
factors. The internal determinants emanate from factors specific to a bank over 
which bank management has control, while the external determinants derive 
from the industry, economic and legal environments that affect the operations 
and performance of the bank (Athanasoglou et al., 2008), but outside the 
control of the bank. Accordingly, variables used to study the determinants of 
NIM are categorised in the literature as being bank-specific, industry/market-
specific, economic and regulatory depending on the nature and purpose of the 
empirical enquiry. It could also be gleaned from the foregoing empirical 
investigations that studies documented so far in the literature are either single-
country (Mcshane and Sharpe, 1984) or cross-country studies (Saunders and 
Schumacher, 2000). 
2.5 Some Documented Econometric Relationships between 
Typical Variables Used in Empirical Studies of the 
Determinants of Net Interest Margins 
In the empirical modelling of the determinants of NIM, size is 
incorporated to account for the inherent economies and diseconomies that 
obtain in the market. The general perspective in the extant literature is that size 
is closely related to capital adequacy of a bank, since larger banks seem to 
raise cheaper capital and by extension able to make more profits because of 
higher interest margins resulting from the exercise of market power. Claeys and 
Vennet (2008) incorporate size in their study of the determinants of NIM in the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) in the shape of market share 
which they calculated as bank i’s share of assets at time t in country j’s total 
bank assets at time t, to proxy for relative market power6. They find that in the 
accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe the coefficient on the market 
share variable is not significant, which means, larger banks are not in a position 
to exploit their market power to achieve higher rents in terms of higher interest 
margins (Claeys and Vennet, 2008). The most plausible explanation of Claeys 
and Vennet’s (2008) result is the benefit of increased foreign bank participation 
                                            
6
 This is not the norm in the extant literature as most studies use the Lerner index 
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in terms of higher efficiency and competition for CEEC banking sectors 
following their accession (Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2010). This finding 
seems to be corroborated by Berger et al (1987) who suggests that there could 
only be little cost saving by increasing the size of a bank. This seems to 
contrast with Short (1979) who is quoted in Athanasoglou et al (2008) as 
arguing that size is closely related to capital adequacy of a bank since larger 
banks seem to raise cheaper capital and by extension able to make more 
profits. 
As regards the place of the management of risks in the determination of 
NIM two types of risks namely, credit and liquidity risks, have been identified in 
the literature. Credit risk applies to the possibility that an asset or a loan cannot 
be recovered should there be a default, or the risk of an unexpected delay in a 
loan repayment (Heffernan, 2005). Heffernan (2005) again defines risk of 
liquidity as the possibility that there would be insufficient funds to meet the 
ordinary operating needs of the banking firm. Also to control for risk appetite, 
empirical works have found several ways to incorporate Ho and Saunders 
(1981) original idea of absolute risk aversion in a bank’s utility function (Gunter 
et al, 2013). Gunter et al (2013) aver that, in empirical work linking risk appetite 
to credit risk-related variables like loan loss provisions and/or the nonperforming 
loan ratio has become common place. Angbazo (1997) also confirms the gains 
in diversification in bank margins by allowing for multiple and different loan and 
deposit types. Therefore, this is all the more reason why Gunter et al (2013) 
suggest that when asset structure is controlled it could help in highlighting the 
partial influence of other risk appetite variables on interest margins Maudos and 
de Guevara (2004) suggest that credit risk requires that banks implicitly include 
a risk premium in interest rates and therefore the net interest margin. In the 
literature liquidity risk is expected to be positively related to NIM since banks 
tend to pass their liquidity risks to customers through increasing interest 
margins (Chortareas et al, 2011). Brock and Suarez (2000) use the ratio of 
short-term assets to total deposits to proxy liquidity risk and find that liquidity 
risk, is positively related to the spread for all the studied countries, and 
statistically significant for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, which results reflect the 
industrialised economy benchmark and also the impact of holding low-yielding 
short-term assets. This is a finding also arrived at by Chortareas et al (2011) in 
some Latin American countries. 
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Also in the empirical literature is found support for the notion that high 
operating costs raise interest margins and therefore the need to incorporate it 
into the model of NIM determinants. The idea of bank costs is generally deemed 
in the literature to be related to the efficiency of management. Sharma and 
Gounder (2011) for example defined quality of management as the ratio of 
operating expenses to gross income, that is, the operating costs necessary to 
generate one unit of gross income; in which case higher bank management 
quality is associated with higher interest margins, in that a high management 
quality means the ability to raise low cost liabilities and invest in highly profitable 
assets (Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and Guevara, 2004). Thus, a rising ratio 
indicates a falling quality of bank management and therefore a lower NIM and 
hence a negative expected sign. Athanasoglou et al (2008) also quote 
Molyneaux and Thornton (1992) as finding a positive relationship between 
better-quality management and profitability. 
On structural effects on NIM two alternative hypotheses come to the fore: 
the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (SCP) and the efficient structure 
hypothesis (ESH) which are rooted in the industrial organization literature on 
bank structure and efficiency.  Berger (1995), Goldberg and Rai (1996), and 
Vander Vennet (2002) have explored the literature on the relationship between 
the overall bank profitability and market structure within the context of these two 
hypotheses, giving four different explanations to them. Similarly, Claeys and 
Vennet (2008) extend this analysis to the relationship between bank interest 
margins and market structure. According to Claeys and Vennet (2008) the 
traditional SCP posits that the positive relationship between margins and market 
structure is a reflection of non-competitive pricing behaviour in more 
concentrated markets. The relative-market-power hypothesis (RMP), which is a 
related theory, also states that the ability to exercise market power in loan 
pricing to earn higher interest margins can only be displayed by banks with 
large market shares. Other alternative explanations also available to explain the 
positive relationship between interest margins and the presence of market 
concentration or market share are the two efficient structure hypotheses, 
postulated by Demsetz (1973). On these hypotheses Berger (1995) states that 
it is efficiency that drives the positive profit-structure relationship and that the 
relationship in itself is of no direct origin. Formally stated the efficient-structure 
(ES) hypothesis says that variations in interest margins derive from differences 
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in either the operational efficiency across banks, designated by X-efficiency (X-
ES) or the efficient scale at which some banks produce than their peers, also 
designated by scale-efficiency (S-ES). The X-efficiency (X-ES) version states 
that lower cost in some banks may be either as result of superior management 
or production technologies, in which case such banks are able to offer more 
competitive interest rates on loans and deposits, resulting in a negative 
relationship between operational efficiency and interest margins. To the extent 
that these firms are assumed to gain larger market shares, the market may 
become more concentrated in the final analysis. The other explanation based 
on the scale-efficiency (S-ES) version of the ES hypothesis is that some firms 
produce at a more efficient scale than their peers, which will be in the end 
translated into smaller margins given the competitive market conditions. If this 
efficiency leads to increase the market share of the firms assumed to be 
efficient then it would lead to higher market concentration (Claeys and Vennet, 
2008).  
To the extent that changes in the macroeconomic conditions affect the 
banking system as a whole and influence the NIM the last major class of 
determinants of NIM incorporated in most studies of the literature are 
macroeconomic control variables. The variables which are commonly employed 
are the inflation rate, the long-term interest rate and/or the growth rate of money 
supply. Gunter et al (2013) asserts that most empirical studies use GDP growth 
as a control variable and is assumed to have a positive correlation. Claeys and 
Vennet (2008) used real GDP growth as a proxy for business cycle fluctuations 
and find a positive correlation between the business cycle and bank margins. 
This means economic boom or higher economic growth is associated with 
higher bank margins, reflecting more granting of credit and lower incidence of 
credit default rates in such periods. Claeys and Vennet (2008) note that this 
finding is typical of the Western European bank markets. Many papers also 
consider market interest rates of different maturities. Also Chortareas et al 
(2011) control for average annual market interest rate and find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between NIM and the average annual 
interest rate in Colombia and a negative relationship in Argentina.  
Athanasoglou et al (2008) also mention Revell (1979) as introducing the 
issue of the relationship between bank profitability and inflation. He notes that 
the effect of inflation on bank profitability depends on whether banks’ wages 
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and other operating expenses increase at a faster rate than inflation. They as 
well mention Perry (1992) as stating that the effect of inflation on bank 
profitability is dependent on whether inflation is fully anticipated, so that interest 
rates could be adjusted accordingly by the management of bank to increase 
their revenues faster that their costs to achieve higher economic profits. The 
literature is replete with studies that have evidence of a positive relationship 
between either inflation or long-term interest rate and profitability. Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2000) find that while the impact of inflation on profitability 
may not be very significant, it is positive. Claeys and Vennet (2008) also 
conclude that lower inflation (and decreasing inflation expectations) has a 
relatively considerable reducing effect on long-term interest rates than short-
term interest rate, resulting in a reducing impact on interest margins. 
2.6 Empirical studies on Africa 
Most of the studies investigating the determinants of net interest margins 
are focused on the developed countries, notably the US and the Western 
European countries and to a lesser extent Latin America and Asia. Studies on 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively few. For example, in a study of 
bank efficiency in 10 Sub-Saharan African countries using stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) Chen (2009) note that research on emerging economies is quite 
recent, and that studies on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) banks for example, are 
relatively few partly as a result of low level of financial development and lack of 
quality data.  
Both cross-country and single-country studies employing the Ho and 
Saunders (1981) dealership model do obtain in Africa. Notable among these are 
single-country studies by Naceur & Goaied (2010) in Tunisia, Khediri and 
Khediri (2011) also in Tunisia, Chirwa and Mlachila (2002) in Malawi, and Beck 
and Hesse (2009) in Uganda, and Aboagye et al (2008) in Ghana. Among 
cross-country studies for Sub-Saharan Africa are: Flamini et al (2009), 
Folawewo and Tennant (2008), Ahokpossi (2013), and Boutin-Dufresne et al 
(2013). 
Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) set out to study the particularly high interest 
rate spreads in the aftermath of the financial sector reforms in Malawi and find 
that high monopoly power, high reserve requirements, high central bank 
discount rate and high inflation were the responsible factors. 
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Naceur & Goaied (2010) investigate the determinants of bank interest 
margins and profitability in the Tunisian banking industry for the period1980-
2000. For a considerable portion of the within country variations in interest 
margins and profitability they find that individual bank-specific factors were 
responsible. For example, high net interest margins and profitability tend to be 
positively correlated with banks that hold a relatively high amount of capital, as 
well as large overhead costs. They also find bank size to be negatively related 
with profitability, meaning Tunisian banks are operating above their optimum 
level of profitability. They lastly find macroeconomic variables not to have any 
impact on the profitability of Tunisian banks. 
Ben Khediri and Ben-Khedhiri (2011) investigate the determinants of Net 
Interest Margins (NIM) in Tunisia employing the dealership model of Ho and 
Saunders, (1981). They find operating costs and bank capital to be positively 
correlated with interest margin, and thus showing consistency with the Ho and 
Saunders (1981) model. Additionally, they find NIM to be positively associated 
with opportunity costs of bank reserves, implicit interest payments and also 
negatively associated with management quality.  
Using a sample of 456 banks in 41 Sub-Saharan African countries over 
1995 to 2008 Ahokpossi (2013) demonstrate that bank-specific factors such as 
credit risk, liquidity risk and bank equity are important in the determination of 
bank interest margins. As regards the macroeconomic environment, while 
inflation is sensitive to bank interest margins, economic growth is not. 
In a study of bank interest margins in Ghana, Aboagye et al (2008) find 
that an increase in the following factors increases the net interest margins of 
banks. Net interest margin is found to be positively related to market power, 
bank size, staff costs, administrative costs, extent to which a bank is risk averse 
and inflation. On the other hand, the study finds a negative relationship of bank 
interest margins with excess reserves of banks, central bank lending rate and 
management efficiency. 
Beck and Hesse (2006) also study the persistently high interest rate 
spreads and margins in the Ugandan banking system using bank-level dataset. 
They find that while foreign banks had lower interest rate spreads, interest 
spread is not sensitive to privatization, foreign bank entry, market structure and 
banking efficiency. In pretty much the same way, the macroeconomic 
environment explained little of the over-time variation in bank spreads. Rather 
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bank-specific variables, namely, bank size, operating costs, and composition of 
loan portfolio, explained a large proportion of cross-bank, cross-time variation in 
spreads and margins. These findings seem to run counter to the view 
expressed by Chirwa and Mlachila (2002), who lament the failure of spreads in 
developing countries to converge to international levels even after financial 
liberalization. They suggest that high interest rate spreads in developing 
countries will persist if financial sector reforms ‘do not significantly alter the 
structure within which banks operate’ (Chirwa and Mlachila, 2002), whereby 
structure refers to the market/industry and macroeconomic environment in 
developing countries.  
Folawewo and Tennant (2008) also study the determinants of spreads 
between banks’ deposit and lending rates in SSA countries from the 
perspectives of market and macroeconomic environments, employing a 
dynamic panel model for 33 countries. They find that different market and 
macroeconomic policy variables, such as the extent of government crowding 
out in the banking sector, public sector deficits, discount rate, level of inflation, 
level money supply, reserve requirement, level of economic development, and 
population size are important in explaining variations in interest rate spreads in 
SSA countries. 
Lastly, Boutin-Dufresne et al (2013) study the determinants of net 
interest margins across four regional blocks in Sub-Saharan Africa and did a 
comparative analysis with the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union and find that 
high operating costs and a high equity capital and institutional actors such as 
the rule of law, are the most important factors explaining the high interest 
margins in the East African Community (EAC) compared to other sub-regions. 
Overall it might also appear the generally high bank spreads in the Sub-
Saharan African region could be explained by high switching costs between 
banks for bank customers which tend to slack competition among banks 
resulting in high bank spreads. For example, Cihak and Podpiera (2005) find in 
the Kenyan banking sector that while competition is predominant among the top 
tier corporate clients most other customers are often tied to one bank, with very 
high switching costs. 
It is clear from the foregoing review of both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the determinants of net interest margin (NIM) that a model 
incorporating the role of monetary union membership has never been 
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investigated. In this context we extend the literature by demonstrating that given 
the competition and efficiency implications for NIM in a monetary union the 
relationship between bank margins and competition measures varies 
significantly across banks in a monetary union and a non-monetary union 
respectively. 
In this chapter we have attempted to review the extant theoretical and 
empirical literature that explain the behaviour of bank net interest margin and its 
determinants. We first looked at the mechanics of the two main theoretical 
models namely, the Monti-Klein (1972) model and the Ho and Saunders (1981) 
dealer model, that are available for the study of bank net interest margins and it 
determinants. We next looked at how the most popular of the two, that is, the 
Ho and Saunders (1981) dealer model has been extended variously in empirical 
investigation in both single-country and cross-country studies. In these studies, 
we note that generally factors that are found to have impact on bank net interest 
margin are classified as being bank-specific, market/industry related and 
macroeconomic in nature. countries. While we note that studies on Africa are 
scanty, we reviewed some selected few in both single-country and cross-
country investigations. Overall results of all the cited empirical investigations of 




3 CHAPTER THREE 
THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY 
AREA (OCA), CONVERGENCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY 
UNION (EMU), THE NON-EURO AREA, THE 
WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND 
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MONETARY UNION (WAEMU) AND THE 
NON-MONETARY UNION SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
3.1 Historical background of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union  
The Economic and Monetary Union in the European union can be 
characterised as Europe’s desire to achieve full liberalisation of capital 
movements, the total convertibility of Member States’ currencies and the 
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates. Historically the European monetary and 
economic union could be traced to the sentiments that swept the United States 
and Europe during the second world war; one of a desire for the restructuring of 
international financial relations which gave birth to the Bretton Woods 
agreements which laid down the rules and procedures governing the world 
economy in 1944. The Bretton Woods agreements having been born out of the 
need for international cooperation to avert further suffering caused by the 
Second World War and the subsequent setting up of the United Nations (UN). 
In Europe specifically this need for cooperation led to the first foundations of the 
European Union, in the shape of the three Treaties, the first two bringing 
together six signatory States (Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands). These treaties were: 
1. The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), signed on 18 April 1951. 
2. The Rome Treaties, that is, the treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and that establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM), signed in March 1957. 
3. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
Further developments led to the desire for a European integration, the 
pursuit of which culminated in a proposed phased Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) by the Delors Commission in 1989. The proposals made by the 
Delors Commission were formalised in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty, which had 
as its first stage of implementation economic convergence criteria for the 
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adoption of the common currency. By this provision, countries which were to 
become part of the union were then those deemed to have met a convergence 
criteria set out by the treaty. Apart from aspects of this criteria on and respect 
for human rights, as well as stable democratic credentials the primary economic 
convergence criteria were nominal convergence of certain macroeconomic 
indicators to the levels aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and the 
stability of the single currency within the EMU (Kowalski (2003) in Drastichova 
and Ostrava (2012)). The details of the criteria are that inflation should not 
exceed the three best-performing member states’ economies by 1.5 percentage 
points; budget deficit should also not exceed 3 percent of GDP; gross public 
debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP; and interest rates should be the 
average of the lowest six countries of the union plus 2 percentage points; all to 
ensure member states were converged to low fiscal deficits, low rates of 
inflation and stable exchange rates.  
 
The second stage of the economic integration and monetary union 
process was the establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) as a 
precursor to the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB). With the 
establishment of the ECB member states had to relinquish their control of 
monetary policy to it. The treaty described the competencies of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and of the governments and central banks of the twelve 
Euro area countries with regard to the issuing of euro cash. It gave the ECB the 
exclusive right to authorise the issuance of banknotes within the euro area, but 
also extended this right of issuance to the national central banks (NCBs). 
Nevertheless, given that the ECB has no cash operations role, it is the NCBs 
that actually put the banknotes into circulation and withdraw, process and store 
them. 
The third and final stage of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty 
was the introduction of the single currency, the Euro, with conversion rates 
being fixed irrevocably for the former national currencies and a single monetary 
policy conducted by the ECB. However, the Euro bank notes and coins did not 
begin circulation as a legal tender until January 2002. The single currency was 
in the view of the European Commission complimentary to the single market. 
The Single Market is a common market for all goods and services in the 
European Union which, although has its origins in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
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officially launched in 1993. It is a creation which refers to the European Union 
as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the 
free movement of goods and services. Although some of the single market 
legislation remains to be implemented in member states it is believed to have 
stimulated competition and trade, improved efficiency, quality, price cuts, and 
fuelled economic growth. And it is lauded as one of the EU’s greatest 
achievements (europa.eu). 
3.2 The OCA Theory in Shaping the European EMU 
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA), pioneered by Mundell 
(1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969), is the relevant theory that 
underpins any discussion on monetary integration in the context of articulating 
the conditions under which a monetary union thrives. Therefore, the pioneering 
work of the proponents of the OCA theory and for that matter the inception of 
the proliferation of literature on the OCA theory dates back to the 1960s; 
emerging from debates on the merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate 
regimes, as well as the comparison of several features of the US and European 
economies (Mongelli, 2008). An optimal currency area can be defined as the 
optimal geographical area for a single currency, or for several currencies, 
whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged (Mongelli, 2008). Mundell (1961) 
defines the optimum currency area as a region in which production factors are 
internally mobile but immobile internationally, to facilitate the intra-regional 
redistribution of resources in response to demand shifts. Proponents of the 
Optimum Currency Area theory, Mundell (1961), Mckinnon (1963), and Kenen 
(1969), together with other seminal contributors, such as, Friedman (1953) and 
Ingram (1962) characterize the Optimum currency area as a region where the 
following features must as of necessity be observed: 
• Mobility of labour and other factors of production:  
where Mundell (1961) believe that high factor market integration within a 
group of countries that come together to form a currency union can 
reduce the need to change real factor prices and the nominal exchange 
rate between countries in response to shocks (Mundell (1961) 
• Economic openness: 
McKinnon (1963) demonstrates the need for a group of countries 
contemplating a currency union to show economic openness, where they 
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are deemed to be open to trade among themselves and with the rest of 
the world. The assumption is that the higher the degree of openness, the 
more changes in international prices of tradables are likely to be 
transmitted to the domestic cost of living. He therefore posited that the 
extent of economic openness in such countries has the effect of reducing 
the potential for money and/or exchange rate illusion by wage earners. 
Furthermore, a devaluation would be more rapidly transmitted to the 
price of tradables and the cost of living, negating its intended effects; in 
which case the nominal exchange rate would be less useful as an 
adjustment instrument.  
• Diversification in production and consumption: 
Kennen (1969) also argues that high diversification in production and 
consumption has the effect of reducing the likely impact of shocks 
specific to any sector. In which case, he argues, diversification reduces 
the need for changes in the terms of trade through the nominal exchange 
rate and provides a hedge against a variety of disturbances. And that 
where partner countries are more diversified they are more likely to incur 
reduced costs from forsaking nominal exchange rate changes between 
them and find a single currency beneficial.   
• Price and wage flexibility  
The proponents also argue that when nominal prices and wages are 
flexible between and within countries contemplating a single currency, 
the adjustment following a shock is less likely to be associated with 
sustained unemployment in one country and/or inflation in another. This 
therefore makes the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments 
redundant (Friedman,1953). Conversely, if nominal prices and wages are 
downward rigid some measure of real flexibility could be achieved by 
means of exchange rate adjustments. And in such a situation the loss of 
direct control over the nominal exchange rate instrument may not augur 
well for the countries in question (Kawai,1987). 
Other criteria include: 
• Similarity of supply and demand shocks and business cycles 
• Fiscal integration and similarity of inflation rates (Mongelli, 2002, 
in Oshikoya et al, 2010). These characterisations are what is referred to 
in the OCA literature as the ‘Old OCA theory’. 
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Sometime after the seminal contributions on the different properties of the so-
called ‘old OCA theory’ had been digested exhaustively a barrage of criticisms 
were levelled against it, bringing into sharp focus its inappropriateness in 
offering any robust analytical framework to define the optimum economic and 
monetary   competencies of a given “area” such as the European Union 
(Mongelli, 2002). For example, in Mongelli (2002), in what Tavlas (1994) calls 
‘the problem of inconclusiveness ‘, he shows how the OCA properties are 
difficult to evaluate 
 against each other. Tavlas (1994) believes the OCA theory as a whole stopped 
short of a unifying framework, which could still make one end up drawing 
different borders for a currency area by referring to different OCA properties. 
Therefore, according to Tavlas (1994), a country might, for instance be quite 
open with respect to reciprocal trade with a group of partner countries indicating 
that a fixed exchange rate regime is preferable, or even monetary integration, 
with its main trading partners. Nevertheless, the same country might also exhibit 
a low mobility of factors of production, including labour, among these trading 
partners, to rather suggest that a flexible exchange rate arrangement might be 
desirable. 
3.2.1 The OCA endogeneity hypothesis and the European EMU 
The endogeneity hypothesis is one that emerged as the assessment of 
OCA properties became more articulated, particularly by studying the effects of 
monetary unions. Empirical studies giving birth to the endogeneity hypothesis 
posit that monetary integration leads to a very significant deepening of 
reciprocal trade. That is, reciprocal trade between the members of a currency 
area is likely to increase after the launch of a single currency.  
Within the European EMU, the weaknesses and limitations of the OCA 
theory notwithstanding, some critics of the Delors Report (1989) which made a 
strong case for a single currency to complement a single market to eliminate 
exchange rate volatilities and misalignments, nevertheless, argued that it failed 
to prominently feature the OCA properties. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty (1991) 
convergence criteria cannot be said to have satisfied the OCA conditions. While 
the Maastricht criteria emphasised macroeconomic convergence prior to the 
beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) the OCA stresses 
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microeconomic and political conditions for a successful monetary union (De 
Grauwe, 2012). For example, to deal with the fear of inflationary bias inflation 
convergence was a key requirement in the Maastricht criteria. Similarly, 
budgetary convergence requirements were stipulated to prevent high deficits 
and debts countries which had the tendency to increase the risk of more 
inflation in the future monetary union, specifically the EMU (De Grauwe, 2012). 
Macroeconomic convergence is the process whereby countries move toward a 
common macroeconomic climate with similar policies on such macroeconomic 
variables as inflation, public debts, current accounts, budget deficit, long-term 
interest rates and so on. 
Nevertheless, the likes of Emerson et al (1992) who support the 
endogeneity of the OCA theory argue that the criteria for the European EMU 
was more likely to be beneficial than what could be presumed on the basis of 
the application of the OCA characteristics alone. For instance, while the labour 
mobility is low in Europe the mobility of capital which can provide an alternative 
adjustment channel is quite high and rising in Europe. Ingram (1962) also posit 
that financial market integration, a characteristic which facilitates capital 
mobility, is an essential criterion that can reduce the need for exchange rate 
adjustment. The possibility of the capital mobility having been already facilitated 
by the single market programme which had capital mobility as one of its ‘four 
freedoms’. While this is the case it must however be mentioned that within the 
EMU this created huge macroeconomic imbalances which were at the centre of 
the Eurozone crisis (Ederer, 2015). Ederer (2015) explains that domestic 
demand booms and current account deficits in the South countries financed by 
large capital flows deriving from current account surplus countries like Germany 
dubbed North countries, created huge stocks of debt in the South countries. 
Therefore, at the inception of the financial crisis when capital flows to the South 
countries stopped suddenly it caused domestic demand in the South countries 
to plummet. This sudden decline in domestic demand together with the 
accumulated huge debt stocks, therefore, made recovery at the end of the 
global financial crisis difficult. The situation got further aggravated when in an 
attempt to reduce their debt burdens by reducing their expenditures, rather 
deflated demand, thereby making the economic crisis rather worse.  
Mongelli (2002), argues that plans for the establishment of the EMU were 
meant to complement the single market programme, indeed aimed at 
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eliminating the risks of destabilising exchange rate volatilities that had on 
several occasions disrupted the European Monetary System (EMS) and that the 
main focus was not to explicitly reflect the provisions of the OCA theory in its 
entirety. The resulting financial integration in the EMU which promises to reduce 
the costs of a single monetary policy, nevertheless, does support the hypothesis 
that optimum currency areas are endogenous. From the journey of conception 
to the eventual establishment of the European economic and monetary union it 
could be observed that it took the path of the paradigm of a single market 
fostering the need and conditions for one currency as opposed to the paradigm 
of a single currency generating the need for a single market. That said, to the 
extent that broad assessment of the European economic and monetary union 
shows that reciprocal trade has increased since the introduction of the single 
currency the OCA endogeneity hypothesis can be supported. Indeed, there is 
evidence that trade between Eurozone countries has increased after the 
adoption of the euro compared to trade involving non-Eurozone countries 
(Nitsch and Pisu, 2008). They point to evidence in the EMU evaluation literature 
which puts increase in bilateral trade between Eurozone members at between 5 
and 20 percent. These figures are also reported by Mongelli (2008) from 
available empirical evidence.  
3.2.2 Sub-optimality of the European EMU 
While the proponents of the endogeneity hypothesis seem to have won 
the day, the unfolding of the 2008 global financial crisis which morphed into the 
Eurozone debt crisis in 2010/11 raises questions about the optimality of the 
Euro zone. For example, we ask whether the Eurozone debt crisis of 2010 
erupted as a result of lack of socio-economic cohesion and convergence in the 
EMU in terms of meeting the OCA criteria, fiscal harmonisation with the fiscal 
capacity for mitigating asymmetric developments in the economic cycle (Andor, 
2014); and was therefore inevitable; what the effects were; and what solutions 
were proposed. Clarke and Daley (2010) argue that a sub-optimal economic 
and monetary union will always be subject to crises, because it lacks a central 
body to direct and coordinate activity. This in their view was the case of the 
Eurozone, where it lacked the political structures to coordinate the economic 
actions of member states by establishing rules to prevent countries from 
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pursuing their selfish interest in ways that are inimical to the economic well-
being of the union. For example, by the implicit guarantee from the ECB and 
other Eurozone countries weaker economies like Greece had been encouraged 
to borrow excessively when the level of their economic growth could not support 
such borrowings and therefore had less likelihood of paying back. Also within 
the Eurozone no clear line of responsibility for bank bail-outs, a responsibility for 
the national government in the case of a sovereign state, had been defined. As 
a matter of fact, while the stability of some banks might be considered critical to 
the wider financial stability of the EMU, depositors in one country would 
naturally be unhappy about having to bail out ‘too-big-to-fail banks in other 
countries. It is clear from the foregoing that critical gaps in the construction of 
stability of the Eurozone were appreciated post-crisis.  
Mullineux (2013) characterises the Eurozone as only a currency union by 
a sub-group of EU member states coming together to adopt the euro as a 
common currency. And that to graduate from a currency union to a fully-fledged 
monetary union there must be in place a significant fiscal harmonisation and 
fiscal transfers, with the fiscal harmonisation encompassing taxes as well as 
welfare provision. Indeed, according to the theory of currency unions, for the 
asymmetries between member states of a monetary union experiencing a 
downturn and those with economic overheating to be managed there must be a 
harmonisation of fiscal policy. Within the Eurozone however, while 
macroeconomic convergence was stressed no provision for the convergence of 
tax and welfare systems, as well as fiscal transfers were made (Mullineux, 
2013). Indeed, in the Eurozone there is no budget to compensate for 
divergence in economic well-being. That is a budget which will afford the 
countries within the Eurozone the opportunity to maintain similar levels of 
economic well-being, based on large-scale redistribution between countries, as 
well as affording the countries the ability to recover from recession (Andor, 
2014). This contrasts with what obtains in the Australian Commonwealth, 
deemed to be one of the more successful monetary unions in the world. Here 
provision is made for fiscal transfers from better-performing member states in 
the union to the less well-performing countries (Mullineux, 2013). 
Also of note in the Eurozone is the lack of a banking union, the purpose 
of which is to provide a common banking supervision, a common deposit 
insurance scheme, and a common bank resolution mechanism for resolving 
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cross-border bank failures (Mullineux, 2013). Also lacking was a strong political 
union that would underpin any desired income equalisation across the 
Eurozone, and give a strong legal backing to redistributive decisions taken at 
the union level (Andor, 2014). 
While the forgoing and a lot more which made the Eurozone an 
incomplete monetary union, in the words of Andor (2014), were the case, their 
impact became apparent only after the Eurozone crisis. Mullineux (2013), 
asserts that it became apparent after the crisis that significant fiscal, political, as 
well as economic and financial sector convergence was needed to make the 
union a trade-enhancing one; and to convert the currency union into a stable 
and lasting monetary union.  
Having said that we would also like to note here, as asserted by Andor 
(2014), the socio-economic cohesion that underpinned the European single 
market of the 1980s which preceded the introduction of the single currency was 
stronger than that obtained under the economic and monetary union 
arrangements. This is because, as explained by Andor (2014), the instruments 
for cohesion and convergence in the single market were social legislation which 
ensured social equalisation, as well as, financial instruments ensuring 
economic, social and territorial cohesion. Whereas in the case of the EMU the 
social dimension and its ability to deal with the problems of cyclicality and 
asymmetry have not been developed (Andor, 2014).   
3.2.3 Some policy responses following the global economic and financial 
crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis 
Following on from section 3.2.2, in short, the EMU was in effect an 
incomplete one and deemed not to be properly functioning. Hence an elaborate 
policy response had to be set in motion. One of such policy responses was the 
banking union. The aim of the banking union was to eliminate the hitherto 
fragmentation that characterised the Eurozone banking markets, by forging 
integrated banking systems with integrated prudential oversight as the new 
framework for financial stability. In fact, an arrangement to satisfy the need to 
establish a joint European banking supervision where the regulation of cross-
border banks was to be directed and coordinated at the European level as 
opposed to the national level (Bremus and Lambert, 2014). A further aim of the 
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banking union was to break the vicious cycle of sovereign and bank risk; a 
move which appears to have achieved its aim because to date the Eurozone 
crisis and reports of bailouts for both banks and governments have subsided 
(Bremus and Lambert, 2014). In sum a banking union was an arrangement 
precipitated by the Eurozone debt crisis at its peak in 2012 to complement the 
economic and monetary union and bring all EU-wide banking rules in the 
Eurozone under one supranational authority, that is the ECB.  
Also among the battery of policy responses to the destabilisation created 
by the Eurozone debt crisis was the adoption of unconventional monetary policy 
measures by the ECB in the form of quantitative easing and the use of negative 
interest rates. Quantitative easing is where because of the economic downturn 
in the Eurozone and a fall in inflation expectations an asset purchase program 
was adopted in the Eurozone. This was where the ECB bought government 
bonds and in so doing put money base into circulation to raise inflation. The rise 
in inflation coming through the raising of the prices of those financial assets and 
the lowering of their yield, while at the same time increasing the money supply. 
While the intended effect has been a fall in real interest rates by reducing the 
financing costs for businesses and ordinary people, and consequent 
revitalization of the economy, the reported evaluation of mixed side effects on 
the profitability of banks including their net interest income. Demertzis and Wolff 
(2016) for example report of the following three ways by which bank profitability 
is affected by quantitative easing: (i) Since quantitative easing drives up bond 
prices it strengthens the balance sheets of banks which hold such bonds. (ii) 
Quantitative easing has the effect of reducing term spreads through the 
reduction of long-term yields. This reduces lending-deposit ratio, thereby 
impacting negatively on the level of net interest income on new loans. (iii) 
Finally, with improved macroeconomic outlook deriving from quantitative easing 
new lending business opportunities become available to banks with the 
attendant reduction in non-performing loan problems. Overall, however the 
reported evaluation of this non-standard monetary policy stance has been one 
of an expansionary effect on aggregate demand and inflation, reflective of the 
experience of other currency areas (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016). The other 
unconventional monetary policy tool employed by the ECB was the negative 
interest rate. Subsequent to the use of quantitative easing was the ECB’s 
implementation of the negative interest rate. Specifically, this was done by the 
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lowering of its deposit rate to -0.1 percent, as the conventional monetary policy 
of the theoretical lower bound of zero percent did not appear to be sufficient to 
stimulate a recovery (Arteta et al, 2016). This unconventional monetary policy 
stance therefore constituted the adoption of extra monetary policy tool aimed at 
salvaging the Eurozone from the prospect of further deflationary trends, and 
support economic growth. The mechanics of this unconventional monetary 
stance is that rather than being charged interest on deposits, depositors would 
have to pay money to keep their deposits with the bank. The intention is to 
stimulate economic growth by motivating banks to lend more freely, and 
depositors to invest, lend, and spend instead of paying for the safe-keeping of 
their deposits. Effectively the policy is a tax on the stocking of liquidity by banks 
to rather motivate them to utilise their excess reserves to increase lending to 
invigorate the Eurozone economy. For the ECB, a big worry however, is that 
banks have been increasing their excess reserves. This defeats the very 
purpose of negative interest rates. Between June 2014 and January 2016, 
excess reserves shot up more than 400 percent. This shows that banks in the 
Eurozone still prefer to park extra funds and pay the ECB rather than lending in 
the current environment of market uncertainty and subdued economic growth. 
Cross-border lending, which would have helped, has been hit due to differential 
risks within the Eurozone and cautious national regulators. Indeed, for negative 
interest rates to make an impact, the banking system’s response is critical. 
Unfortunately, banks are under pressure in the Eurozone due to slow asset 
growth, economic uncertainty, and rising nonperforming assets. Negative 
interest rates have added to their discomfort by denting banks’ interest income. 
For example, net interest income as a share of banks’ total income fell to 58.7 
percent in 2014 from 67.6 percent in 2008 (Barua and Majumdar, 2016). 
3.3 Monetary Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The last few decades have seen monetary union endeavours on the part of 
Sub-Saharan African governments to replicate the European-style economic 
and monetary union through the adoption of parallel institutions, convergence 
prerequisites, and fiscal governance (Quah, 2016). These endeavours have 
manifested, since independence of the various countries, as regional groupings 
engaged in free trade arrangements, with the prospect of becoming regional 
currency unions. And an eventual common currency for the whole of Africa 
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seems not too far in sight. While this is the case, at present, the CFA Franc 
zones and the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in Southern Africa are the only 
known monetary integration arrangements on the continent (Debrun et al, 
2010). That said, the CFA Franc zones of Central and West Africa are the only 
two existing full monetary unions on the continent.  
The Common Monetary Area (CMA) in Southern Africa is regarded as a 
successful monetary coordination endeavour based on an arrangement 
between South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland that came into effect in 
1992, having evolved over time with the establishment of the South African 
Reserve Bank in 1921. It follows an informal exchange rate model whereby the 
currencies of the individual CMA countries are fixed one-to-one to the South 
African Rand, and the Rand is an acceptable currency in all member states. 
While the South African Reserve Bank acts as central bank for the entire CMA 
each member state has its own central bank, with the responsibility for 
monetary policy and the issuance of its own currency. And there is a strong 
coordination among the central banks. 
In this case, in our analysis, where we compare monetary union 
institutions versus non-monetary union institutions we therefore find justification 
in lumping countries of the CMA, that is, South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland together with our elected non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African 
countries on one hand and the CFA Franc zone in West Africa, WAEMU, as our 
elected monetary zone on the other. 
3.3.1 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in its current 
form was originally and historically born out of France’s desire since 1929 to 
back its protectionist posture on foreign trade with a dedicated currency zone 
for its colonies (Korner, 2002). Eventually in 1945 France introduced the CFA 
Franc (Franc des Colonies Francaises d’Afrique), issued by the French 
overseas central bank, in its African colonies as a common currency, which was 
fully convertible to the French Franc at a fixed exchange rate. The convertibility 
was guaranteed by a special account maintained by the French treasury, and 
into which all convertible currency reserves held by the colonies had to be 
deposited. From its introduction in 1945 until 1994 the convertibility of the CFA 
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franc to the French franc remained stable at an exchange rate of 0.5 CFA franc 
to 1 French franc (Kaptouom, 2007). 
On attainment of independence by France’s African colonies from 1958 
France set up two central banks in Paris to manage its newly-independent 
colonies in West and Central Africa respectively. These were the Banque 
Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) for the former West African 
colonies, and the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique Equatoriale et du 
Cameroun (BCEAC), for the former Central African colonies. These central 
banks were then relocated to Africa in 1972 and 1973, with the BCEAO in 
Dakar in Senegal and the BCEAC in Yaounde in Cameroun. Since then the two 
central banks have been issuing their own version of the CFA franc which 
remained mutually convertible and had the same exchange rate with the French 
Franc until 1993. As well they have been responsible for the conduct of 
monetary policy in their respective jurisdictions.  
For our purposes, we will confine our discussion to the West African side 
of the CFA zone, WAEMU, which is our elected monetary union in our Sub-
Saharan African empirical analysis. WAEMU in its current shape was formed in 
1994 following an IMF-engineered devaluation of the CFA franc of 50 percent to 
the French franc, as a result of the deteriorated economic situation in which the 
zone found itself together with its sister Central African zone. The worsening 
economic situation was attributable to the weakness of commodity prices, the 
strength of the French franc, coupled with over-expansionary fiscal policies in 
the zone and the excessive direct and indirect monetary financing of 
government deficits (Masson and Pattillo, 2005).  
While the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) which preceded the 
WAEMU could pursue a continuous monetary policy of low inflation rate, it fell 
short on the expected advantages of a monetary union. For example, the 
promotion of intraregional trade and investment fell short of expectations 
(Kaptouom, 2007). The sub-optimality in the harmonisation of national policies, 
stability, and the low level of commercial relations in the francophone West 
Africa between 1959 and 1994, culminated in a low economic integration. This 
situation eventually served to inform the conversion of the WAMU to the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in 1994 (Kaptouom, 2007). 
The launching of the WAEMU in 1994 therefore included Benin, Burkina Faso, 
the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, with the aim, among others, of 
47 
 
establishing a common market which guarantees the free movement of people, 
goods, services, and capital. Also significant was the objective of harmonising 
the legislation of the participant states, particularly the tax regime to support the 
proper functioning of the common market; and also, ensuring the convergence 
of the different economic policies of member countries. It must be emphasised 
here that while the WAEMU historically predated the Eurozone, in its current 
form, especially as regards the necessary monetary and economic 
arrangements being pursued, it was modelled on the Eurozone.  
3.3.2 The Optimality of the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) 
And therefore, any attempt to assess the WAEMU would naturally be in 
the context of optimality as hypothesised by the OCA theory, its complementary 
endogeneities literature, and the overall socio-economic cohesion and 
convergence which underpin the functioning of the Eurozone. Our approach in 
using the OCA theory and the endogeneities literature is inspired by Mullineux 
(2013) and Claeys and Sindzingre (2003), both of whom seem to re-echo the 
stances of the OCA and the endogeneities schools. Claeys and Sindzingre 
(2003) point out that the Eurozone and the WAEMU in their respective pursuits 
of economic integration set off in opposite directions. They assert that while the 
Eurozone sought to integrate through macroeconomic convergence before 
adopting a common currency, the WAEMU being a currency union already 
sought to subsequently become economically integrated. Mullineux (2013) 
claim that a review of the literature on currency unions in SSA focuses on two 
perspectives. There is those that are of the view that a country’s characteristics 
are irrelevant when it comes to adopting a common currency. And on the other 
side of the argument are those who believe in allowing a currency union to 
mould economic structures through trade, creating reductions in transaction 
cost and exchange rate uncertainty and monetary policy credibility gains; with 
monetary policy credibility gains being achieved through a more credible 
commitment to monetary policy through greater central bank independence 
(Mullineux, 2013).  
Firstly, scoring WAEMU on trade-enhancing properties of currency 
unions Sy and Sow (2016) assert that the WAEMU has typically had the largest 
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level of intraregional exports in Sub-Saharan Africa, although falling behind the 
SADC in 2009. And that overall trade, that is, with imports and exports 
combined puts the WAEMU second to the SADC. These according to them 
have been made possible with the sharing of a common currency, a common 
central bank, a regional real-time gross settlement system (RTGS), and a 
regional automated clearing house, all of which has the effect of reducing 
transaction costs and foster intraregional trade. That said, on the global scale, 
intraregional trade in the WAEMU is comparatively low compared to other 
customs union around the world. This is 15 percent for WAEMU in comparison 
to ASEAN’s 25 percent and the EU’s 60 percent of all their respective trade (Sy 
and Sow, 2016). Mullineux (2013) however makes reference to an IMF Country 
Report No. 12/59 (2012), which says that existing trade between the participant 
countries of the union is not significant. Furthermore, the depth of the financial 
sectors is shallow; particularly the interbank, domestic government and 
corporate bond markets are underdeveloped. Also, Mullineux (2013) argues 
WAEMU is much less integrated economically and financially. 
Under the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory Mundell (1961) asserts 
that the mechanism by which equilibrium could be restored in the labour market 
in a monetary union, following asymmetric shocks, is through labour mobility; 
while Ingram (1962) and Kenen (1969) also add the dimension of labour 
flexibility to be fulfilled by countries in a monetary union. Assessing how well the 
WAEMU has fared on this criteria Quah (2016) concludes that labour market 
conditions are more rigid in the WAEMU compared to the Eurozone. This 
means within the WAEMU adaptation of workers to employment shock is not 
easy, and therefore does not augur well for the union at least in theory. 
Also of note is the level of real economic convergence of the WAEMU. 
Seck (2014) studies the literature investigating the economic convergence of 
the WAEMU member states towards sustained growth. And the bulk of these 
studies conclude that the richest countries in the region remain so over time, 
likewise the poorest. Using sigma convergence and beta convergence Seck 
(2014) finds no disparity reduction and speed at which the lagging countries 
were catching up with the leaders. He for example finds a greater disparity in 
the area of budgetary and economic policy than in the area of monetary policy. 
What this means is that while the monetary authorities have demonstrated 
strong control over inflation the region scores low on the provision of fiscal 
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transfers, the purpose of which is to alleviate the suffering of weaker members 
and help them integrate.  
On the functioning of a single market, while it constitutes a priority 
objective under the WAEMU Treaty, it has not yet been fully functional (Claeys 
and Sindzingre, 2003).   
Given the foregoing broad-brush assessment of the formidability of the 
WAEMU as an economic and monetary union it might appear it scores 
reasonably high in some respects, we would however hold it up against what 
Mullineux (2013) notes as the qualifications for graduation from a currency 
union to a monetary union to see if indeed WAEMU is a monetary union in the 
strictest sense of the name. 
Mullineux (2013) asserts that to progress from a currency union to a 
monetary union a region must be able to demonstrate significant fiscal 
harmonisation, fiscal transfers, an expanded development bank, banking union 
to a common bank supervision, and ideally a common deposit insurance 
scheme and a single bank resolution mechanism. Additionally, a political union 
that can contain and share the impacts of internal and external shocks is 
needed. It must be said, nonetheless, that while the WAEMU treaty appears to 
have replicated all of these characteristics of a full-fledged monetary union from 
the Eurozone, these have not been fully implemented in the WAEMU. Of the 
political union requirement for example, Claeys and Sindzingre (2003) state that 
while political integration is necessary for economic integration this has not 
been achieved in either the WAEMU nor the Eurozone. And that with respect to 
the Eurozone political integration remains the most difficult issue, even though it 
is ultimately necessary for economic institutions.  
Setting these findings about the WAEMU against the Eurozone it could 
be concluded here that the WAEMU by its level of integration can only be 
described as a currency union, as opposed to an economic and monetary 
union. 
In concluding the dichotomy that can be drawn from our analysis of the 
socio-economic cohesion and convergence of both the European EMU and the 
WAEMU is that while both regions do not score highly on the criteria for an 
economic and monetary union the European EMU is underpinned by a well-
developed single market, but not so with the WAEMU. We therefore can say 
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that any anticipated differences in the behaviour of NIMs could partly derive 
from these differences. 
3.3.3 Lessons from the Eurozone crisis for existing and prospective Sub-
Saharan African monetary unions  
Given the incompleteness of the European economic and monetary 
union as exemplified by the eruption and impact of the Eurozone crisis, and the 
policy responses thereafter, there are great lessons to be learnt by African 
governments and institutions responsible for the implementation of economic 
and monetary union pursuits. And these lessons can be summed up thus: that 
the foundation for a solid socio-economic cohesion and convergence must be 
clearly articulated and implemented. As noted by Andor (2014), the socio-
economic cohesion that underpinned the European economic and monetary 
union arrangement was not as strong as that which underpinned the European 
single market of the 1980s. The socio-economic cohesion, according to Andor 
(2014), being in the form of social legislation which ensured social equalisation, 
as well as, financial instruments ensuring economic, social and territorial 
cohesion. And it was this lack which hampered the monetary union’s ability to 
deal with the problems of cyclicality and asymmetry.  
It behoves Sub-Sharan African monetary union endeavours therefore, to 
for example, have a budget to address the disparities in economic performance 
between member states. This will ensure that in the event of a crisis any 
achieved convergence between the periphery and the core is not jeopardised. 
Furthermore, for purposes of giving legitimacy to decisions taken at the union 
level it is critically important that African monetary unions aim at establishing a 
political union, which was something lacking in the European economic and 
monetary union project.  
 
3.4 Benefits and Costs of the European EMU  
3.4.1 Benefits 
 Interest rate convergence 
The requirement of convergence of interest rates in the Euro zone by a 
member state upon accession to a level not exceeding +2% leads to a 
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convergence and strong declines in the long-term interest rates in otherwise 
high interest rate member states. This facilitates unhindered currency flows 
around the Euro zone because it will not be constrained by differing interest 
rates. Also the low and stable interest rates have attracted investment 
throughout the zone7.For example, in countries like Spain, Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal, and Italy, interest rates used to be very high prior to joining the euro. 
However, upon becoming members of the Euro zone they experienced drops in 
the long-term interest rates which led to strong economic booms (De Grauwe, 
2012).  Again, Clarke and Daley (2010) note that since 1998 22% of investment 
within the Euro zone countries with weak currencies before joining the euro was 
due to their being members of the single currency. 
 
 Reduction of transaction costs and exchange rate fluctuation and risk, 
and associated growth effects 
With the single currency, there will no longer be place for currency 
exchange between different currencies within the EMU. This will eliminate the 
loss of funds normally through margins of currency dealers in a competitive 
market8 save individuals and businesses money and help them to flourish and 
expand. Also there is the other associated dimension of the elimination of 
exchange rate risk which in turn reduces systemic risk and thereby lowers real 
interest rate (De Grauwe, 2012). This is because the elimination of exchange 
rate risk makes the economic environment within a monetary union less risky, in 
which case investors demand lower risk premium for the same investment, and 
a lower discount rate for that matter. In other words, the single currency and 
consequent elimination of exchange rate fluctuation and risk within the EMU will 
reduce cost of capital as the prospective capital provider will no longer face the 
risk that the loan or share will be devalued by an exchange rate fall, increase 
the flow of foreign direct investment9 and create reciprocal trade among 
member countries. Clarke and Daley (2010) however note that there are studies 
to suggest that since the introduction of the euro cost reduction attributable to 
                                            
7
 Translates to lower NIM in the Eurozone. 
8
 The EU commission (EU, 1990) projected an average savings in dealers’ margins of 0.4%; 
quite a smaller percentage (0.1%) was however was registered in countries with advanced 
banking systems like the UK where the bulk of currency exchange transaction are through the 
banking system where the IT resources required to convert currencies are not as costly as 
involving human contact like small tourist transactions. 
9
 Minford (1983) remark that studies which suggest that foreign exchange risk is generally found 
to be a minor consideration abound. 
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exchange rate fluctuations are both statistically and economically small; and 
that the overall beneficial effect on levels of trade being subject to debate10. 
  
It is argued that in the final analysis there will be a capital accumulation 
and the attendant economic growth, as the accumulation of capital increases 
the productivity of the capital stock per worker and thereby a higher economic 
growth rate. De Grauwe 2012) however argues that within the Eurozone there is 
little evidence to suggest that the single currency has boosted economic growth 
through a significant decline in the real interest rate11.  
       Price transparency 
A corollary of the elimination of transaction costs which comes with a 
common currency is the presence of price transparency. This means prices are 
quoted in the same currency unit across the monetary union and therefore 
consumers are better able to make price comparisons. This will in turn lead to 
lead to financial integration, as may be seen in the next paragraph, and set in 
motion intense competition which has welfare implications as consumers will 
have the benefit of lower prices. Goddard et al (2001) note that: “the credible 
commitment to liberalise European banking markets will continue to make 
banking practices more uniform, and pricing more transparent. But De Grauwe 
(2010) notes that this is hardly evident in the Eurozone where price 
discrimination is very much present12.  
 
 Financial market integration 
Jappelli and Pagano (2008) characterise an integrated financial market 
as one where securities with identical cash flows command the same price. It 
refers to comparable prices and rates of return for comparable securities issued 
in different countries. In effect, across different countries where the law of one 
price holds. For example, if a firm issues bonds in two different countries or 
regions, it will pay the same interest rate to both sets of bondholders. Likewise, 
in the case of equity issuance the firm will pay will pay the same cost of equity 
                                            
10
 They suggest that some studies put growth in trade between 3 – 10%. 
11
 “The weak link between exchange rate uncertainty, the real interest rate, and growth may 
also be due to the fact that the reduction in exchange rate uncertainty does not necessarily 
reduce systemic risk. Less exchange rate uncertainty may be compensated by greater 
uncertainty elsewhere, for example, output and employment uncertainty, and uncertainty about 
the sustainability of government debts.” (De Grauwe, 2012). 
12
 He puts the price differential between the cheapest and the most expensive country in the 
Eurozone at 30%, which according to him are much larger than within countries. 
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capital in both markets13. The benefits of such an integration, particularly in the 
banking industry are that cross-border liberalisation which accompanies 
financial integration can spur banking competition and in turn lead to the 
expansion of the credit industry for it to impact growth and investment positively. 
In a broader context, to the extent that financial integration allows firms access 
to international capital markets to finance domestic investment and households 
to invest their savings abroad it offers them the avenue through which to 
diversify their risks. In this context Jappelli and Pagano (2008) note that the 
EMU has opened the possibility for the creation of a fully integrated financial 
market comparable to that of the United States, by removing exchange rate risk 
which hitherto was a major obstacle to financial integration. Nonetheless, this 
possibility is constrained by some regulatory barriers that have not been 
addressed and therefore making full financial integration not fully realised. 
Daley and Clarke (2010) also note that since the creation of the EMU evidence 
is rife that there are lower transaction costs for financial firms, as well as for 
those firms trading in EU bonds or stocks within the EMU. 
 
 Financial stability 
It is the argument that within a monetary union in the event of a financial 
crisis, as was the case in the 2007 global economic and financial crisis, the 
relevant central bank may be able to play its role as a lender of last resort to 
forestall liquidity crisis far easier than in countries that are not part of a 
monetary union. The reason is that banking crisis can spill over into a crisis in 
the foreign exchange market as banks may have accumulated large amounts of 
short-term foreign currency deposits to be invested in long-term foreign 
currency assets. And on an occasion like this, in the case of countries that are 
not part of a monetary union, the central bank may not be able to create the 
necessary currency liquidity to redeem its banks. Conversely, in a monetary 
union the central bank will have a much deeper pocket to do just that (De 
Grauwe, 2012). It must however be noted that in the case of the EMU there was 
no clear line of responsibility of who was responsible for bank bail-outs before 
the crisis period. Also problems of macroeconomic imbalances created by the 
                                            
13
 In this sense interest rate convergence will be a good measure of financial integration. 
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North-South capital flows as outlined in section 3.2 undermined the financial 
stability of the EMU.  
3.4.2 Costs 
 Loss of control over national monetary policy 
This is the major cost in participating in a monetary union. In a monetary 
union countries cede control of monetary policy to a common monetary 
authority such as the ECB in the case of the EMU. In such circumstances 
countries and governments for that matter become very much constrained in 
their policy response options in the event of a devastating asymmetric shock 
that sets in motion a recession in the participating countries of the monetary 
union. This means in such an eventuality their ability to devalue to restore 
competitiveness or effect interest rate reduction, as well as fiscal policy would 
be curtailed, particularly in the presence of prior agreements which limit annual 
budget deficits of the participating countries. The only options left to 
governments in this case would be microeconomic measures to boost the 
economy, to cause a rise in employment and output in the long run, which may 
not help in the short-run during a recession.  
3.5 Effects of EMU on the EU Banking Systems 
Specifically, in this section, we anticipate that any influences of monetary 
union membership on the banking systems of the EU would invariably affect 
NIM and its determinants in the EMU, which indeed motivates our next chapter, 
and therefore now discuss them. 
3.5.1 EMU Effects of Banking Risks 
The ECB at the inception of the single currency anticipated that the EMU would 
impact on the risks banks ordinarily incur in the course of their businesses, 
namely credit risk, market risk, market liquidity risk, credit institutions’ risk, 
settlement risk, operational risk, and legal risk. It was expected that due to the 
positive macroeconomic impact deriving from the EMU credit risk in the Euro 
area for example will be moderated or mitigated. Specifically, it might be 
expected that as the macroeconomic environment improves businesses flourish 
and are therefore able to keep up with the repayments on business credits and 
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loans. It must also be said that due to deeper and more liquid markets that 
come with EMU banks’ liquidity risk as well as markets’ liquidity risks were 
expected to reduce. For the legal and operational risks, it was anticipated that 
this would exist mainly in the short-term and wane in the longer term as banks 
may appear to grapple only initially with the changes that may be brought to the 
legal environment by the EMU as well as the operational environment but adjust 
as time went on.  
3.5.2 EMU Effects on Banking Activities 
With the replacement of the hitherto national currencies by the Euro it 
was expected that there would be a reduction in foreign exchange trading in 
those currencies thereby negatively affecting the revenues deriving thereof. 
Nevertheless, this shortfall in revenue was expected to be compensated by the 
likely increase in their money and securities market businesses. Also, while the 
low interest rate environment induced by the EMU may have served as a 
disincentive to depositors who might have sought alternative investment 
products for their funds this may also have forced banks to source funding at 
rather higher interest, and invariably putting up banks’ NIM to negatively affect 
social welfare.  
3.5.3 Effects of EMU on Bank Market Structure and Efficiency 
As it pertains to the competitive structure of the banking industry it was 
observed that with cross-border operations there was to be expected further 
consolidation of banking firms as they sought to merge to rationalise operations, 
close up excess capacity that may have existed in some EU banking sectors, 
take advantage of scale economies afforded by the EMU, compete and to 
achieve efficiency gains. The ECB (2014) for example note that in 2013 the 
euro area banking sector continued its consolidation process, which was 
catalysed by the continued pressure to achieve cost containment, deleveraging 
and restructuring; a process which resulted in a further reduction of the total 
number of credit institutions in the euro area, clearly pointing to market 




The consistent consolidation and concentration in the EU banking structure 
brought about by the EMU is evidenced by figure 3.1 below showing the 
consistent drop in the number of credit institutions in the EU as a whole, the 
Eurozone and the non-Eurozone respectively over the studied period, that is 
2002 to 2013. It could be seen in the wider EU and Eurozone that while the 
number of credit institutions inched up slightly between 2007 and 2008 it 
reverted to its downward trend thereafter. Within the non-Eurozone while this 
picture is hardly observable we see only a slight drop in the number credit 
institutions from 2006, continues at level until 2011 when it rises up a bit and 
begins to drop again from 2012.That the trend in the non-Euro Area seems not 
quite reflective of the trends in the Euro Area and the broader EU can be 
attributed to the fact that the considered countries did not start joining the EU 
until 2004, that is, two years into the period under study. Again, not all the 
seven considered countries joined simultaneously over the considered period. 
The consolidation and concentration effects in the EU and the Euro Area are 
therefore likely not to be captured by our considered non-Euro Area countries.   
It would be concluded here that our study of the effects of monetary union 
membership on NIM and its determinants is motivated by the foregoing 













Figure 3.1. Number of Credit Institutions in the EU, the Euro Area and the 




Source: ECB and author’s own calculation 
3.6 Macroeconomic Convergence in the Euro and non-Euro 
Areas 
In this section we introduce the subject matter of macroeconomic 
convergence as we, on a global scale, reckon that macroeconomic 
convergence has risk implications for the determination of NIMs to the extent 
that the Euro and the non-Euro zones’ respective abilities to deal with economic 
shocks harmoniously will impact on the manner in which the respective 
macroeconomic environments will impact on the cost of financial intermediation. 
This is because significant differences in macroeconomic performance between 
countries have the tendency to elicit different reactions to shocks thereby 
necessitating country-specific responses which may harm an entire monetary 
zone (Oshikoya et al, 2010). It happening is indeed a potential source of conflict 
in a monetary union (Houssa and Leuven, 2004; Blanchard and Quah, 1989 in 
Oshikoya et al, 2010). It is clear from the foregoing that a source of risk which 
banks within a monetary union or zone may deem necessary to account for 
when it comes to the setting of interest rates by way of applying the necessary 
premium is the risk of asymmetric shocks, which results from macroeconomic 
divergence.  
 Specifically, we recognise that a key aspect of the EMU is how well the 
macroeconomic environments of the constituent member countries are 
converged in order to foster deeper regional integration, and financial market 
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financial markets including the credit markets people should be able to borrow 
at the same terms across the entire monetary union. In such an environment 
competition drives efficiency on the part of financial intermediaries, thereby 
reducing the cost of financial intermediation and net interest margins for that 
matter.  
De Santis and Surico, (2013), among a number of studies note that while 
the business cycle of the Eurozone may be sufficiently synchronized, and the 
structure of the economies may be sufficiently converged for the transmission of 
monetary policy to be theoretically homogeneous including price changes in 
product markets empirical and anecdotal evidence point to the banking industry 
in the Euro area producing a heterogeneous response in the transmission of 
monetary policy. Particularly, the response of bank lending to monetary 
conditions may vary across countries and within the banking sector, thereby 
making endogenously heterogeneous a common monetary policy. Clearly this 
assertion points to the fact that the Euro zone is not sufficiently immune to 
macroeconomic instability emanating from a fairly macroeconomic 
heterogeneity or divergence of the constituent economies as a potential source 
of risk banks in the Euro zone have to grapple with. We therefore assess the 
level of macroeconomic convergence in the Euro and non-Euro zones 
respectively to give a sense of the level of macroeconomic risks which banks 
operating within both zones have got to brace themselves with. We in so doing 
employ the panel unit root test, deemed to be a more robust econometric 
approach to determining macroeconomic convergence. Since, it is nevertheless 
the norm in the macroeconomic convergence literature that the less robust 
methods of correlation matrix and graphical analyses precede any econometric 
modelling we turn to the use of these methods first in the next section. The idea 
of using all three approaches of determining macroeconomic convergence or 
otherwise is to arrive at robust conclusions on the sources of macroeconomic 
risks which we assume banks in the two respective zones account for. 
3.6.1 Graphical Analysis 
In figure 3.2 below, depicting the convergence of the Eurozone and the 
non-Eurozone exchange rate it is evident that between 2002 and 2013, broadly, 
all 16 countries under study were co-moving, signifying a certain level of 
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convergence, although in some years, particularly in 2003, 2005, 2010, 2011 
and 2012, some non-Eurozone countries were seen to be moving in directions 
counter to the movement of the rest of the countries. 
 
Figure 3.2. Convergence Analysis of Euro Area and Non-Euro Area 
Percentage change in Real Exchange Rates (EXRATEPC). 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
For example, in 2005 Poland and Romania were seen running counter to 
the movement of the rest of the Euro Area and non-Euro Area countries. This 
broad co-movement among all 16 countries could be attributed to the fact that 
during the period under consideration the non-Euro Area countries were 
working assiduously to join the Euro. A closer look at figure 3.2 however shows 
that while all the Euro Area countries bunched up in their movement over the 
period, signifying a complete convergence, those of the non-Euro Area roughly 
trailed their path rather diverging from each other, which signifies a non-
convergence to the Euro Area average. 
Figure 3.3 below shows that while all the Euro Area countries with the 
exception of Greece appear to be co-moving together with the EU average 
although generally below the EU mean, and very close to each other signifying 





































to be somewhat co-moving are generally far apart each other and generally sit 
above the EU average. 
 
Figure 3.3. Convergence Analysis of Euro Area and Non-Euro Area GDP 
Growth Rates (GDPRGR). 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
That the non-Euro Area countries’ GDPRGR are generally siting above 
their Euro Area counterparts’ and the EU average seem to support the neo-
classical theory of convergence which has it that “due to diminishing returns to 
reproducible capital, poor countries or regions with low capital/labour ratios 
have a higher marginal productivity of capital, and therefore will grow faster than 
richer ones, given the same level of saving and investment.” (Soukiazis, 2000). 
It must however be noted that while all the Euro Area countries’ GDP growth 
rate, apart from Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece, together with three of the 
non-Euro Area countries, namely Lithuania, Poland and Romania dipped in 
2009 to negative digits, the rest of the non-Euro Area countries together with 
the EU mean went in the opposite, registering positive growth rates. 
In figure 3.4 below we show the convergence of inflation rates. Clearly 
while all countries in both the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area seem to be co-































mean with the non-Euro Area countries diverging from each other above the EU 
average. 
 
Figure 3.4. Convergence Analysis of Euro Area and non-Euro Area 
Inflation Rates (INFRATE). 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
It must be noted however that between 2002 and 2007, Romania 
recorded astronomically high inflation rates, way above their counterparts in the 
non-Euro Area and the EU mean for that matter. 
In figure 3.5 below we observe that while all the Euro Area economies’ 
real interest rates (REALINT) are bunched up and co-moving with the EU mean, 
showing convergence, and indeed registering negative numbers from 2010 to 
2013, the Euro Area economies are thrown in different directions, diverging 





Figure 3.5. Convergence Analysis of Euro Area and Non-Euro Area Real 































Source: Author’s own calculation. 
That the Euro Area countries registered negative real interest rates from 
2010 to 2013 may be explained by the ECB’s efforts to restore the Euro Area’s 
economic growth by fostering more lending for real investment to kick-start 
economic recovery following the economic recession in 2008. 
3.6.2 Pairwise Correlation Analysis 
We next turn to a pairwise correlation analysis to see if our graphical 
analysis could be supported or not. In our analysis a high positive correlation 
coefficient and a low variance means macroeconomic convergence in the 
member countries, and consequently any external shock would impact them in 
the same direction, with the effect of reducing the risk of the instability of the 
macroeconomic environment. On the other hand, a high variance and a low 
correlation between countries denote macroeconomic divergence and hence 
high costs for the union.  
Below table 3.1 display the correlations of percentage change in 
































to elicit similarities or otherwise in their movements. Looking at the level of 
convergence between countries in both the Euro and non-Euro Areas in table 
3.1 it could be seen that apart from Poland (PL) and a couple of cases in 
Romania14, which correlations with the other countries are generally low the 
remaining countries have correlation coefficients well above 0.50. between 
them. This ranges between 0.97 and 1 for the Euro Area countries, and 0.51 
and 0.98 for the non-Euro Area countries. our findings from the foregoing 
correlation analysis support and reflect our findings of potential convergence in 
the Euro zone and a non-convergence in the non-Euro zone.  
 We can conclude by these results that while the Euro Area countries can 
be said to be relatively fully converged on exchange rate, clearly attributable to 
the Euro as a single currency, those of the non-Euro Area are still approaching 
full convergence. This is not surprising as during the studied period and even to 
date these countries, with the exception of Lithuania which adopted the Euro on 
January 1, 2015, have been making progress towards convergence in their bid 
to fulfil the conditions for adopting the Euro. Reflecting back on our earlier 
graphical analysis it would be said that these findings of full convergence in the 
Euro Area and a non-convergence in the non-Euro Area from our pairwise 
correlation analysis support those findings from the graphical analysis. 
                                            
14
 Romania’s correlation with the Netherlands (NL) is 0.47, and 0.44 with Lithuania (LT). 
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Table 3.1. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area Exchange Rates (EXRATEPC). 
Countries  AT  BE  DE  FR  GR  IT  LU  NL  PT  BG  CZ  HR  HU  LT  PL  RO  MEAN STD DEV 
AT  1.000 
               
-2.7 6.8 
BE  0.997 1.000 
              
-2.8 6.8 
DE  0.999 0.995 1.000 
             
-2.3 6.8 
FR  0.998 0.996 0.998 1.000 
            
-2.4 7.0 
GR  0.977 0.977 0.977 0.983 1.000 
           
-3.4 7.1 
IT  0.997 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.978 1.000 
          
-2.8 6.9 
LU  0.997 0.996 0.998 0.999 0.985 0.998 1.000 
         
-2.8 6.8 
NL  0.994 0.987 0.995 0.995 0.969 0.996 0.991 1.000 
        
-2.6 6.9 
PT  0.992 0.992 0.992 0.995 0.983 0.995 0.995 0.988 1.000 
       
-2.9 7.3 
BG  0.832 0.837 0.839 0.831 0.773 0.846 0.836 0.827 0.843 1.000 
      
-5.4 8.1 
CZ  0.730 0.760 0.728 0.739 0.752 0.731 0.755 0.712 0.757 0.738 1.000 
     
-4.9 8.2 
HR  0.803 0.815 0.806 0.804 0.734 0.820 0.807 0.796 0.819 0.973 0.739 1.000 
    
-3.8 6.1 
HU  0.662 0.668 0.662 0.669 0.669 0.672 0.675 0.658 0.688 0.672 0.781 0.743 1.000 
   
-4.2 9.3 
LT  0.818 0.822 0.823 0.811 0.744 0.830 0.812 0.818 0.818 0.982 0.686 0.953 0.637 1.000 
  
-4.3 6.8 
PL  0.383 0.421 0.378 0.380 0.383 0.364 0.403 0.332 0.397 0.373 0.742 0.467 0.666 0.301 1.000 
 
-2.0 9.8 
RO  0.508 0.519 0.505 0.499 0.503 0.502 0.516 0.470 0.552 0.539 0.553 0.598 0.616 0.440 0.711 1.000 -5.1 8.1 
Notes: The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of percentage change in real exchange rate (EXRATEPC) between 16 countries of the Euro 
and non-Euro Areas respectively, over the period 2002 – 2013, to elicit similarities or otherwise in their movements, and thereby infer the level of 
convergence. A higher coefficient means a higher level of convergence and vice-versa. The table also displays each country’s mean and standard 
deviation. The sample countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands 













Table 3.2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area GDP Growth Rates (GDPRGR). 
Countries AT  BE  DE  FR  GR  IT  LU  NL  PT  BG  CZ  HR  HU  LT  PL  RO  MEAN STDEV 
AT  1.000 
               
1.5 2.0 
BE  0.943 1.000 
              
1.3 1.7 
DE  0.899 0.855 1.000 
             
1.1 2.5 
FR  0.957 0.969 0.861 1.000 
            
1.0 1.6 
GR  0.328 0.409 0.008 0.361 1.000 
           
-0.1 4.9 
IT  0.919 0.972 0.838 0.969 0.461 1.000 
          
-0.2 2.2 
LU  0.067 0.180 -0.069 0.175 0.438 0.235 1.000 
         
3.2 2.3 
NL  0.917 0.924 0.824 0.876 0.488 0.894 0.212 1.000 
        
0.9 2.1 
PT  -0.107 0.107 -0.108 -0.021 0.381 0.132 0.802 0.190 1.000 
       
0.4 1.8 
BG  0.804 0.785 0.529 0.748 0.717 0.761 0.033 0.835 -0.049 1.000 
      
3.4 3.8 
CZ  0.225 0.308 0.044 0.281 0.695 0.354 0.728 0.495 0.689 0.412 1.000 
     
3.3 2.6 
HR  0.742 0.717 0.427 0.713 0.812 0.741 0.159 0.741 -0.017 0.954 0.429 1.000 
    
1.5 4.0 
HU  0.752 0.792 0.537 0.807 0.593 0.837 0.010 0.667 -0.109 0.837 0.250 0.850 1.000 
   
1.5 3.5 
LT  0.883 0.810 0.676 0.860 0.493 0.821 -0.066 0.761 -0.316 0.879 0.132 0.889 0.848 1.000 
  
4.5 6.9 
PL  0.681 0.705 0.657 0.648 0.399 0.636 0.202 0.855 0.274 0.615 0.558 0.500 0.340 0.492 1.000 
 
3.8 1.8 
RO  0.782 0.771 0.529 0.714 0.686 0.717 -0.037 0.807 -0.061 0.963 0.352 0.899 0.797 0.816 0.656 1.000 3.8 4.5 
Note: The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) between 16 countries of the Euro and non-Euro Areas 
respectively, over the period 2002 – 2013, to elicit similarities or otherwise in their movements, and thereby infer the level of convergence. A higher 
coefficient means a higher level of convergence and vice-versa. The table also displays each country’s mean and standard deviation. The sample 
countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), 




In table 3.2 above showing the correlation coefficients for GDP growth 
rate (GDPRGR) for both the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area we see the 
generally high correlation between the Euro Area economies and even with 
most of their counterparts in the non-Euro Area with a few exceptions like 
Portugal which has generally low correlations with the economies in both 
regions, indeed between -0.02 with France and 0.38 with Greece for the Euro 
Area, while having correlations ranging between -0.02 with Croatia and -0.05 
with Bulgaria15. It must be said that the magnitude of the coefficients between 
the non-Euro Area economies and with their Euro Area counterparts are mixed, 
showing divergence and seems to support the graphical representation in figure 
3.3. 
Table 3.3 below shows the pairwise correlation matrix for the Euro Area 
and the non-Euro Area inflation rates (INFRATE). Apart from the Netherlands 
and Greece we observe a generally high correlation between the Euro Area 
economies than between the non-Euro Area economies where a generally low 
correlation between countries and a mixed picture obtain. This picture seems to 
reflect that shown by the graphical representation in figure 3.4 which points to a 
convergence in inflation rates in the Euro Area and a non-convergence in the 
non-Euro Area economies.  
In table 3.4 below showing the pairwise correlation matrix for the Euro 
Area and the non-Euro Area real interest rates (REALINT) we observe a 
reasonably high correlation between the Euro Area economies ranging between 
0.59 and 0.97. Within the non-Euro Area economies on the other hand a mixed 
picture of negative and generally low correlations between countries obtain. 
This picture seems to reflect the graphical representation in figure 3.5 which 
points to a convergence in real interest rates in the Euro Area and a non-





                                            
15
 It has a correlation of 0.68 with the Czech Republic though.  
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Table 3.3. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area Inflation Rates (INFRATE). 
Countries AT  BE  DE  FR  GR  IT  LU  NL  PT  BG  CZ  HR  HU  LT  PL  RO  MEAN STDEV 
AT  1 
               
2 0.8 
BE  0.906 1 
              
2.1 1.2 
DE  0.875 0.796 1 
             
1.6 0.6 
FR  0.718 0.848 0.707 1 
            
1.7 0.7 
GR  0.241 0.515 0.197 0.609 1 
           
2.8 1.5 
IT  0.671 0.794 0.658 0.931 0.462 1 
          
2.2 0.8 
LU  0.867 0.929 0.835 0.859 0.509 0.783 1 
         
2.3 0.8 
NL  0.432 0.297 0.327 0.370 -0.108 0.521 0.287 1 
        
2 0.7 
PT  0.558 0.604 0.591 0.837 0.582 0.813 0.756 0.394 1 
       
2.3 1.3 
BG  0.421 0.553 0.669 0.554 0.488 0.487 0.517 0.020 0.390 1 
      
5.1 3.2 
CZ  0.626 0.708 0.785 0.571 0.221 0.568 0.596 0.178 0.235 0.829 1 
     
2.3 1.6 
HR  0.482 0.613 0.623 0.426 0.087 0.515 0.472 0.166 0.126 0.734 0.858 1 
    
2.7 1.3 
HU  0.204 0.255 0.432 0.410 0.456 0.364 0.216 -0.110 0.399 0.593 0.480 0.202 1 
   
5 1.6 
LT  0.452 0.527 0.583 0.228 0.155 0.283 0.388 -0.021 -0.019 0.757 0.831 0.861 0.328 1 
  
3.1 3.1 
PL  0.456 0.447 0.315 0.170 0.119 0.250 0.229 -0.030 -0.050 0.302 0.538 0.371 0.393 0.592 1 
 
2.7 1.3 
RO  -0.172 -0.095 -0.207 0.310 0.393 0.282 -0.071 0.406 0.428 0.092 -0.209 -0.273 0.141 -0.439 -0.312 1 8.6 5.6 
Note: The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of inflation rate (INFRATE) between 16 countries of the Euro and non-Euro Areas 
respectively, over the period 2002 – 2013, to elicit similarities or otherwise in their movements, and thereby infer the level of convergence. A higher 
coefficient means a higher level of convergence and vice-versa. The table also displays each country’s mean and standard deviation. The sample 
countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), 












Table 3.4. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area Real Interest Rates (REALINT). 
 
AT  BE  DE  FR  GR  IT  LU  NL  PT  BG  CZ  HR  HU  LT  PL  RO  MEAN STDEV 
AT  1 
               
0.4 1.4 
BE  0.938 1 
              
0.3 1.4 
DE  0.967 0.870 1 
             
0.9 1.1 
FR  0.914 0.867 0.913 1 
            
0.8 1.2 
GR  0.660 0.665 0.590 0.751 1 
           
-0.3 1.4 
IT  0.896 0.846 0.899 0.972 0.623 1 
          
0.3 1.2 
LU  0.956 0.932 0.946 0.940 0.733 0.909 1 
         
0.2 1.2 
NL  0.806 0.672 0.794 0.851 0.587 0.902 0.770 1 
        
0.5 1.4 
PT  0.744 0.683 0.735 0.823 0.573 0.817 0.812 0.728 1 
       
0.2 1.4 
BG  -0.566 -0.433 -0.582 -0.678 -0.618 -0.682 -0.548 -0.762 -0.395 1 
      
4.3 2.5 
CZ  -0.421 -0.516 -0.300 -0.392 -0.754 -0.332 -0.535 -0.338 -0.345 0.289 1 
     
4.6 1.7 
HR  -0.508 -0.300 -0.495 -0.581 -0.675 -0.525 -0.476 -0.754 -0.434 0.724 0.342 1 
    
7.2 1.7 
HU  -0.508 -0.451 -0.544 -0.429 -0.221 -0.379 -0.426 -0.211 0.019 0.280 -0.013 0.168 1 
   
5 1.6 
LT  -0.006 0.200 -0.007 -0.127 -0.152 -0.167 0.080 -0.421 0.081 0.687 -0.052 0.640 0.145 1 
  
2.8 4.5 
PL  0.284 0.253 0.368 0.144 0.102 0.048 0.280 -0.164 -0.150 0.038 -0.038 0.105 -0.818 0.220 1 
 
5 1.8 
RO  -0.372 -0.167 -0.367 -0.365 -0.347 -0.340 -0.295 -0.561 -0.148 0.527 0.086 0.844 0.374 0.637 -0.064 1 6 4.2 
Note: The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of real interest rate (REALINT) between 16 countries of the Euro and non-Euro Areas 
respectively, over the period 2002 – 2013, to elicit similarities or otherwise in their movements, and thereby infer the level of convergence. A higher 
coefficient means a higher level of convergence and vice-versa. The table also displays each country’s mean and standard deviation. The sample 
countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), 




3.6.3 Sigma Convergence (𝝈) 
We further explore the concept of sigma convergence to see if our 
observations from the above graphical and pairwise correlation analyses could 
be supported. The use of the concept of sigma convergence is to see if cross-
country distribution of the individual macroeconomic variables declines over 
time. Standard deviation and the coefficient of variation are the two most 
frequently used summary measures of sigma convergence. Other sigma 
convergence methods used are the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index, the 
Theil index, and the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD). For our purposes 
however we elect to use the coefficient of variation and therefore do not intend 
to discuss the other methods beyond their mention. The coefficient of variation 
is a normalised measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. And it is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, taking the following 
form: 




where 𝑐𝑣 is the coefficient of variation, √𝜎2 is the standard deviation, and ?̅? is 
the sample mean for the variable in question? For a particular macroeconomic 
variable in a particular region convergence is said to be taking place if the 
dispersion of the variable is decreasing. Conversely, it is said to be diverging if 
the dispersion is seen to be increasing over time. Simionescu (2014) assesses 
the degree of convergence of GDP per capita in 28 EU countries for the period 
2000 – 2012 using the sigma convergence methodology and finds a reduction 
in the level of divergence between countries. Table 3.5 below shows the results 
of the calculation of sigma convergence for all four macroeconomic variables 










Table 3.5. Coefficient of variation of all macroeconomic variables for the 
Euro and non-Euro Areas. 
YEAR EXRATEPC GDPRGR INFRATE REALINT 
2002 1.26 1.36 2.24 2.93 
2003 1.37 1.93 1.56 2.5 
2004 0.59 1.42 1.2 2.64 
2005 1.8 1.43 0.79 2.51 
2006 1.04 1.35 0.78 1.18 
2007 1.11 1.55 0.94 1.32 
2008 1.62 1.63 1.28 1.5 
2009 2.21 3.23 0.81 3.4 
2010 1.57 1.45 0.66 3.36 
2011 1.32 1.82 0.45 3.02 
2012 2 1.53 0.4 2.92 
2013 0.45 1.17 0.45 3.11 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
To be able to better detect convergence or otherwise we plot our 
summary measures of sigma convergence based on the coefficient of variation 
for all our four macroeconomic variables consecutively below. In figure 3.6 
below we find the evolution of the coefficient of variation calculated for 2002 to 
2013 percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC) for both the Euro Area 
and the non-Euro Area. Over the period no consistent and clear declining trend 
is observed. Rather the trend is one of peaks and troughs. For example, while 
we observe a dispersion between 2007 and 2009 as per the rise in the 
coefficient of variation from 1.11 in 2007 to 2.21 in 2009, similarly between 2009 
and 2011 we observe a decline in the coefficient of variation from 2.21 in 2009 
to 1.32 in 2011 signifying a convergence among the Euro Area and the non-
Euro Area countries. While our sigma convergence analyses do not support our 
graphical and pairwise correlation analyses we intend to arrive at a more 
conclusive and robust results of ascertaining convergence or otherwise, with the 

































































Similarly, in figure 3.7 above we observe an alternating trend of 
dispersion and convergence over the studied period, that is 2002 to 2013. For 
example, between 2008 and 2009 as per the rise in the coefficient of variation 
from 1.63 in 2008 to 3.23 in 2009, we observe a dispersion, while between 2009 
and 2010 we observe a decline in the coefficient of variation from 3.23 in 2009 
to 1.45 in 2010 signifying a convergence among the Euro Area and the non-
Euro Area countries. Again, here as well, our sigma convergence analyses do 
not support our graphical and pairwise correlation analyses.  
For inflation rate (INFRATE) we rather find two episodes of convergence 
over 2002 to 2006, and 2008 to 2013. For the first episode we observe a 
decline in the coefficient of variation from 2.24 in 2002 to 0.78 in 2006 depicting 
a convergence. Then between 2006 and 2008 the coefficient of variation rises 
up to 1.28, implying a dispersion or non-convergence. Nevertheless, from 2008 
the coefficient drops again from 1.28 to 0.45 in 2013, implying another episode 
of convergence of inflation rate among the Euro Area and non-Euro Area 
countries. The picture here seems to support our graphical analysis which 
generally shows a co-movement between all countries within the two regions 
save a closer convergence in the Euro Area generally below the EU mean than 
the non-Euro Area where countries are further apart from each other and mostly 
above the EU mean over the years. 
Figure 3.9 below shows the graphical representation of the sigma 
convergence of the real interest rate (REALINT) for both the Euro Area and 
non-Euro Area. Again looking at the alternating trend of dispersion and 
convergence over the studied period, that is 2002 to 2013, an absolute 
convergence between the EU economies cannot be confirmed. For instance, in 
2005 to 2006 a convergence in real interest rate was observed when it dropped 
from 2.51 in 2005 to 1.19 in 2006. Then we see another rise to 3.40 in 2009 
implying a divergence.    
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3.6.4 Panel Unit Root Literature 
In using panel unit root the focus here is on long-run bivariate 
convergence between both the Euro and the non-Euro zone countries and their 
respective means. Baltagi (2005) notes that several unit root tests used in the 
time series literature have been extended to panel data. In the theoretical 
literature a number of issues which arise in this application to panel data arise 
which have been tackled by Im et al (2003), Maddala and Wu (1999), Choi 
(2001), Kao (1999), and Phillips and Moon (1999). For instance, Baltagi (2005) 
explains that the problem of spurious regression which obtains in the time 
series literature can be avoided when panel data is used as panel data 
regression estimates produce a consistent estimate of the true value of the 
parameter as both the cross-sectional and the time dimensions tend to ∞. This 
in his view is because the panel estimator averages across individuals and the 
information in the independent cross-section data in the panel leads to a 
stronger overall signal than obtains in a pure time series scenario. Lopez, C. 
and Papell, D. (2010) also in their empirical application of panel unit root test re-
echoe the view shared by Baltagi (2005) and his fore-runners by noting that the 
extension of time series investigation of the convergence hypothesis, which 
often relies on unit root tests, to the panel framework has significantly 
influenced the literature on how to measure convergence of macroeconomic 
variables. According to them the rejection of the null hypothesis is commonly 
interpreted as evidence that the series have converged to their equilibrium 
state, since any shock that causes deviations from equilibrium eventually dies 
out. Holmes (2002) posits that panel data unit root testing offers a means of 
overcoming problems of low test power associated with the earlier applications 
of univariate ADF tests, and therefore uses the t-bar panel data unit root tests 
as advocated by Im et al. (1997) and Breuer et al. (1999) to identify strong 
convergence using either the US or Germany as the base country in his 
investigation of the international output convergence. Hall and Mairesse (2002) 
also note that in recent years the econometrics literature has proposed a 
number of tests for unit roots in panel data. One of such is the IPS (Im-Pesaran-
Shin) test which is valid, as in our case, when the number T of time periods 
(years in our case) is small and the number N of individuals (countries in our 
case) is large, that is are consistent when T is fixed and N→∞. The IPS test 
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according to Hall and Mairesse (2002) views the panel data regression as a 
system of N individual regressions and is based on the combination of 
independent Dickey-Fuller tests for these N regressions. They further posit that 
aside allowing for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and non-normality, this 
test also allows for heterogeneity of trends and of the lag coefficient under the 
alternative hypothesis of no unit root.  
While there have been quite a few possible procedures which have been 
proposed for testing unit roots in panel data (Levin and Lin (1992), Breitung and 
Mayer (1994), Quah (1992, 1994), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (1997)) the 
general structure used by most (though not all) panel unit root testing 
procedures follow a system of Augmented Dicker-Fuller regressions as follows 
(Lopez and Papell, 2010): 
 
 ∆𝑦t = 𝜌t 𝑦t-  + ∑ ∅
𝑝𝑖
𝑙=1 t ∆ 𝑦t-  + dt+ t  
(3.1) 
 
where the dt are the deterministic components. The null and alternative 
hypotheses tested are: 𝜌 = 0 means the 𝑦 process has a unit root for individual 
while 𝜌 < 0 means that the process is stationary around the deterministic 
part. And 𝜌 is the homogeneous rate of convergence. Stationarity in fact implies 
that the difference between a macroeconomic variable of interest of two 
countries at time (t) is less than the difference observed over a period (t-1). 
Based on this definition, the test of convergence can be performed as a unit 
root test on the random variable of interest defined as the difference between 
the variable of interest of the two countries. If the null hypothesis that there is a 
unit root in the process can be rejected, then it is concluded that the variable in 
question of the two countries converges. In a scenario where multiple countries 
are being considered the unit root test can be performed on the difference 
between the variable of interest of a country k in the group and the average 
macroeconomic variable of interest of the entire group of countries. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis in this case means that country k converges 
towards the regional average.  
Furthermore, following the empirical approach adopted by Ben-David 
(1993) in which he estimates the model below we aim to determine if the 
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differences between the individual Euro and non-Euro Areas countries for our 
selected macroeconomic variables and the regional means or averages are 
indeed diminishing over time and that individual country values tend to 
converge toward the regional mean over time. In other words, it may be 
expected that within the Euro and non-Euro Areas countries may be sharing a 
long-run equilibrium or persistent co-movement with respect to the selected 
macroeconomic variables, meaning they may wander from each other in the 
short run but then maintain a common path or equilibrium, and their deviation 
from this equilibrium has no tendency to grow steadily over time. 
 
 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑡) =  ɸ(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  ?̅?𝑡−1) +  𝑖,𝑡                            (3.2)         
   
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the log of country 𝑖
′𝑠  real per capita income at time t and ?̅?𝑡 is the 
average of the group’s log per capita incomes at time t. A ɸ <1 indicates the 
existence of income convergence within the group, while a ɸ >1 indicates 
divergence.  
According to Ben-David (1996) once ɸ is estimated it gives an indication 
of the speed or rate of convergence within the given group of countries. A ɸ can 
therefore be interpreted as a measurement of the strength of convergence 
toward the common mean. As a result, a more persistent differential, that is, 
higher value of ɸ would correspond to weaker convergence as any shock would 
have a longer lasting impact, and a less persistent differential, that is, a lower 
value of ɸ would correspond to stronger convergence. In contrast to the p-
values, the rate of convergence remains the main attractiveness of his model 
and sits in its simplicity, its applicability to relatively small groups of countries, 
and its usefulness for conducting relatively quick and simple convergence 
comparisons across a multitude of groups that include different country 
compositions. According to Lopez and Papell (2010) the most common 
measure of persistence of an economic time series is the half-life, which is the 
amount of time it takes for a shock on a macroeconomic variable differential to 
dissipate by 50 percent. It is indeed the estimated length of time to eliminate 
half or 50 percent of the initial differential and how long it will take to close those 




3.6.4.1 Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for the Euro Area and the Non-
Euro Area 
In this section, we test for the macroeconomic convergence in the Euro 
and non-Euro Areas respectively, and present the results below. 
 
Table 3.6. Combined Euro Area and Non-Euro Area Test of Panel Unit 
Root Combined. 
With Individual Intercept  Without Individual Intercept 
 ADF Test IPS Test PP Test LLC Test  ADF Test PP Test LLC Test 
EXRATEPC 68.193*** -4.28*** 58.225*** -9.221***  122.93*** 114.29*** -9.505*** 
GDPRGR 51.739** -2.54*** 56.562*** -5.340***  83.863*** 84.071*** -5.517*** 
INFRATE 103.952*** -6.99*** 140.71*** -8.598***  61.835*** 59.918*** -6.320*** 
REALINT 57.238*** -2.72*** 72.567*** -4.506***  69.130*** 64.157*** -4.298*** 
Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%. The table presents the coefficients of the results of the panel 
unit root tests of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), 
GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for all the 16 sample 
countries of the Euro and non-Euro Areas combined, for the period 2002 – 2013. The sample countries are 
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Lithuania 
(LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO). Time trend was not included in these computations.  The four different tests 
for purposes of robustness are ADF - Fisher Chi-square, PP - Fisher Chi-square, Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC), and 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. Bandwiths in all the unit root tests are determined by the Newey-West statistic 
using the Barlett-Kernel.  
   
 
Table 3.7. Euro Area Test of Panel Unit Root in Level. 
with Individual Intercept  Without Individual Intercept 
 ADF Test IPS Test PP Test LLC Test  ADF Test  PP Test LLC Test 
EXRATEPC 33.764** -2.753*** 31.837** -5.955***  67.401*** 64.571*** -7.084*** 
GDPRGR 35.970*** -2.756*** 41.102*** -4.657***  53.754*** 55.127*** -4.972*** 
INFRATE 65.982*** -5.920*** 89.437*** -8.222***  26.189* 24.437 -3.148*** 
DINFRATE 74.888*** -6.523*** 139.450*** -9.700***  128.55*** 164.04*** -12.261*** 
REALINT 18.609 -0.415 12.540 -1.069  45.142*** 41.708*** -4.651*** 
DREALINT 36.204*** -2.900*** 36.584*** -3.927***  77.923*** 77.566*** -7.817*** 
Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%; DINFRATE is differenced inflation rate; DREALINT is 
differenced real interest rate. Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%. The table presents the coefficients 
of the results of the panel unit root tests of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in 
exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate 
(REALINT) for all the 9 sample countries of the Euro Area, for the period 2002 – 2013. The sample countries 
are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Time trend was not included in these computations.  The four different tests for 
purposes of robustness are ADF - Fisher Chi-square, PP - Fisher Chi-square, Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC) and Im, 








Table 3.8. Non-Euro Area Test of Panel Unit Root in Level. 
With Individual Intercept Without Individual Intercept 
 ADF Test IPS Test PP Test LLC Test  ADF Test PP Test LLC Test 
EXRATEPC 34.428*** -3.335*** 26.388** -6.851***  55.538*** 49.721*** -6.345*** 
GDPRGR 15.769 -0.710 15.460 -2.760***  30.109*** 28.944** -3.124*** 
DGDPRGR  52.482*** -5.381*** 80.350*** -8.439***  91.870*** 104.25*** -10.164*** 
INFRATE 37.970*** -3.815*** 51.281*** -6.348***  35.646*** 35.487*** -5.569*** 
REALINT 38.629*** -3.652*** 60.028*** -5.914***  23.988** 22.447* -2.234** 
Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%; DGDPRGR is differenced GDP growth rate. The table 
presents the coefficients of the results of the panel unit root tests of our selected macroeconomic 
variables: percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate 
(INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for all the 7 sample countries of the non-Euro Area, for the 
period 2002 – 2013. The sample countries are Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Croatia (HR), Hungary 
(HU), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO). Time trend was not included in these computations. The 
four different tests for purposes of robustness are ADF - Fisher Chi-square, PP - Fisher Chi-square, Levin, 
Lin & Chu (LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin W-sta. Bandwiths in all the unit root tests are determined by 
the Newey-West statistic using the Barlett-Kernel. 
 
 
Table 3.9. Euro Area Speed of Adjustment and Half-Life. 
 β (Euro Area Average speed of adjustment) Half-life 
EXRATEPC 0.203*** 0.43 
GDPRGR 0.194*** 0.42 
INFRATE -0.024 undefined 
REALINT 0.725*** 2.15 
Note: Probability values ***1% **5% *10%. The table presents the results of the Euro Area speed of 
adjustment and Half-life of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate 
(EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for 
all the 9 sample countries of the Euro Area, for the period 2002 – 2013. The sample countries are Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands 
(NL), Portugal (PT). INFRATE is not statistically significant so we cannot compute the half-life. 
 
Table 3.10. Non-Euro Area Speed of Adjustment and Half-Life. 
 β (Non-Euro Area speed of adjustment) Half-life 
EXRATEPC 0.173*** 0.39 
GDPRGR 0.354*** 0.67 
INFRATE 0.588*** 1.31 
REALINT 0.611*** 1.41 
 Note: Probability values ***1% **5% *10% The table presents the results of the Non-Euro Area speed of 
adjustment and Half-life of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate 
(EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for 
all the 7 sample countries of the non-Euro Area, for the period 2002 – 2013. The sample countries are 
Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania 








Above in table 3.6 we present the results of the panel unit root test of all 
the macroeconomic variables indicating convergence of the national values of 
the sample countries of the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area combined to the 
European Union mean. Also in tables 3.7 and 3.8 are presented the results of 
the panel unit root test of all the macroeconomic variables to infer convergence 
of national values to the Euro and non-Euro Areas means respectively. 
It is evident from tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 that the results for all the 
macroeconomic variables, whether in the case of the combined Euro Area and 
the non-Euro Area or individual zonal analyses, are very consistent throughout 
with a unit root always rejected at mostly statistical significance of between 1 
and 5 percent. The conclusion therefore is that there is convergence towards 
the sub-regional/zonal averages with respect to our chosen macroeconomic 
variables, among countries in the respective Euro Area and the non-Euro Area, 
as well as both zones combined. In terms of speed of convergence within both 
the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area, estimating Ben-David’s (1993) model, 
the results of which appear in tables 3.9 and 3.10, the results are mixed. We 
find, for example, that while the speed of convergence for GDP growth rate 
(0.194) and inflation rate, (-0.024 (although not statistically significant)) within 
the Eurozone is faster than it obtains in the non-Eurozone (0.354 and 0.588 
respectively) the reverse is for the percentage change in exchange rate and real 
interest rate variables. What all of this means is that while in the case of the 
non-Euro Area the average speed of convergence for percentage change in 
exchange rate (EXRATEPC) and real interest rate (REALINT) variables are 
closer to zero than in the Euro Area, on the other hand the average speed for 
the GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) and inflation rate (INFRATE) variables are 
closer to zero in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area. If the values are 
closer to one, it denotes a slow rate of convergence. Conversely if it is closer to 
zero then it denotes faster rate of convergence. The speed of convergence is 
calculated by estimating equation (3.2) above. Again, we calculate the half-life 
of the convergence process for both zones. As per our results in the last 
columns of tables 3.9 and 3.10 for both zones, for all variables, apart from the 
GDP growth rate variable (0.42 for the Euro Area and 0.67 for the non-Euro 
Area) it takes a shorter time for the gap between the non-Euro Area countries’ 
values and the sub-regional average to be cut into half than the countries in the 
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Euro Area. This is not surprising as most of the European countries outside the 
Euro Area have been making efforts to join the Euro Area during the period 
under consideration, and would therefore be expected to be making efforts to 
meet the Euro Area convergence criteria as fast as possible. For example, while 
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Sweden are on the 
enlargement agenda the following countries joined the Euro zone in the 
respective years in the parenthesis: Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta 
(2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015). 
The catching-up process of our sample non-Euro Area countries, all being 
CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries), with the Euro Area countries, 
as appears in table 3.6 above reflects the CEEC integrative process into the 
Euro Area and the EU for that matter. This corroborates findings to the effect 
that the CEEC macroeconomic similarities to Western Europe have grown and 
have economic benefit implications (Ciobanu and Ciobanu, 2009). Ciobanu and 
Ciobanu (2009) note that the CEECs’ catching-up reflects their achievement of 
market economy status, where they have open borders to trade and capital, a 
dwindled central planning regime and state intervention in production. They as 
well observe a generally low and stable inflation rates, and monetary and fiscal 
policies which were for most part transparent. 
3.7 WAEMU and Non-Monetary Union SSA Panel Unit Root 
Results 
In this section, we test for the macroeconomic convergence in Sub-
Saharan Africa. We however go straight to the use of the more robust of our 
chosen convergence test methods, that is, the test of unit root without first 
exploring the less robust preliminary methods as was done for our European 
analysis in the previous section. Below we present the results for the test of unit 











Table 3.11. Combined WAEMU and Non-Monetary Union Sub-Saharan 
Africa Test of Panel Unit Root Combined. 
With Individual Intercept  Without Individual Intercept 
 ADF Test IPS Test PP Test LLC Test  ADF Test PP Test LLC Test 
EXRATEPC 175.936*** -8.959*** 144.221*** -11.888***  283.632*** 259.167*** -14.4402*** 
GDPRGR 195.472*** -9.4390*** 256.511*** -12.918***  74.275** 99.402*** -1.7456** 
INFRATE 195.170*** -9.628*** 251.452*** -9.807***  85.723*** 113.787*** -3.909*** 
REALINT 213.896*** -10.954*** 224.437*** -12.308***  160.052*** 203.428*** -6.611*** 
Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%. The table presents the coefficients of the results of the panel 
unit root tests of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), 
GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for all the 27 sample 
countries of the WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA combined, for the period 1999 – 2013. The sample 
countries are Burkina Faso (BF), Burundi (BI), Benin (BJ), Botswana (BW), Cote Ivoire (CI), Ethiopia (ET), 
Gambia (GM), Ghana (GH), Kenya (KE), Lesotho (LS), Madagascar (MG), Mali (ML), Mauritania (MR), 
Mauritius (MU), Malawi (MW), Mozambique (MZ), Namibia (NA). Niger (NE), Nigeria (NG), Rwanda (RW), 
Sierra Leone (SL), Senegal (SN), Swaziland (SW), Togo (TG), Tanzania (TZ), Uganda (UG), South Africa 
(ZA). Time trend was not included in these computations.  The four different tests for purposes of robustness 
are ADF - Fisher Chi-square, PP - Fisher Chi-square, Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat. Bandwiths in all the unit root tests are determined by the Newey-West statistic using the Barlett-Kernel.  
   
 
 
Table 3.12. WAEMU Test of Panel Unit Root in Level. 
with Individual Intercept  Without Individual Intercept 
 ADF Test IPS Test PP Test LLC Test  ADF Test  PP Test LLC Test 
EXRATEPC 49.760*** -5.0489*** 26.214** -7.7632***  78.246*** 55.583*** -8.609*** 
GDPRGR 60.638*** -6.241*** 54.199*** -6.964***  16.587 29.871*** -1.156 
DGDPRGR 103.301*** -11.245*** 147.943*** -12.035***  131.700*** 133.569*** -16.659*** 
INFRATE 71.809*** -7.309*** 113.538*** -8.335***  28.975** 45.131*** -3.488*** 
REALINT 51.163*** -5.259*** 53.353*** -6.921***  65.916*** 71.643*** -6.541*** 
Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%; DGDPRGR is differenced GDP growth rate Note: Probability 
values are: ***1% **5% *10%. The table presents the coefficients of the results of the panel unit root tests of our 
selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate 
(GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for all the 7 sample countries of the Euro 
Area, for the period 1999 – 2013. The sample countries are Burkina Faso (BF), Benin (BJ), Cote Ivoire (CI), Mali 
(ML), Niger (NE), Senegal (SN), Togo (TG). Time trend was not included in these computations.  The four 
different tests for purposes of robustness are ADF - Fisher Chi-square, PP - Fisher Chi-square, Levin, Lin & Chu 
(LLC), and Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. Bandwiths in all the unit root tests are determined by the Newey-West 
















Table 3.13. Non-Monetary Union Sub-Saharan Africa Test of Panel Unit 
Root in Level. 
With Individual Intercept Without Individual Intercept 
 ADF Test IPS Test PP Test LLC Test  ADF Test PP Test LLC Test 
EXRATEPC 126.176*** -7.424*** 118.007*** -9.225***  205.385*** 203.584*** -11.712*** 
GDPRGR 134.834*** -7.289*** 202.312*** -10.959***  57.689** 69.531*** -1.439* 
INFRATE 123.361*** -6.348*** 137.915*** -7.129***  56.748** 68.656*** -3.056*** 
REALINT 162.733*** -9.6122*** 171.084*** -10.147***  94.137*** 131.786*** -5.0502*** 
Note: Probability values are: ***1% **5% *10%; The table presents the coefficients of the results of the 
panel unit root tests of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate 
(EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for 
all the 20 sample countries of the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, for the period 1999 – 2013. 
The sample countries are Burundi (BI), Botswana (BW), Ethiopia (ET), Gambia (GM), Ghana (GH), Kenya 
(KE), Lesotho (LS), Madagascar (MG), Mauritania (MR), Mauritius (MU), Malawi (MW), Mozambique (MZ), 
Namibia (NA), Nigeria (NG), Rwanda (RW), Sierra Leone (SL), Swaziland (SW), Tanzania (TZ), Uganda 
(UG), South Africa (ZA). Time trend was not included in these computations. The four different tests for 
purposes of robustness are ADF - Fisher Chi-square, PP - Fisher Chi-square, Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC), and 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. Bandwiths in all the unit root tests are determined by the Newey-West 
statistic using the Barlett-Kernel. 
 
 
Table 3.14. WAEMU Speed of Adjustment and Half-Life. 
 β (WAEMU Average speed of adjustment) Half-life 
EXRATEPC 0.308*** 0.59 
GDPRGR 0.254*** 0.51 
INFRATE -0.176*** 0.45 
REALINT 0.118*** 0.32 
Note: Probability values ***1% **5% *10%. The table presents the results of the WAEMU speed of 
adjustment and Half-life of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage change in exchange rate 
(EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT) for 
all the 7 sample countries of the WAEMU, for the period 1999 – 2013. The sample countries are Burkina 
Faso (BF), Benin (BJ), Cote Ivoire (CI), Mali (ML), Niger (NE), Senegal (SN), Togo (TG). 
 
Table 3.15. Non-Monetary Union Sub-Saharan Africa Speed of Adjustment 
and Half-Life. 
 β (Non-Monetary Union SSA speed of adjustment) Half-life 
EXRATEPC 0.265*** 0.52 
GDPRGR 0.313*** 0.60 
INFRATE 0.276*** 0.54 
REALINT 0.464*** 0.90 
 Note: Probability values ***1% **5% *10% The table presents the results of the non-monetary union Sub-
Saharan Africa speed of adjustment and Half-life of our selected macroeconomic variables: percentage 
change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation rate (INFRATE), and real 
interest rate (REALINT) for all the 20 sample countries of the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
the period 1999 – 2013. The sample countries are Burundi (BI), Botswana (BW), Ethiopia (ET), Gambia 
(GM), Ghana (GH), Kenya (KE), Lesotho (LS), Madagascar (MG), Mauritania (MR), Mauritius (MU), 
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Malawi (MW), Mozambique (MZ), Namibia (NA), Nigeria (NG), Rwanda (RW), Sierra Leone (SL), 
Swaziland (SW), Tanzania (TZ), Uganda (UG), South Africa (ZA). 
 
We present the results of the panel unit root test of all the 
macroeconomic variables indicating convergence of the national values of the 
sample countries of the WAEMU and the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan 
Africa combined to the Sub-Saharan African mean in table 3.11 above. Also in 
tables 3.12 and 3.13 are presented the results of the panel unit root test of all 
the macroeconomic variables to infer convergence of national values to the 
WAEMU and non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African means respectively. 
Clearly, from these three tables it could be seen that the results for all the 
macroeconomic variables, whether in the case of the combined WAEMU and 
the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa or individual zonal analyses, are 
very consistent throughout with a unit root always rejected at mostly statistical 
significance of between 1 and 5 percent as in the European analyses preceding 
it. We can therefore conclude that there is convergence towards the sub-
regional/zonal averages with respect to our chosen macroeconomic variables, 
among countries in the WAEMU and the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan 
Africa respectively, as well as both zones combined. Within the respective 
WAEMU and non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa regions the results also 
give an indication of the periphery economies catching up with the core. In 
regard to the speed of convergence within both the WAEMU and the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, estimating Ben-David’s (1993) model, as 
was done in the European analyses, the results are also somewhat consistent. 
The speed of convergence is generally faster in the WAEMU than in the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, with all our macroeconomic variables apart 
from the percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC) variable. This is a 
sharp deviation from the European analyses where the speed of convergence 
was broadly faster in the non-Euro Area than in the Euro Area. We find for 
example in tables 3.14 and 3.15 that the speed of convergence for GDP growth 
rate (0.254), and real interest rate (0.118) respectively within the WAEMU is 
faster than it obtains in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa (0.313, and 
0.464 respectively). The converse is rather for the percentage change in 
exchange rate variable where the speed of adjustment is faster in the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa than the WAEMU. What all of this means is 
that a generally faster speed of convergence obtains in the WAEMU than in the 
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non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa. We can thus locate a speedier 
catching up process with respect to the exchange rate variable in the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa than in the WAEMU, most probably 
because of the regional integrative processes that have taken off all over the 
region.  The West African Monetary zone (WAMZ) for example is working 
tirelessly towards adopting a common currency any time soon, which it keeps 
postponing, while the Republic of South Africa has been in a common monetary 
arrangement which provides a framework for exchange rate and monetary 
policies since 1986 with Lesotho and Swaziland, both of whom are among our 
sample of countries.  The faster speed of convergence in the WAEMU for all the 
rest of our macroeconomic variables could be explained by the WAEMU’s 
common objective of attaining improved competitiveness, economic 
convergence, common market, policy coordination, and law harmonization 
(Kireyev, 2016). Again, we calculate the half-life of the convergence process for 
both zones, which is the time span which is necessary for current disparities to 
be halved. As per our results in the last columns of tables 3.14 and 3.15 for both 
zones, for all variables, apart from the percentage change in exchange rate 
variable (0.59 for the WAEMU and 0.52 for the non-monetary union Sub-
Saharan Africa) it takes a longer time for the gap between the non-monetary 
union Sub-Saharan Africa countries’ values and the sub-regional average to be 
cut into half than the countries in the WAEMU.  
3.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have looked at the historical background to the 
creation of the European single market, as a world war II desire for the 
restructuring of international financial relations which gave birth to the Bretton 
Woods agreements as a special purpose vehicle which laid down the rules and 
procedures governing the world economy in 1944. We have also looked at the 
Optimum currency areas theory (OCA) as propounded by Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969), and in the context of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union, whereby we find support for the OCA 
endogeneity hypothesis in the literature. The analysis is further extended to the 
WAEMU where we find that the region does not score highly on the OCA 
criteria. For purposes of establishing macroeconomic stability we as well 
ascertained the level of macroeconomic convergence as we believe that 
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macroeconomic convergence has risk implications for the determination of 
NIMs to the extent that the Euro and the non-Euro Areas’ respective abilities to 
deal with economic shocks harmoniously will impact on the cost of financial 
intermediation. This is because significant differences in macroeconomic 
performance between countries have the tendency to elicit different reactions to 
shocks thereby necessitating country-specific responses which may harm an 
entire monetary zone and effectively raise the cost of financial intermediation 
(Oshikoya et al, 2010). To establish the level of macroeconomic convergence 
we employ a gamut of macroeconomic convergence methods starting with 
graphical analysis, through pairwise correlation analysis, sigma convergence 
and panel unit root test. Before then we explore the econometric literature on 
the use of panel unit root test in a rather fairly brief detail, where it is observed 
that the use of several unit root tests in the time series literature have been 
extended to panel data, thereby supporting our approach. Our findings are that 
while all four methods give mixed results we deem the results of the panel unit 
root a more robust one because of its robust theoretical underpinnings in the 
econometric literature. While we find both the Euro Area and non-Euro Area to 
be converging to their respective regional averages as well as their EU average 
on all the four macroeconomic variables we generally find the speed of 
convergence higher in the non-Euro Area than in the Euro Area. This is not 
strange as our sample non-Euro Area countries were vigorously pursuing 
accession agenda. In the final analysis we can establish that possible 
macroeconomic instability resulting from possible lack of convergence in the 
macroeconomic environment within either zone with dire consequences for cost 
of financial intermediation could not be supported. 
The same analysis, however moving straight into the use of the most 
robust of all the methods, test of panel unit root, without any preliminary 
assessment with the use of the less robust methods, is again extended to the 
WAEMU and the non-monetary Sub-Saharan African region as comparator 
regions. The findings here are that there is convergence towards the sub-
regional/zonal averages with respect to our chosen macroeconomic variables, 
among countries in the WAEMU and the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan 
Africa respectively, as well as both zones combined. And that within the 
respective WAEMU and non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa regions the 
results also give an indication of the periphery economies catching up with the 
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core. As well the speed of convergence is generally faster in the WAEMU than 
in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, with all our macroeconomic 
variables, which is also indicative of the fact that their periphery is catching up 
faster with the core than it does in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African 
region. This finding and conclusion again are replicative of the finding for the 
Euro Area and the non-Euro Area convergence. Nevertheless, the findings in 
the WAEMU are in sharp contrast with the findings of Seck (2014) who finds no 
disparity reduction and speed at which the lagging countries were catching up 





4 CHAPTER FOUR 
THE USE OF BANK-LEVEL DATA TO 
STUDY THE DETERMINANTS OF BANK NET 
INTEREST MARGINS IN THE EURO AREA 
VERSUS THE NON-EURO AREA 
4.1 Introduction 
The banking industry in an economy is known to play a crucial role in 
providing support for economic growth, in that it allocates capital in an economy 
by channelling funds from lenders to borrowers. It is therefore important that this 
intermediation role is executed at the lowest possible cost for the realisation of 
greater social welfare, as the lower the intermediation margin, the lower the 
social costs of financial intermediation. This was echoed by Merton (1993) who 
stated that: “A well developed, smoothly functioning financial system facilitates 
the efficient life-cycle allocation of household consumption and the efficient 
allocation of physical capital to its most productive use in the business sector.” It 
is this all-important role of the bank in an economy and the efficiency with which 
it is required to be discharged which links net interest margin (NIM) to the real 
economy, and therefore warrants our investigation, particularly in the context of 
the competition and efficiency effects of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) on the European banking industry. This is further reinforced by the 
European Commission’s (EC) principal objective, in its White Paper on 
Financial Services Policy (2005-2010) which presents the European 
Commission’s financial services policy priorities up to 2010. The paper states 
that the commission’s principal objectives included consolidating dynamically 
towards an integrated, open, inclusive, competitive, and economically efficient 
European Union financial market and to remove the remaining economically 
significant barriers so that financial services could be provided and capital can 
circulate freely throughout the EU at the lowest possible cost (EC’s Financial 
Services Policy 2005-2010). Casu and Giradone (2011) also note that the 
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deregulation of financial services together with the establishment of the EMU 
was aimed at creating a level playing field in the provision of banking services 
across the EU, with the removal of entry barriers to foster competition and 
efficiency in the banking markets. This was because the expectation was that 
increased competition would incentivise bank managers to reduce costs, 
thereby fostering efficiency in turn to maximise social welfare.  
It is not surprising that over a decade after the establishment of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) one of its effects on the 
European banking industry that stands in relief is, competition, and the resulting 
efficiency. We noted that the establishment of the EMU spurred increased 
cross-border consolidation as banking firms sought to take advantage of scale 
economies afforded by the EMU, compete and to achieve efficiency gains. All of 
this is consistent with the literature in which competition is generally regarded 
as a positive force and often associated with the increase in efficiency both of 
which enhance consumer welfare. Note must however be made that the 
momentum of competition experienced in the crisis period tapered in the post-
crisis period (Davis and Karim, 2014)  It is in our bid to find empirical support for 
these developments that we look at the effects of the European Monetary and 
Economic Union (EMU) on bank net interest margin (NIM) and its determinants, 
testing the hypotheses outlined below in sub-section 4.1.1, with particular 
emphasis on competition and efficiency, which to the best of our knowledge, 
has never been studied. In this empirical study we contrast our findings in the 
Euro Area with the non-Euro Area. For our analysis we use a total sample of 
361 banks, made up of 290 banks from the Euro Area, and 71 banks from the 
non-Eurozone, from across 9 countries of the Euro Area where we could obtain 
adequate data on individual banks, namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, but not for Spain; and 7 
countries from the non-Euro Area namely, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania over the period 2002 – 2013. 
Overall we find all our tested hypotheses outlined in the next sub-section 
4.1.1 supported by our empirical results. That is, we find reducing impact of our 
explanatory variables on NIMs in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area 
reflecting, inter alia, a more competitive environment, greater scale and 
management efficiencies and a higher macroeconomic stability generated by 
the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section, which is 
Section 4.2 reviews the empirical literature on banking competition in the 
European. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and data, followed by 
Section 4.4 which also discusses the empirical results. And lastly Section 4.5 
concludes with policy implications and recommendations.   
4.1.1 Tested Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1 
       We hypothesize that the two efficient structure hypotheses, that is, 
the X-efficiency, referring to, management efficiency, and proxied by 
bank cost-to-income ratio, and abbreviated as (BMQCI) and S-efficiency, 
that is scale efficiency, also proxied by log of bank total assets and 
abbreviated as (BSIZE), both have a greater reducing effect on NIM in 
the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area. 
We recognise that the EMU has attracted and will continue to attract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from within and outside the union, 
particularly large ones that might only be viable above a certain size 
resulting in: a) economies of scale b) lower marginal cost, all with 
reducing effects on NIM in the Euro zone than in the non-Euro zone 
(Oshikoya et al, 2010) 
 Hypothesis 2 
The degree of banking competition, respectively using the Boone indicator, 
the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), has a larger 
magnitude of reducing impact on NIM in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro 
Area, because of the effects of the EMU by way of the single market in 
combination with free capital movement, free open borders and the single 
banking licence affording market contestability. 
As the generally accepted hypothesis goes a more competitive banking 
market is expected to drive down bank loan rates/increase deposit rates, 
adding to the welfare of households and enterprises (Van Leuvensteijn, 
2009). Within the context of the Euro and the non-Euro Areas the reducing 
effect of the competition variable on NIM is so expected given the liberalised 
and harmonised financial regulation which allows free competitive market 
behaviour and cross-border operation within the single market, as well as 
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creating a level-playing field between banks from different member states 
(ECB, 1999). However, the magnitude of the reducing impact is expected to 
be higher in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area because of the effects 
of a monetary union. 
 Hypothesis 3 
We hypothesize that exchange rate has a larger reducing impact on NIM in 
the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area. Exchange rate stability between 
countries within the Euro Area should enhance the effectiveness of the 
Single Market as a source of competitive pressure. 
4.2 Empirical Literature on banking competition in the 
European   Union 
In this section we examine the empirical Literature on banking 
competition in the European Union to see how it has evolved, and if indeed 
differences obtain in the levels of competition between the Euro Area and the 
non-Euro Area.  
Competition in banking like other industries is generally considered to 
have welfare implications as it impacts the efficiency with which banks deliver 
services to the public, and the quality and prices of products and services they 
put on offer. It is not surprising that the establishment of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of the Euro and the 
extensive deregulation of financial services, all of which took place over two 
decades ago, were all aimed at fostering integration, eliminating entry barriers 
and promoting competition and efficiency in EU banking (Casu and Girardone, 
2009; Weill, 2011). Our objective in this section therefore is to analyse the 
evolution of competition in the EU banking industry to ascertain whether the 
process of integration has indeed resulted in the expected results in terms of 
competition, efficiency in bank intermediation and ultimately welfare. It must 
however be noted that the nexus between competition, efficiency and financial 
stability has not been straightforward both in the theoretical and empirical 
literature16. For example, while Carletti and Hartmann (2002) find that the 
widely-accepted trade-off between competition and stability does not generally 
hold, Northcott (2004) note that there is no consensus in the literature as to 
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which competitive structure optimizes both efficiency and stability. That said, to 
the extent that the philosophy exists that competition is important for the 
dynamic efficiency of the banking industry bank market competition authorities 
within the EU like in other jurisdictions around the world have never relented in 
fostering competition among banks within the EU. In the EU the responsibility 
for competition policy and enforcement is the remit of the European 
Commission (EC), where the presence of a possible trade-off between 
competition and stability has always been central to policy formulation (Casu 
and Girardone, 2011). 
In the dawning years of the EMU it was widely claimed that there had 
been phenomenal structural change in the European banking and financial 
services market, manifesting itself in the shape of trends towards consolidation; 
heightened disintermediation and increase in the level of actual and potential 
cross-border competition, with a downward pressure on bank profitability, 
particularly catalysed by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Goddard et 
al., 2001; Humphrey et al., 2006; De Bandt,. and Davis, 1999). A few studies at 
the time however point to a reduced banking competition, thereby countering 
the generally accepted view of heightened competition (Fernandez de Guevara, 
Maudos and Perez, 2005; Weill, 2004 in Weill, 2011). Nonetheless Weill (2004) 
argues that most of the 1990s mergers and acquisitions were domestic in 
nature and therefore anti-competitive, but in the post EMU banking industry 
competition the major mergers and acquisitions are cross-border and are as a 
result competition-enhancing. Bikker and Bos (2008) also echo a similar 
perspective by noting that while cross-border competition increased across the 
EU within the confines of the individual EU countries’ national borders some 
banks may occupy dominant positions. Indeed, with the advent of the EMU, 
which saw the consolidation of harmonised regulations, the absence of 
exchange rate risk for banks and the elimination of entry barriers; the European 
banking landscape can be said to be characterised by cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, consolidation, and further intensification of banking 
competition and contestability. This is supported by Weill (2011) who finds 
greater banking competition and integration in the EU, post-EMU. This cross-
border nature of competition in the EU is further given credence by Andries and 
Capraru (2012) who find evidence to conclude that competition in the EU is 
more the work of the internationalization process than deregulation. Figure 4.1 
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shows a consistent reduction in the number of credit institutions over the period 
2002 to 2013 in the EU to confirm the consolidated nature of the banking 
industry through cross-border mergers and acquisitions as a result of 
competition, this trend is however not as marked in the non-Euro Area as in the 
Euro Area and the EU as a whole. 
  Bikker et al. (2006) however note that the increased concentration and 
the increased market shares of major banks may have impaired competition. 
This fear was re-echoed by Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) who also suggested that 
the blurring of the borders between sectors of the financial serves industry may 
have weakened banking competition within the EU.  
The theoretical relationship between competition and net interest margin 
is not difficult to find in the literature. And it is generally accepted that the level 
of net interest margins reflects competitive conditions and efficiency in a bank 
market, premised on the assumption that competition forces banking firms to be 
efficient and narrows bank interest margins. To that extent Bikker and Bos 
(2009) posit that in the decade following the introduction of the EMU net interest 
margins in most countries within the EU fell, implying heightened competition, 
although the steady decline in interest rates may also have been a contributing 
factor. Analysis of competition and efficiency in 27 EU banking systems by 
Andries and Capraru (2012) over the period 2001 to 2009 corroborate this 
inferring competition from the relationship between competition and efficiency, 
and concluded that an increase in the efficiency of banks fostered competition 
in the new EU member states, most of which belong to our sampled non-Euro 
zone countries. Liebscher (2005) also underscored the implications for bank net 
interest margins in the wake of intense competition within the EU and said 
higher competition may lead to a reduction in interest rate margins and that 
without a compensating rise in cost efficiency might adversely affect banks’ 
profitability, particularly in the Euro zone. The consequence would then be for 
banks to be tempted to relax their credit policies and take on more risk in their 
bid to maintain profitability.  
It could be seen from the forgoing empirical studies that within the broad 
European Union in the post EMU era the presence of intense banking 
competition is observed. It must however be noted that most of the sampled 
countries in these studies belong to the Euro zone. For example, of the 14 EU 
countries studied by Humphrey et al (2006) only Sweden and the United 
93 
 
Kingdom do not belong to the Euro Area, the remaining 12 are all Euro Area 
countries.  
Figure 4.1. Number of Credit Institutions in the EU, the Euro Area and the 
non-Euro Area, 2002 – 2013. 
 
Source: ECB and author’s own calculation 
Also in our sample of non-Euro Area countries all of which belong to the 
CEEC block evidence is rife that competition levels are approaching the levels 
which obtain in the Euro zone as they open their economies to the large EU 
banks that may be operating at relatively low margins and may wish to extend 
their cross-border operations into the CEEC (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). To 
be precise Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) find the level of competition in our 
sampled non-Euro zone countries as monopolistic competition. Andries and 
Capraru (2012) also find an increase in competition in our sampled non-Euro 
zone countries among other CEEC countries over the period under study, 2001 
to 2009, and attributed it to deregulation and foreign banks’ entry through 
acquisitions or ‘greenfield’ investments.  
It could be concluded here that overall, across the Euro and non-Euro 
zones increases in cross-border banking competition have been observed, 
particularly after the creation of the EMU as opposed to within individual 
countries. The peculiarity of the nature of these observed increases in 
competition being the cross-border or international nature of it as opposed to 
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4.3 Methodology and Data description 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
The application of the single-step, static approach which incorporates all 
the determinants of net interest margins in a single estimation is the norm in the 
literature (Agoraki, 2009). We would however argue that the static model cannot 
be justified for advanced countries as in emerging markets. This is because in 
advanced economies, unlike emerging economies where information opacity is 
rife, banks’ assessment of net interest margins and its determinants is based on 
clear information that changes only slowly over time. Not all the relevant 
information can be updated based on new information each period, so that 
NIMs could be systematically related each period, which provides enough 
justification for a dynamic specification as opposed to a static, one for advanced 
economies. The existence of inertia may also reflect the inability to observe all 
determinants of the NIM, and some may evolve slowly over time. The need for a 
dynamic approach is a testable proposition, and if serial correlation exists in a 
static evaluation of NIMs it is almost certainly the case that a lagged dependent 
variable is the omitted variable that causes the serial correlation. 
The static approach has been applied in several studies including 
McShane and Sharpe (1985), Angbazo (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), Claeys and Vander Vennet 
(2008), and Valverde and Fernandez (2007). The basic framework for this 
model involves the estimation of the following linear equation which brings 
together all the determinants of NIMs in a single stage as follows: 
 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 +  𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀
   + 𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀
 +    𝑖𝑡  




where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  represents the bank net interest margin for bank 𝑖, at time  𝑡, α is a 
constant term, 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆
 denotes the vector of bank-specific explanatory 
variables, where it indexes bank 𝑖, at time 𝑡, 𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀
 is a vector of 
market/industry characteristics variables,  𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀
 is a vector of macroeconomic 
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control variables, and 𝑖𝑡  is the error term capturing all other omitted factors, 
with 𝜇𝑖 being the unobserved bank-specific effect and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 the idiosyncratic 
error.  Such static models in the literature are commonly estimated using least 
squares methods on fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) models. 
However, in dynamic relationships as is the case in our study these methods 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates, particularly with a large N and 
smaller T, which does not augur well for the accurate estimation of N-invariant 
regressors, mostly macroeconomic regressors (Garcia-Herrero et al, 2009), in 
which case the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator may be 
employed. 
The display of a dynamic model in this particular study is our anticipation 
that previous values of bank margins may affect current values of those margins 
as banks need to match the random deposit supply function and the random 
demand of lending and non-traditional activities across periods (Valverde and 
Fernandez, 2007). Indeed, Valverde and Fernandez (2007) posit that the 
maximization of bank wealth considers both initial and end-of-period 
information. Therefore, within the empirical literature NIMs are known to display 
a tendency to persist over time. In this regard, we state the following dynamic 
specification of our model, which includes a lagged dependent variable among 
the regressors. 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿У𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 +  𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀
   + 𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀
 +    𝑖𝑡  








) and macroeconomic variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀), and 𝑦𝑖𝑡  represents 
the net interest margin. Subscripts 𝑖  and 𝑡 are for 𝑖-th bank and 𝑡-th time 
period. The error term has an unobserved bank-specific (𝜇𝑖), and the 
idiosyncratic error (𝜈𝑖𝑡) components, however we anticipate a possibility that, 
given developments like the 2007/2008 global financial crisis that occurred in 
the European banking sector during the sample period, time effects are present 
in the error component of the model, for which 𝛾𝑡  is the unobserved time 
effects.    У𝑖𝑡−1 is the one-period lagged NIM and 𝛿 the speed of adjustment to 
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equilibrium. A value of 𝛿 between 0 and 1 implies that NIMs persist, but they 
will eventually return to their normal (average) level after a temporary shock, 
that is, mean-reverting. A value close to 0 means that the industry is fairly 
rapidly competitive (high speed of adjustment), while a value of 𝛿 close to 1 
implies less immediate competitive structure (very slow adjustment).  
In the econometric literature because the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term by construction using OLS with fixed effects in the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors gives rise to 
dynamic panel bias and inconsistent estimates (Nickel, 1981; Roodman, 2006). 
The combination of this problem and the challenges of unobservable 
heterogeneity across banks, as well as the potential endogeneity with some of 
our regressors warrant that we move away from the methodology of OLS with 
fixed or random effects and employ the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator following Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
We anticipate that the challenge of unobservable heterogeneity in this 
study could be reflected in for example differences in ownership structure 
across banks and jurisdictions, Management quality, and so on. With regards to 
potential endogeneity we consider that banks with higher NIM may be able to 
increase their equity more easily through profit retention17. Again they would 
also be able to afford more advertising to increase their market share and 
consequently their size, of which they might take advantage to increase their 
NIM. Such reverse causality is not difficult to find in banking operations, and the 
use of OLS for estimation yields biased and inconsistent results in the presence 
of such problems.   
To overcome the problem of endogeneity the meticulous use of 
instrumental variables is suggested in the literature as they are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the error term. Nevertheless, if the instruments are poorly 
correlated with the explanatory variables they are meant to replace they render 
the regression results biased and inconsistent. To eliminate the time-invariant 
bank-specific effects emanating from unobservable heterogeneity, as well as 
the problem of endogeneity Arellano and Bond (1991) initially suggest first-
                                            
17
 Athanasoglou et al. (2008) suggest that capital ratio is better modelled as an endogenous 
determinant of bank profitability in econometrical models. 
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differencing the regression equation for a GMM estimator for panel data, and 
also instrumenting the endogenous explanatory variables with suitable lags of 
their own levels.  Nonetheless, given that the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator was flawed to the extent that if the lagged levels to be used as 
instruments were weakly correlated with the differences of the explanatory 
variables because they may be highly persistent then the included 
supplementary instruments may not be useful and thus yield large sample bias.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) therefore propose an improved panel data GMM 
estimator. This GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is the system GMM. Their position is 
that lagged levels are often poor instruments for variables in first differences. 
Thus, the original equations in levels can be added to the system, whereby 
predetermined and endogenous variables are instrumented with their own 
lagged first-differences, in which case the system GMM estimator is proven to 
have dramatic efficiency gains over the basic first-difference GMM (Baltagi, 
2001). To this effect, in this study, we treat all bank specific variables in section 
4.3.2.1 as endogenous and instrument them with their orthogonal 
transformations. We also test whether the instruments, as a group, are 
exogenous and indeed valid by performing the Hansen J. specification test of 
over-identifying restrictions. The test examines the lack of correlation between 
the instruments and the error term. Serial correlation has to be tested carefully 
in this context, and as Roodman (2009) explains, we expect to see first order 
serial correlation and not second order given the techniques we are using. All 
our results do display first order serial correlation, and we only test for second 
order.  We obtain the AR2 statistics which measure the presence of second-
order serial correlation with the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation 
in the residuals. So in all we deem the methodology followed, that is, the system 
GMM estimator capable of controlling for potential endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity and the persistence of the dependent variable, to yield consistent 
unbiased estimators.  
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4.3.2 Variable Construction 
Following the empirical literature in Chapter one, we implement model 
4.2 in section 4.3.1 above by considering the following bank-specific, 




4.3.2.1 Bank-specific variables 
Dependent variable 
 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
In the introduction chapter we defined net interest margin of banks. For 
completeness, however we repeat it here, and also do an accounting 
decomposition of it following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). NIM is an 
accounting ratio which reflects bank efficiency in its intermediation role18. It is 
defined as a bank’s total interest income minus the total interest expense over 




𝑁𝐼𝑀 =  





    
The accounting decomposition of a bank’s interest margin from a bank’s 
accounting identity of profits was first developed by Hanson and Rocha (1986), 
and followed by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Beck and Fuchs 
(2004). The starting point is to establish what constitutes a bank’s before-tax-
profits-to-assets (BTP/TA). Before tax profits to assets (BTP/TA) equals after-
tax profits to assets (ATP/TA) plus taxes to assets (TX/TA). Therefore, BTP/TA 
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 While net interest margin can indicate bank efficiency or inefficiency, it is not always the case 
that a reduction in net interest margins means improved bank efficiency, as a reduction in net 
interest margins can, reflect a reduction in bank taxation or, alternatively, a higher loan default 
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) into its constituent parts as follows: 
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Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).  
From the foregoing accounting decomposition, it is clear that NIM as a 
summary measure of banks’ net interest return is also an important component 
of bank profits (Angbazo,1997). Also according to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) 
while NIM reflects the efficiency with which a bank intermediates, it is also an 
indicator of the competitive nature of the banking markets. This is supported by 
Bikker and Bos (2008) who note that while competition and efficiency describe 
two different things they are often seen as almost synonymous, in that heavy 
competition forces banks to improve efficiency. As a result, like profitability 
measures as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) NIM is 
expected to be smaller, the heavier competition is, thereby establishing a 
negative relationship between NIM and competition.  
 
Independent variables 
 Bank Capital (BCAP) 
Our bank capital variable proxies for risk aversion and regulatory 
requirements which is the norm in the empirical literature investigating the 
determinants of net interest margins. To this effect we use the ratio of equity to 
assets, hereafter abbreviated as BCAP, to proxy the bank capital variable. By 
Bankscope’s definition this ratio measures the amount of protection afforded to 
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the bank by the equity they invested in it, as equity is a cushion against asset 
malfunction. And that the higher this figure the more protection there is. Our 
choice of this ratio as a proxy for this variable is particularly motivated by 
McShane and Sharpe (1985), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), 
Claeys and Vennet (2008).  According to the theoretical model, a positive 
relationship is expected between our bank capital variable and net interest 
margin, as banks that are most risk averse will require a higher margin to cover 
the higher costs of equity financing compared to external financing, ceteris 
paribus. As well because these banks are seen to have lower bankruptcy and 
funding costs they are more likely able to charge higher margins. In addition, 
increases in regulatory capital requirements will also increase the NIM as banks 
are forced to fund their loan book using more expensive capital rather than 
lower cost debt and deposits. 
 
 Bank Credit Quality (BCREDSK) 
Saad and El-Moussawi (2012) in Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) note that credit 
risk belongs to the group of factors with the highest impact on banks’ interest 
margins. Nassreddine et al (2013) also assert that the impact of deterioration of 
the credit quality on the NIM seems positive as banks seek to increase their 
margins to compensate, on the one hand the risk of default, and on the other 
additional costs necessary to monitor these credits. Following Bankscope’s 
categorisation of asset quality ratios our bank credit quality variable, 
abbreviated to BCREDSK hereafter, is the ratio of loan loss provision to net 
interest revenue19. It is the relationship between provisions in the profit and loss 
account and the interest income over the same period. While this ratio should 
ideally be as low as possible, in a well-managed bank if the lending book is 
fraught with a higher risk it should be reflected by higher margins. Also while 
this ratio may not provide a forward-looking measure of bank exposure to 
default and asset quality it is more predominant in the literature than the 
forward-looking proxies like loan-to-asset ratio. We would therefore, as it 
broadly obtains in the empirical literature expect its relationship with NIM to be 
positive.  
                                            
19
 Ideally, the credit quality should be proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans 
as is predominant in the empirical literature. The Bankscope database however only has these 




 Bank liquidity (BLIQ) 
We follow Ahmad and Matemilola (2013); and Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) 
and proxy our bank liquidity variable as the ratio of net loans to customer 
deposit and short-term funding, which we abbreviate hereafter as BLIQ. The 
understanding is that to the extent that banks’ relatively illiquid loans are largely 
funded by relatively stable customer deposits they must ensure they have 
sufficient liquidity resources to be able to pay depositors in the event that a 
large number of them and investors may wish to withdraw their savings, that is, 
the bank’s funding at once, leaving the bank short of funds which may have 
inimical consequences for critical services banks contribute to the economy. In 
order to compensate for this risk, known as liquidity risk, a premium dependable 
on the level of risk, is charged to the interest income. A high liquidity ratio 
means that a bank has adequate liquid assets to be able to meet unexpected 
deposit withdrawals or to fund increased loan demands and vice versa. We 
would therefore expect that banks with high levels of liquid assets, either 
voluntarily or for prudential reasons or as a result of regulation, may receive 
lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets, in which case, and 
given that the market for deposits is reasonably competitive, the relationship 
with net interest margin is expected to be negative (Angbazo, 1997; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2004). Conversely, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) state that the 
liquidity ratio may have a positive impact on interest margins to the extent that 
banks are able to transfer this opportunity cost to borrowers. Under conditions 
of high volatility of wholesale funding on which banks have increasingly become 
dependent, bank interest rates can significantly diverge from the central bank 
rates, because of difficulties in obtaining liquidity. For example, during the 
2007/8 financial crisis spill-over of tensions in the US subprime mortgage 
markets to the banks’ short-term wholesale funding market in the EU led to a 
rapid deterioration of liquidity conditions (van Rixtel and Gasperini, 2013) 
 
 Bank Size (BSIZE) 
The inclusion of the bank size variable accounts for possible scale 
economies, where average cost declines as bank output rises, resulting from 
spreading fixed costs over a greater volume of output. Whether or not this 
happens in reality, that is, if indeed just based on their size larger banks are 
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more efficient than small banks has spanned a lot of empirical literature. Allen 
and Liu (2007) note that broadly, most studies on economies of scale in 
financial institutions find only small economies of scale in a firm’s cost structure.  
Also within the empirical literature there exists the general feeling that 
economies of scale rise up to a certain level with size, beyond which financial 
institutions become too complex to manage and diseconomies of scale sets in. 
We therefore anticipate that the effect of size could be nonlinear, meaning that 
NIM is likely to increase up to a certain level by achieving economies of scale 
and decline from a certain level at which banks become too complex to 
manage. As earlier noted because the possible collapse of some large and 
complex banks could generate negative externalities that could cascade into the 
real economy, for which reason governments and regulatory authorities 
endeavour to prevent always, S-efficiency could have a positive impact on NIM. 
This problem with large and complex financial institutions is what is often 
referred to in the banking literature as ‘too-big-to-fail’ (Dudley, 2012). We would 
thus use the logarithm of total asset to capture the potential non-linear effect of 
bank size on NIM and thus expect the sign of the coefficient of bank size to be 
ambiguous based on the literature. Athanasoglou et al (2008) use real assets in 
logs and their square to capture the possible non-linear relationship between 
bank size and profitability in their analysis of the determinants of bank 
profitability in Greece over the period 1985 – 2001. 
 
• Bank Management Quality (BMQCI) 
This variable controls for the X-efficiency as described in our hypothesis, 
and is proxied by the cost to income ratio, defined as operating expenses of a 
bank as a share of sum of net-interest revenue and other operating income. It 
effectively measures the operating cost incurred to generate one unit of gross 
income or revenue. It is included as an indicator of the management’s 
contribution in interest margins, to the extent that management quality is 
reflected in the composition of a bank’s portfolio through providing, inter alia, 
profitable composition of assets and low-cost liabilities. A variety of measures 
have been used to proxy for management quality in the empirical literature. 
Angbazo (1997) for example uses ratio of earning assets to total assets, while 
Maudos and Fernandez De Guevera (2004); Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) use 
cost-to-income ratio. Our choice of cost-to-income ratio is motivated by Maudos 
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and Fernandez De Guevera (2004) posit that an increase in this ratio implies a 
decrease in the efficiency or quality of management, which will translate into a 
lower interest margin. And thus a negative sign is expected. In this study we 
use this management quality proxy to test for the hypothesis of X-efficiency as 
delineated in section 4.1.1 above. The X-efficiency (X-ES) version of the 
efficient structure hypothesis (ESH) states that banks with superior 
management or production technologies have lower costs and subsequently 
can offer more competitive interest rates on loans and/or deposits, leading to a 
negative relationship between operational efficiency and interest margins 




4.3.2.2 Industry-specific variables 
We capture the effect of the degree of banking market competition with 
three proxies for the robustness of competition: 
 The use of the Lerner index which is common in the empirical 
literature 
 The use of the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI) 
 The use of the Boone Indicator which is relatively novel in the 
literature. 
And in the light of the earlier hypothesized competition and x-efficiency in 
both the Eurozone and the non-Euro zone we would expect all three 
competition measures to bear a negative sign. In what follows we look at 
the nature of our three competition measures. 
 
Competition measures 
 The Lerner index 
Data for the Lerner index is taken from the World Bank’s Global Financial 
Development Database. And is calculated from the underlying bank-by-bank 
data from the Bankscope by World Bank and Bankscope staff using annual data 
from 1996-2010. The estimations follow the methodology described in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2010)20. The index is one of the non-
structural measures of competition used in the banking competition literature to 
infer competitive behaviour of banks. It directly measures pricing power by 
                                            
20
 They also follow Fernandez de Guevera et al (2005, 2007) and Berger et al (2008) 
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examining the price markup over marginal cost21. It is the difference between 
the price and the marginal cost, divided by the price, which measures the 
capacity to set prices above the marginal cost, being an inverse function of the 
elasticity of demand and of the number of banks (Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevera, 2004). Higher values of it indicate greater market power and lower 
levels of bank competition. Simply put the Lerner index is a level measure of the 
percentage that price exceeds marginal cost represented algebraically as 
follows:  
 
𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  





where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price charged by bank 𝑖̇ at time t on their assets and 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the 
marginal cost. The calculation of marginal costs is also based on the following 
specification of a trans logarithmic cost function, where the estimated 
coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost: 
 






















+  𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖  𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑗𝑖 
+ 𝜇1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜇2
1
2
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑2 +  𝜇3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐴𝑖 +  ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝟑
𝒋=𝟏
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ln 𝑤𝑗𝑖 + 𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑖 
 
(4.6)  
Where 𝐶𝑖 is the bank’s total costs, including financial and operating costs; and 
total assets (𝑇𝐴𝑖) proxies as a measure of bank output. Prices of the production 
factors are defined as follows:   
W1. Price of labour, defined as the ratio of labour costs to total assets. 
W2. Price of capital, which is the ratio of operating costs (excluding personnel 
costs) / Fixed assets. 
W3. Price of deposits, defined as financial Costs / Customer and short-term 
funding 
 The costs function (and hence of the marginal costs) is estimated separately 
for each country. This allows the parameters of the cost function to vary from 
one country to another to reflect different technologies. Fixed effects, are as 
well incorporated, aimed at capturing the influence of variables specific to each 
                                            
21
 That is, the extra cost of producing an additional unit of output. 
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bank. Also included is a trend (Trend) to reflect the effect of technical change, 
which translates into movements of the cost function over time. Empirical 
studies that have used the Lerner index include, Fernandez de Guevera et al 
(2005), Carbo et al (2009), and Maudos and Fernandez de Guevera (2004). 
Following Fernandez de Guevera et al (2005) we dissect the index into its 
constituent parts as follows, first, with the assumption that the production of 
goods and services by a bank is proportional to its total assets, and therefore 
their prices can be calculated by estimating the average price of bank 
production, proxied by total assets, as a quotient of total revenue and total 






 The Boone Indicator of Competition 
 
The Boone indicator is a new approach to measuring competition 
recently introduced by Boone (2008). Data for the indicator is taken from the 
World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database. And is calculated from 
the underlying bank-by-bank data from the Bankscope by World Bank and 
Bankscope staff using annual data from 1997-2010. The estimations follow the 
methodology described in Schaeck and Cihák (2010) with a modification to use 
marginal costs instead of average costs22. This new measure of competition is 
based on the notion that in a competitive market more efficient companies are 
likely to be rewarded in terms of profits than their less efficient counterparts. 
This notion was motivated by Demsetz’s (1973) efficiency hypothesis which has 
it that more efficient firms achieve superior performance in the way of higher 
profits than their less efficient competitors. It is this reallocation effect from 
inefficient to efficient firms which the Boone indicator exploits. The Boone 
indicator is the profit elasticity estimating the percentage decrease in profits 
resulting from a 1 percent increase in the marginal cost as follows (Clerides et 
al, 2013): 
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The effect being intensified when the least efficient firms exit the market. 
Boone (2008) demonstrates that the reallocation effect increases in monotone 
with the degree of competition; with competition resulting from a decrease in 
entry costs or to goods becoming closer substitutes. By this Boone (2008) 
indicates the difference between profits will increase when the market is more 
competitive, as the more efficient market will severely punish the least efficient 
bank. So that  
the profit elasticity establishes a link between firm performance with 
differences in efficiency, measured by marginal cost, leading to the following 
estimable regression-based empirical model: 
 




where 𝛼, 𝛽𝑡 and 𝛾 are parameters and 𝜋𝑖𝑡 denotes the profit of firm i in year t. 
Relative profits 𝜋𝑖𝑡/𝜋𝑗𝑡 are defined for any pair of firms and depend, inter alia, 
on the relative marginal costs of the respective firms, 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡/ 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑡 . The variable 
𝜏𝑖 is a time trend and 𝑖𝑡 an error term. The parameter of interest is 𝛽𝑡. It is 
expected to have a negative sign, because relatively efficient firms make higher 
profits. For example, if β = -0.2, a 1% increase in the marginal cost, due to a 
decrease in the efficiency level) of bank I will decrease its profits by 0.2 %. If β = 
-0.5, a 1% increase in the marginal cost of bank will decrease its profits by 0.5 
%.  And the 𝛽𝑡 is referred to as the Boone indicator. Boone shows that when 
profit differences are increasingly determined by marginal-cost differences, this 
indicates increased competition. As marginal cost 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 cannot be observed 
directly, it is derived from a trans-logarithmic cost function similar to the 
estimable cost function for the Lerner index above and commonly used in the 
banking literature. Empirical application to banking of the Boone indicator is 
limited and can be found in studies including Schaeck and Cihák (2012) and 
Amidu and Wilson (2014). Given the much touted banking competition resulting 
from the single market and currency we would expect it to have a negative 
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relationship with NIM in both the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area, but of a 
higher magnitude in the Euro Area than the non-Euro Area. 
 
 The Herfindhal-Hirschman Index 
 
The Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the most widely treated 
summary measure of concentration in the theoretical literature and often serves 
as a benchmark for the evaluation of other concentration indices (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002). In the United States, the HHI plays a significant role in the 
enforcement process of antitrust laws in banking. It is often called the full-
information index because it captures features of the entire distribution of bank 
sizes, as it takes into account all banks and not only the largest ones, and also 
considers the inequality of market shares (Garcia-Herrero et al, 2009). It takes 
the form:   





That is the HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual 
market shares of all the firms in the market. The HHI gives proportionately 
greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms. The HHI   index ranges 
between 1 𝑛⁄   and 1, reaching its lowest value, the reciprocal of the number of 
banks, when all banks in a market are of equal size, and reaching unity in the 
case of monopoly. Davies (1979) in Bikker and Haaf (2002) analyses the 
sensitivity of the HHI to its two constituent parts, that is, the number of banks in 
the market and the inequality in market shares among the different banks and 
finds that the index becomes less sensitive to changes in the number of banks 
the larger the number of banks in the industry. Bikker and Haaf (2002) note that 
just as the index is widely treated in the theoretical literature so is it also about 
the most widely applied banking competition/concentration measure in the 
empirical literature on banking competition. As with the aforementioned 
competition measures we would expect it to have a negative relationship with 
NIM in both the Eurozone and the non-Euro zone. 
We would like to argue that of the three foregoing competition variables 
the Boone indicator might seem to better reflect the competitiveness emanating 
from the single market and the establishment of the European economic and 
monetary union (EMU). This is because firstly, the Boone indicator is 
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monotonically related to competition, and that with no activity restrictions and no 
entry barriers and costs in the EMU, which are the theoretical bases of the 
indicator these would be captured more appropriately by it. Secondly the Boone 
indicator, unlike the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI), is a non-structural 
competition measure reflecting individual bank behaviour and therefore can 
capture cross-country competition effects than the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) which is a structural measure, making it country-specific and therefore not 
particularly appropriate for a cross-country study as ours where we expect 
effective cross border competition. Again to the extent that the index becomes 
less sensitive to changes in the number of banks the larger the number of 
banks in the industry, as posited by Davies (1979), it will not be as good a 
metric for a cross-country study like the EU as for a single country study. The 
Lerner index while it is a non-structural competition measure, not requiring the 
relevant market to be defined, unlike the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and 
would therefore also be appropriate for a cross-country study like this, is also 
bedevilled by some shortcomings. Leon (2015) note that although the Lerner 
index is a measure of pricing market power and not a proxy for competition an 
increase of average market power over time may reflect an increase in the 
intensity of competition23. So overall we argue here that while the Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index (HHI) is country-specific, the Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator could reflect conditions across countries. 
 
4.3.2.3 Macroeconomic variables 
 
We consider that the macroeconomic environment may as well impact 
NIM through a variety of channels. For instance, credit risk is influenced by 
economic growth, inflation and the level of real interest rates to the extent that 
they affect the borrower’s repayment ability and the value of collateral (Garcia-
Herrero et al, 2009). Again as macroeconomic instability heightens the risk 
faced by commercial banks it may have consequences for social welfare 
through increased NIM. Following most studies in the empirical literature we 
capture various aspects of the macroeconomic environment using percentage 
                                            
23
 Leon (2015) makes reference to recent studies which show that there have been situations 
where in the presence of decreases in individual Lerner indices as a result of competition, the 
average degree of market power either increases or decrease or remain stable owing to the 
reallocation effect from inefficient firms to efficient ones (Boone, 2008). 
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change in real exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), 
inflation rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT). Percentage change 
in real exchange rate is defined as the real exchange rates growth rates 
(EXRATEPC), that is, the percentage change in the Euro in the case of the 
Eurozone and the respective relevant national currencies in the case of the non-
Euro zone to the US Dollar exchange rate adjusted by the CPIs from the USA 
Department of Agriculture website. While the effective exchange rates can be 
used, we follow what is predominant in the empirical literature and elect to use 
the real percentage change in the relevant currency to the dollar. Effective 
exchange rates reflect a weighted average of the movements in cross-
exchange rates against a basket of other currencies, with weights reflecting the 
relative importance of the other currencies , as measured by trade flows 
between the relevant countries (www.bankofengland.co.uk) Given the 
elimination of transaction costs through the single currency we would expect a 
reducing effect on NIM in the case of the Eurozone, and also in the non-
Eurozone because of their participation in the ERM II in readiness of accession. 
GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) is measured as the annual percentage growth rate 
of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency and aggregates 
based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Evidence abound in the extant literature 
that a positive relationship exists between rapid economic growth, measured by 
GDP growth rate and NIM as demand for credit increase during periods of 
economic boom and thus widen NIM (Athanasoglou, 2008).  Chortareas et al 
(2011) also used GDP growth as a control variable in their study of the 
determinants of NIM in Latin American banks and found a rather negative 
relationship with NIM. We would similarly expect the same result for real interest 
rates as shown in the empirical literature. The real interest rate variable is 
included to capture the stance of monetary policy. It is defined as the lending 
interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator (World Bank 
National Accounts data). Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) used real interest 
rate as well as government short term securities in their study of commercial 
bank interest margins and profitability in 80 countries from 1988 to 1995 and 
arrived at a negative relationship between real interest rate and NIM. Finally, 
our inflation rate variable (INFRATE) is measured by the CPI percentage 
change (World Bank National Accounts data). In line with the literature we 
expect a positive relationship between inflation rate and NIM, especially as in a 
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developed environment like EU the relationship would incorporate inflation 
expectations. Gunter et al (2013) however believe with perfect foresight of 
inflation there should be no influence on NIM, at least in theory. They find that in 
Austria where inflation has been stable over a long period, that is, low inflation 
variance, it may have caused banks to refrain from pricing in inflation for NIM. 
 
4.3.3 Data sources 
For our analysis, we use a total sample of 361 banks, made up of 290 
commercial banks from the Eurozone and 71 banks from the non-Eurozone, 
from across 16 countries of the Euro and non-Euro zones, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
for the Eurozone; and Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania for the non-Eurozone, over the period 2002 – 
2013. We intentionally took Spain from the analysis because of limited data. In 
selecting our non-Eurozone countries as a comparator group of countries we 
were mindful of the fact that it would have served our purposes better if we 
chose a group of countries whose special characteristics and features were 
similar, especially in terms of level of development, to those in the Eurozone. 
Nevertheless, the number of such EU countries outside the Euro Area like the 
UK and Sweden were very limited, hence our choice of the group of countries 
who, although, were predominantly of the CEEC block, were part of the EU over 
a greater part of the considered period. 
As could be gleaned from the previous section our explanatory variables 
are divided into three groups being: bank specific variables, banking market-
structure variables, and country-specific macroeconomic characteristics. Our 
bank-specific variables were extracted from the Bankscope database 
maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk. The financial information therein is 
provided by Fitch Ratings and compiled predominantly from the filed balance 
sheet and income statement as well as notes from the audited annual reports. 
To ensure comparability across countries the Bankscope financial data is based 
on the standardized global accounting format, and for same purposes we also 
limit our analyses to commercial banks of all sizes which were active under the 
period of study. Also, to serve our purposes of focusing on financial 
intermediation we use only unconsolidated financial data so that our analysis is 
not distorted by information from other non-bank subsidiaries not engaged in 
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financial intermediation. Data on our country-specific macroeconomic variables, 
namely, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, and real interest rate were taken from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; while our percentage change 
in exchange rate variable was compiled by Dr Matthew Shane and obtained 
from the United States Department of Agriculture website. For data on our 
market structure variables we extracted data for the Boone Indicator and the 
Lerner Index from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database 
compiled by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2009), and subsequently updated in 2013, a 
country-level bank dataset, which underlying data is the Bankscope database; 
and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Data for the HHI was the 
author’s own computation using total assets data from the Bankscope.  
 
4.3.4 Summary Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we look at the dynamics of net interest margins (NIM) and the 
independent variables in a monetary union vis-à-vis a non-monetary union. 
Specifically, we compare the behaviour of NIM and its determinants, 
respectively, within the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area. 
Table 4.1. Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Euro Area, Non-Euro 
Area and Overall European Union (EU) 












NIM 2.4 2.1 5.1 3.9 3.0 2.7 
BCAP 12.2 14.0 14.0 8.1 12.5 13.1 
BCREDSK 20.2 60.7 22.2 48.0 20.6 58.4 
BLIQ 73.0 63.9 91.3 60.2 76.6 63.6 
BMQCI 67.5 34.1 80.8 51.4 70.1 38.5 
BSIZE 6800107 39086635 1288681. 2257631. 5716143. 35114426 
BOONE -0.03 0.02 -0.1 0.2 -0.05 0.1 
LERNER 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.04 0.2 0.1 
HHI 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
EXRATEPC -2.6 6.6 -3.1 8.5 -2.7 7.0 
GDPRGR 1.2 2.3 3.0 2.9 1.6 2.5 
INFRATE  1.9 0.8 4.0 3.3 2.3 1.8 
REALINT
 
0.6 1.2 3.8 3.1 1.2 2.2 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eviews 
Notes: Variable names in first column are the acronyms for the various elected variables 
described in section 4.3.2 above.  
 
In Table 4.1 we present the variables that are employed in the empirical 
analysis of the Euro and the non-Euro Areas, averaged by region/zone over the 
period 2002 - 2013. In figure 4.1 we also present a graph comparing the 
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respective NIM means of the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area to those of the 
entire EU.  From table 4.1 above the Euro Area has a lower mean NIM overall, 
2.4 percent, than the non-Euro Area mean of 5.1 percent, and again lower than 















Figure 4.2. Means of Net Interest Margins (NIM) for EU, Euro Area and 
Non-Euro Area.  
 
Source: Eviews and Author’s own calculation 
 
Figure 4.3. Year-on Year Means of Net Interest Margins (NIM) for the EU, 

































Source: Eviews and Author’s own calculation 
Also in figure 4.3 above we observe that over the period under 
consideration, that is, from 2002 to 2013, NIM in the Euro Area has been 
consistently far lower than the non-Euro Area, as well as the EU mean as might 
be expected, even though the Non-Euro Area and the overall Europe means 
have also been falling consistently over the sample period. Again in table 4.1 
the Euro Area has the least volatile NIM as per the standard deviation of 2.1 
compared to 2.7 for the entire EU and 3.9 for the non-Euro zone. The most 
plausible explanation for this picture is that banks operating within the Euro 
zone can be said to be operating in an environment in which, first, there is no 
foreign exchange risk because of the elimination of transaction and accounting 
costs associated with bid-ask spreads and commissions on foreign exchange 
transactions;  the effect of this being a reduction in systemic risk and the 
concomitant lowering of real interest rate, also naturally driving down NIMs 
within the Eurozone (Alkholifey and Alreshan, 2010; De Grauwe, 2012).  
 
Figure 4.4. Trends in Mean Bank Capital (BCAP) for the EU, Euro Area and 






























































Source: Eviews and Author’s own calculation 
 
We also note that the mean equity-to-assets ratio (BCAP), our bank 
capital proxy, in the Euro Area, is 12.2 percent, which is lower than the non-
Euro Area’s mean of 14.8 percent, and the overall EU mean of 12.5 percent. 
While this may be due to the generally lower systemic risk which obtains in a 
monetary union, it may also be specifically due to the slow post-crisis recovery 
which made most Euro zone banks credit expansion averse. This proposition 
could further be supported by the lower mean bank credit risk ratio (BCREDSK) 
of 20.2 percent in the zone as compared to 22.2 and 20.6 percent for the non-
Euro zone and the entire EU respectively, meaning Eurozone banks are 
keeping capital commensurate with their credit risk. Looking at trends in levels 
of bank capital over the period 2002 – 2013 as graphically represented in Figure 
4.4 above. we see a consistent lowering in trend until 2010 when both the Euro 
Area and the EU together with the Non-Euro Area started rising to converge in 
2013. This may be due to the implementation of financial support measures 
such as the European financial stability facility which facilitated capital flows to 
the Euro Area countries which needed financial bailout. And to the extent that 
most of the Euro Area sovereign debts were owned by the Euro Area banks this 
support invariably found its way to the banks. We could also point to the rising 
of bank capital in all Euro Area, non-Euro Area and EU in general to converge 
at the end of the sample period, as due to the imminent phasing-in of the Basel 
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by a high quality capital base following the financial crisis of 2007/8 (BIS, 2011). 
In terms of bank liquidity Euro Area banks appear to be holding less liquid 
assets than their counterparts in the non-Euro Area, with a mean of 73.0 
percent as compared to the entire EU mean of 76.6 percent, and 91.3 for the 
non-Euro zone. While this may mean banks in the non-Euro Area are able to 
provide depositors with the reassurance that they will be able to meet their 
obligations when they fall due to forestall any possible runs than their 
counterparts in the Euro Area, it may as well signal the lower systemic risk 
which obtains in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area and that regulators 
may not place as high liquidity requirements as they would in the case of the 
non-Eurozone24. This is also reflected graphically in the trends over the period 









Figure 4.5. Trends in Mean Bank Liquidity for the EU, Euro Area and Non-
Euro Area. 
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Source: Eviews and Author’s own calculation 
 
The Euro Area has a lower mean cost-to-income ratio (BMQCI), our X-
efficiency proxy, of 67.5 percent compared to the non-Euro Area mean of 80.8 
percent, and the EU mean of 70.1 percent. Again volatility of these mean values 
is lower in the Euro Area, with a standard deviation of 34.1 percent, than the EU 
average, with a standard deviation of 38.5 percent, and the non-Euro Area, with 
a standard deviation of 51.4 percent. What this implies is that banks in the Euro 
Area have a higher management/cost efficiency. 
The mean for individual bank size (BSIZE) by total assets in the Euro 
Area in millions of US dollars (USD) is 6800107, larger than the non-Euro Area 
mean of 1288681 and 5716143 for the overall EU. That the Euro Area has a 
higher mean can be interpreted as a case of the monetary union affording the 
banks cross border opportunities to expand as compared to their counterparts 
in the non-Euro zone and the resulting characteristic consolidation. This is also 
reflected in the trends in bank size over the period 2002 – 2013 as appears in 
figure 4.6 below. 
 
Figure 4.6. Trends in Mean of Bank Size (BSIZE) in Total Assets (USD) for 
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Source: Eviews and Author’s own calculation 
 
The mean bank concentration as measured by the Herfindhal-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is 0.1 for the Euro Area, less than the non-Euro Area 0.2 but about 
the same as the mean for the EU mean of 0.1. This reflects a more competitive 
banking sector in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area. This is however not 
confirmed by the Boone indicator’s mean of -0.03 for the Euro Area as against 
that for the non-Euro Area of -0.1, and -0.05 for the entire EU; the Lerner index 
places both the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area at par, that is, both zones 
have mean Lerner indices of 0.2 each, as well as the EU average.   
In regards to our foreign exchange variable while both the Euro Area and the 
non-Euro Area means of the percentage change in foreign exchange rate 
(EXRATEPC), show an appreciation of the local currency against the US dollar 
as they carry the minus sign (-), this is higher in the Euro Area, with -2.6 
percent, than -3.1 percent for the non-Euro Area, and again the overall EU 
mean of -2.7 percent over the sample period. In terms of volatility as measured 
by the standard deviation, the Euro Area as would be expected displays less 
volatility, 6.6 percent, than the non-Euro Area with a standard deviation of 8.5 
percent, with the overall EU standard deviation at 7.0 percent. The reason for 
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this section, as a result of the elimination of foreign exchange risk through the 
elimination of transaction costs and accounting costs associated with bid-ask 
spreads and commissions on foreign exchange transactions within a monetary 
zone. 
Interestingly GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) in the Euro zone has a lower 
mean of 1.2 percent. This comes behind the non-Euro zone mean of 3.0 
percent and the EU mean figure of 1.6 percent. It seems however that this is a 
reflection of beta-convergence in the economic growth literature where the 
sampled countries of the non-Eurozone are all accession countries from the 
CEEC block and that their GDP growth rate would be expected to be faster as 
they seek to converge with the Eurozone. It must however be noted that the 
Eurozone GDP growth rate has been steadier, 2.3 percent, as measured by the 
standard deviation, than the non-Eurozone’s 2.9 percent and the EU mean of 
2.5 percent.  
 
Figure 4.7. Trends in Mean Inflation Rate (INFRATE) for the EU, Euro Area 
and Non-Euro Area 2002-2013. 
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Coming to inflation rate (INFRATE) the Euro zone records a lower mean 
inflation rate of 1.9 percent, and a standard deviation of 0.8 percent, than the 
non-Euro zone with a mean of 4 percent, and a standard deviation of 3.3 
percent, with the EU mean being 2.4 percent and volatility of 1.8 percent. The 
lower mean inflation rate in the Eurozone is not unexpected, as being a 
monetary zone the constituent countries adhere to strict price stability regime. 
These figures are supported by the trending over the period under consideration 
as represented in figure 4.7 above. 
Again the lower mean real interest rate of 0.6 percent and a standard 
deviation of 1.2 percent, occurring in the Euro Area, as against the non-Euro 
Area’s 3.8 percent and a standard deviation of 3.1 percent as well as the EU 
mean of 1.2 percent and a standard deviation of 2.2 percent is also as a result 
of the Euro Area being a monetary union. Even though the zone records lower 
mean for both inflation and real interest rates the mean real interest rate of 0.6 
percent is lower than the mean inflation rate of 1.9 percent. This reflects the 
negative relationship that exists between inflation rate and interest rate in 
macroeconomic theory. The picture painted by the mean real interest rate 
values also seem to be reflected in the graphical representation of the trend 
over the period under discussion in figure 4.8 below, where consistently real 
interest rate in the Euro Area is below that of the non-Euro Area and the EU 
overall, except for 2007 where values for all three converge because interest 
rates in the Euro Area rose because of the financial crisis, pushing the EU 
overall to converge with the all-time high levels in the non-Euro Area.  
 
4.3.5 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
In this section we use pairwise correlation coefficients as appear in 
tables 4.2 and 4.3 below to test the relationship between the key variables and 
also to test for the level of multicollinearity among the independent variables. It 
is evidently clear from tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively depicting pairwise 
correlation matrices for the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area that all the 
variables show low pairwise correlation coefficients between them. This rules 
out the possibility of any considerable multicollinearity which warrants attention, 
meaning none of the independent variables is a perfect linear function of one or 
more independent variable 
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Figure 4.8. Trends in Mean Real Interest Rate (REALINT) for the EU, Euro 
Area and Non-Euro Area 2002-2013. 
 
Source: Eviews and Author’s own calculation 
 
In terms of the relationships between NIM and the independent variables 
we see NIM positively related to bank capital (BCAP) in the correlation matrices 
for the two zones. This is consistent with the literature, and means well 
capitalized banks are less risky and are therefore able to pay less deposit rates 
and charge high loan rates, thereby making higher NIMs (Demirguc-Kunt et al, 
2004). 
We also observe the same positive relationship with bank credit risk 
(BCREDSK) in the case of the Euro Area which is consistent with much of the 
literature which signals better credit quality of loans warranting less provisioning 
and thus a reduction in provisioning costs, which in turn afford banks higher 
NIM. A negative relationship is on the other hand observed in the case of the 
non-Eurozone, which means banks make higher loan loss provisioning which 
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Table 4.2. Euro Area Pairwise Correlation Matrix. 
  NIM  BCAP  BCREDSK  BLIQ  BMQCI  BSIZE  BOONE1  LERNER1  HHI1  EXRATEPC  GDPRGR  INFRATE  REALINT  
NIM  1 
            BCAP  0.286 1 
           BCREDSK  0.068 0.047 1 
          BLIQ  0.343 0.223 0.048 1 
         BMQCI  -0.061 -0.017 -0.031 -0.029 1 
        BSIZE  -0.248 -0.471 -0.071 -0.066 -0.141 1 
       BOONE  -0.102 0.031 0.037 -0.079 -0.015 0.029 1 
      LERNER  0.04 0.067 0.036 0.052 0.025 -0.063 0.226 1 
     HHI -0.058 0.031 0.067 -0.025 0.046 0.052 0.356 0.147 1 
    EXRATEPC  -0.036 0.003 0.03 0.006 -0.014 0.043 0.084 0.04 0.029 1 
   GDPRGR  -0.077 -0.021 -0.099 -0.116 -0.094 -0.008 -0.02 0.022 -0.016 -0.169 1 
  INFRATE  -0.032 -0.012 -0.033 -0.024 -0.022 0.045 -0.004 -0.012 0.068 -0.244 0.28 1 
 REALINT  0.068 -0.002 -0.022 0.015 -0.003 -0.063 -0.088 0.066 -0.096 -0.292 0.1 -0.247 1 
Notes: No of observations is 3480. The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of all our chosen variables: Net interest Margin (NIM), Bank 
Equity Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size 
(BSIZE), Boone Indicator, Lerner Index, Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI), Percentage change in Exchange Rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate 
(GDPRGR), Inflation Rate (INFRATE), and Real Interest Rate (REALINT) for 9 countries of the Euro Area, over the period 2002 – 2013, to test the 
relationship between the key variables and also to test for the level of multicollinearity among the independent variables. A higher coefficient means 
there is a linear correlation and vice-versa to infer multicollinearity or otherwise. The sample countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), 











Table 4.3. Non-Euro Area Pairwise Correlation Matrix. 
 NIM  BCAP  BCREDSK  BLIQ  BMQCI  BSIZE  BOONE LERNER HHI EXRATEPC  GDPRGR  INFRATE  REALINT  
NIM  1             
BCAP  0.361 1            
BCREDSK  -0.065 -0.096 1           
BLIQ  0.114 0.289 -0.020 1          
BMQCI  -0.160 0.042 0.090 -0.240 1         
BSIZE  -0.271 -0.531 0.053 0.066 -0.352 1        
BOONE 0.056 0.081 -0.007 0.059 0.016 0.050 1       
LERNER -0.109 -0.148 0.020 0.075 -0.119 0.261 -0.492 1      
HHI 0.141 0.029 -0.008 0.015 -0.040 0.026 -0.335 -0.028 1     
EXRATEPC  -0.073 -0.025 0.157 -0.001 0.000 0.059 0.188 0.088 -0.225 1    
GDPRGR  0.036 -0.022 -0.181 0.010 -0.034 0.007 -0.109 0.054 -0.107 -0.442 1   
INFRATE  0.215 0.064 -0.033 -0.114 0.031 -0.085 -0.187 0.051 0.222 -0.224 0.233 1  
REALINT  0.108 0.024 -0.036 0.037 -0.084 0.180 -0.216 0.269 0.413 -0.030 -0.186 0.167 1 
Notes: No of observations is 852. The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of all our chosen variables: Net interest Margin (NIM), Bank Equity 
Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size (BSIZE), 
Boone Indicator, Lerner Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Percentage change in Exchange Rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate 
(GDPRGR),Inflation Rate (INFRATE), and Real Interest Rate (REALINT) for 7 countries of the Non-Euro Area, over the period 2002 – 2013, to test the 
relationship between the key variables and also to test for the level of multicollinearity among them. A higher coefficient means a there is a linear 
correlation and vice-versa to infer multicollinearity or otherwise. The sample countries are Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Croatia (HR), Hungary 







Bank liquidity (BLIQ) in the case of the two zones has a positive 
relationship with NIM, which is what is predominant in the literature. This means 
banks while banks with high levels of liquid assets, either voluntarily for 
prudential reasons or as a result of regulation, may receive lower interest 
income than banks with less liquid assets. They may however pass on the 
opportunity cost of the loss in interest income to customers, in which case a 
positive relationship with NIM may obtain (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) 
For both zones we find bank size (BSIZE) and bank management 
efficiency (BMQCI) to be negatively related to NIM, which is consistent with the 
literature25. This means while quality management decisions may result in high 
NIM and a positive relationship, the relationship may conversely turn negative if 
the cost savings is passed on to customers. The same interpretation could be 
given in respect of BSIZE which accounts for the economies and diseconomies 
of scale of operations in the market for which empirical results have been 
mixed. The negative correlation in our case means banks in both zones are 
able to pass on their scale economies to the market as lower loan rates and 
higher deposit rates. 
In the case of competition, the extant literature has it that in a competitive 
environment banks operate with lower margins, whereby a negative relationship 
obtains and vice versa. In the correlation matrix for the Eurozone we find that 
the Boone indicator and the HHI have a negative impact on NIM, while the 
Lerner index has a positive impact. On other hand, in the non-Eurozone, while 
we find a negative relationship for the Lerner index, a positive relationship is 
found with the Boone indicator and the HHI in the case of the non-Eurozone. 
The relationship of percentage changes in exchange rate (EXRATEPC) 
with NIM is negative in both the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone. Since the 
relationship is ambiguous in the literature it remains to be seen what the result 
will be. For example, Fuentes and Basch (1998) note that while exchange rate 
affects bank margins its impact varies depending on the structure of the bank’s 
assets and liabilities in foreign currency. 
Similarly, for GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) and inflation rate (INFRATE) 
mixed relationships are found in the empirical literature. And this is reflected in 
the two zones. While the Euro Area shows a negative relationship for GDPRGR 
and INFRATE the non-Euro Area shows a rather positive impact of these 
                                            
25
 The literature makes an unambiguous prediction. 
124 
 
variables on NIM. This means in the case of the non-Euro Area while greater 
inflation increases the risk of default and thus banks will charge a higher lending 
rate that increases the interest rate spreads, within the Euro Area inflation may 
not be rising that much to occasion it being factored in interest rates.  Lastly 
within the two zones we find a positive relationship with real interest rate 
(REALINT), which is consistent with the empirical literature. For example, 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) note that greater market interest rate 
fluctuations increase interest rate margins 
 
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The objective of this chapter has been to investigate the dynamics of 
monetary union membership in the determination of net interest margins in the 
European Union, contrasting the Euro Area with the non-Euro Area. This was 
motivated by the creation, in our view, of the opportunities afforded by the single 
market and the common currency which generated higher competition and 
efficiency. In this context we recognise that these developments would have 
implications for the following determinants of net interest margins (NIM): The 
degree of banking competition (BOONE, LERNER and HHI), Exchange rate 
Risk (EXRATEPC) S-efficiency (BSIZE), that is scale efficiency, and X-
efficiency (BMQCI) that is, management efficiency, which hypotheses we test 
and report results. 
Below in tables in 4.4 for the Euro Area, 4.5 for non-Euro Area, and 4.6 
for both, we present the regression results, with the different specifications 
reflecting the different empirical approaches to testing for banking competition 
(the Boone indicator, Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index), in the 
determination of net interest margins. We as well control for the effects of the 






Table 4.4. Simultaneously Controlling for all Bank-Specific, Market 
Structure, Macroeconomic and Bank Capital in the Presence of the 
Financial Crisis Variables in the Euro Area. 
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Variable Column 1 Column2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
 BOONE LERNER HHI BOONE LERNER HHI 
























































































  -0.0501** 
(0.023) 



























































J-Statistic 56.90 57.11 56.89 58.92 56.59 53.81 
Prob(J-Statistic) 0.178 0.199 0.178 0.114 0.159 0.229 
No. of Observations 2610 2900 2610 2610 2610 2610 
AR (2) – P-Value 0.059 0.000 0.498 0.884 0.000 0.000 
No. of Banks 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Note: The table presents regression results of all our chosen variables: The dependent variable is Net Interest Margin 
(NIM). The independent variables are: Bank Equity Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity 
(BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size (BSIZE), Boone Indicator, Lerner Index, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Percentage change in Exchange Rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), 
Inflation Rate (INFRATE), and Real Interest Rate (REALINT) and the interaction variable BCAP_DAFTER2008 which 
controls for Bank Capital during the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis for 9 countries of the Euro Area, over the period 
2002 – 2013. Columns 1 - 3 report the results of our baseline specifications simultaneously controlling for all our chosen 
variables. Columns 4 – 6 additionally control for the interaction variable BCAP_DAFTER2008, depicting Bank Capital 
during the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis. The sample countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), 
France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT). Probability values indicating 
statistical significance: ***1% **5% *10. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. AR (2) is the test of second order 
serial correlation in the residuals, which null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. The J statistic is the 
Hansen test of over-identification restriction which null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous. 
Table 4.5. Simultaneously Controlling for all Bank-Specific, Market 
Structure, Macroeconomic, and Bank Capital in the Presence of the 
Financial Crisis Variables in the Non-Euro Area. 
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LERNER  -0.007 
(0.007) 
  0.151*** 
(0.018) 
 
HHI   -0.060*** 
(0.011) 
  -0.062*** 
(0.012) 























































J-Statistic 46.69 55.14 48.83 46.35 54.05 51.72 
Prob (J-Statistic) 0.567 0.254 0.48 0.541 0.254 0.331 
No. of Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 
AR (2) P-value 0.773 0.269 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Banks 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Note: The table presents regression results of all our chosen variables as described in table 4.4 for 7 
countries of the Non-Euro Area, over the period 2002 – 2013. The sample countries are Bulgaria (BG), 
Czech Republic (CZ), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO). Columns 1 
- 3 are the results for the baseline specification simultaneously controlling for all our chosen variables. 
Columns 4 – 6 additionally control for the interaction variable BCAP_DAFTER2008, which controls for 
Bank Capital during the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis. Probability values indicating statistical 
significance: ***1% **5% *10. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. AR (2) is the test of second 
order serial correlation in the residuals, which null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. The J 
statistic is the Hansen test of over-identification restriction which null hypothesis is that the instruments are 
exogenous. 
. 
      
Table 4.6. Simultaneously Controlling for all Bank-Specific, Market 
Structure, Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Variables in the Euro and 
Non-Euro Areas. 
Euro Area  Non-Euro Area 
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Variable  Column 1 Column2 Column 3  Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 



































































































DUMMY_AFTER2008                                  




















































































J-Statistic 57.24 58.97 
 
57.44  50.08 53.17 45.58 
Prob(J-Statistic) 0.146 0.113 
 
0.142  0.391 0.282 0.572 
No. of Observations 2610 2610 2610  710 710 710 
AR (2) – P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Banks 290 290 290  71 71 71 
Note: The table presents regression results of all our chosen variables as described in table 4.4, and also 
controlling for the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis (DUMMY_AFTER2008) for the 9 Euro Area and 7 
Non-Euro Area countries, over the period 2002 – 2013. Columns 1 - 3 are the regression results for the 
Euro Area, and Columns 4 – 6 for the Non-Euro Area. Probability values indicating statistical significance: 
***1% **5% *10. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. AR (2) is the test of second order serial 
correlation in the residuals, which null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. The J statistic is the 
Hansen test of over-identification restriction which null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous. 
   In general, our econometric specifications look sound, and in all cases the 
lagged dependent variable is significant and correctly signed for a stable model. 
We report the serial correlation statistics in each case. Where this is acceptable, 
we can proceed on the assumption that the explanation is sound. If, as in the 
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case of the Euro Area with the Lerner Index we find that it is failed then we have 
to proceed with care. However, we have other reasons to be dubious about this 
indicator in banking studies as we discuss below. When we introduce intercept 
dummies or step dummies on capital to take account of the financial crisis we 
induce serial correlation in to the errors. This is not totally surprising in a short 
time series model, and we discuss these results only briefly below. As our 
baseline specification seems robust across indicators and regions we do not 
feel a need to re-specify them when we fail serial correlations tests, but rather 
accept that there is weak evidence supporting the underlying hypothesis being 
tested. In all other cases the errors on our relationships are acceptable and we 
can proceed to discuss our results, first bring out patterns of short run effects, 
following the common approach in the literature, and then we discuss the 
similarities differences between regions that emerge in the long run. The speed 
of response in our two regions differs, with the Euro Area responding more 
quickly to a change, and hence short-run difference may exist whilst long run 
similarities are present, as we discuss below with our bank capital variable. As 
differences remain for almost all variable that are maintained in both the short 




We hypothesize that the two efficient structure hypotheses, that is, the X-
efficiency, proxied by bank cost-to-income ratio (BMQCI) and S-efficiency, also 
proxied by log of bank total assets (BSIZE), both have a greater reducing effect 
on NIM in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area. 
We recognise that the EMU has attracted and will continue to attract Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) from within and outside the union, particularly large 
ones that might only be viable above a certain size resulting in: a) economies of 
scale   b) lower marginal cost, all with reducing effects on NIM in the Euro zone 




BMQCI, our management efficiency variable which tests the X-efficiency 
hypothesis and proxied by cost-to-income ratio, is statistically negatively 
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significant at 1% across all specifications in both the Euro and non-Euro zones, 
as in the standard specifications in tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 respectively. This 
lends support to the X-efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure-Hypothesis. 
This means within both zones banks have lower levels of operating cost per unit 
of gross income, implying efficient management where more profitable assets 
and low-cost liabilities are selected by management of banks. In both zones 
therefore banks are able to pass the lower costs on to their customers in the 
form of lower loan rates and/or higher deposit rates, thereby lowering the 
interest margin. This is consistent with the results in Vander Vennet (2002), who 
finds that higher efficiency reduces interest margins significantly for a sample of 
Western European countries. Maudos and Solis (2009) also find a significantly 
negative relationship between NIM and efficiency in bank management in their 
study of the determinants of net interest income in the Mexican banking system 
using an integrated model. The finding is further corroborated by those of 
Chortareas et al (2009) who investigated the determinants of interest rate 
margins in the Mexican banking industry focusing on their relationship with 
structural and non-structural measures of competition and non-parametric 
estimates of efficiency. The same authors also find a strong negative 
relationship between the X-efficiency and the net interest margins of the 
banking sectors of some Latin American countries. Notwithstanding the 
negative relationship between NIM and management efficiency (BMQCI) within 
both the Euro and non-Euro zones differences lie in the magnitude of the 
impact, where across our baseline specifications controlling for all three 
competition measure in tables 4.4 and 4.5 the magnitude of the reducing impact 
of Management efficiency (BMQCI) on NIM is higher in the Euro zone than in 
the non-Euro zone.   For example, looking at our baseline specification in 
column 1 of table 4.4 in which the Boone indicator proxies for competition, while 
within the Euro Area the coefficient of BMQCI is -0.011, this is -0.001 in the 
case of the non-Euro Area. This level of differences in the reducing effects 
between the two zones, could be attributed to efficiency savings and industry 
competition which obtain more in a monetary union, and thus the Euro Area as 
a result of macroeconomic stability, than in a non-monetary union, and the non-
Euro Area for that matter. It has for example been noted by Clarke and Daley 
(2010) that since the establishment of the Euro zone there is evidence of lower 
transaction costs for financial firms within the EMU. Another example is where 
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with the benefit of the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer) and SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) 
payments platforms the Euro system allows economies of scale to be exploited 
for lower fees and better cost efficiency to be achieved, indeed making the 
payments market within the Euro Area more dynamic and cost efficient (ECB, 
2011). On the competition aspect, that a higher competition obtains in the 
Eurozone than in the non-Eurozone is evidenced by the mean values of our 
competition measures, for example. While the mean for the Boone indicator, for 
example is -0.03, that for the non-Eurozone is -0.1, indicating a higher 
competition in the Eurozone than in the non-Eurozone. 
 
BSIZE 
Again with Bank size (BSIZE), measured by the log of total assets, a 
significantly negative relationship with NIM at 1% is observed across all our 
baseline specifications within both the Euro and the non-Euro Areas as appear 
in tables 4.4 and 4.5. The contrast however lies in the magnitude of the 
reducing impact of BSIZE on NIM within the two zones. For example, in our 
baseline regression in column 1 of table 4.4 while in the Euro Area the 
coefficient for bank size is -0.855, that for the non-Euro Area in column 1 of 
table 4.5 is -0.383, that is, of a higher magnitude in the Euro Area than in the 
non-Euro Area. The S-efficiency hypothesis predicts a negative relationship 
between interest margins and scale efficiency. That the sign of the BSIZE 
coefficient is negative within both zones supports the scale-efficiency 
hypothesis and captures the presence of economies of scale within the banking 
sector of both zones. The higher reducing impact within the Euro Area than in 
the non-Euro Area however are attributable to cost differences affording the 
Euro Area banks the ability to pass on part of their efficiency savings in the form 
of lower NIMs than the non-Euro Area banks, with all of this efficiency savings 
emanating from a more intense competition in the Euro Area than in the non-
Eurozone, as alluded to earlier. The ECB (2014) for example in reporting on the 
market structure of the euro area banking system, that is, its capacity, 
consolidation and concentration over time asserts that in 2013 the euro area 
banking sector continued its consolidation process, driven by continued 
pressure to achieve cost containment, deleveraging and restructuring. Again, it 
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is our stated view that all of this is catalysed by heightened competition in the 
Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area.  
Our findings of a negative relationship between NIM and BSIZE within the Euro 
and the non-Euro Areas are corroborated by the findings of Maudos and 
Fernando De Guevara (2004), and Angbazo (1997) who find that a negative 
association of bank size with net interest margins point to cost reduction 
resulting from economies of scale. A negative relationship is also reported by 
Gelos (2006) who show that higher net interest margins are associated with 
smaller bank size and larger overheads in the Latin American banking sector. 
Agoraki (2009) on the other hand find a rather positive relationship between 
NIM and bank size (BSIZE) in her analysis of NIMs in the South Eastern 
European countries where larger banks are earning higher margins. This 
positive relationship is confirmed by Peria and Mody (2004) who posit that such 
larger banks may be able to reap economies of scale while they do not choose 
to pass on some of these benefits to their customers in the form of lower 
spreads, which seems to be the case in the non-Euro zone. 
With the foregoing results for both management efficiency (BMQCI) and bank 
size (BSIZE) the conclusion can then be drawn that the hypotheses of bank S-
efficiency and X-efficiency respectively having reducing effects on NIM can be 
supported in both the Euro and the non-Euro Areas, although its incidence is 




The degree of banking competition (BOONE, LERNER and HHI) has a 
larger reducing effect on NIM in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area 
because of the effects of the EMU. As we have discussed above, there are 
good theory based reasons for preferring the Boone indicator as it can apply to 
cross country competition, whilst the HHI cannot because it describes only local 
structure. As we note below there may be good reasons to be careful when 
using the Lerner index in studies of NIMs. 
As the generally accepted hypothesis goes a more competitive banking market 
is expected to drive down bank loan rates/increase deposit rates, adding to the 
welfare of households and enterprises (Van Leuvensteijn, 2009). Within the 
context of the Euro and the non-Euro Areas the reducing impact of the 
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competition variables is so expected given the liberalised and harmonised 
financial regulation which allows free competitive market behaviour and cross-
border operation within the single market, as well as creating a level-playing 
field between banks from different member states (ECB, 1999).  Andres and 
Capraru (2014) find that competition in the EU generally increased after 2001 
due to the adoption of the euro and the continuing European integration; and as 
well observe banking competition convergence among member states of the 
EU. 
We note that since different competition measures belong to different 
measurement classifications they measure different things and do not provide 
the same inferences about competition our results seem mixed (Carbo-Valverde 
et al, 2009; Liu et al, 2013 in Leon, 2015). The choice of a particular competition 
measure in this context influences conclusions that can be drawn in regards to 
the implications of competition (Leon, 2015). For example, the HHI belong to 
the class of measures that infer competition from the structural characteristics of 
the bank market and specifically measures the level of market concentration, 
while the Lerner index which is based on bank behaviour measures the level of 
market power of a firm identified by the divergence between the firm’s price and 
its marginal cost. The Boone indicator which is also another non-structural 
measure of competition and based on bank behaviour, infers the degree of 
competition from the effect of reallocation of market share or profits from 
inefficient firms to efficient ones. To support this finding we investigate the 
degree of consistency among our three competition measures using cross-
country correlations a squared correlation coefficient, r2 in parenthesis. For this 
we use the mean values of our competition measures for the Euro Area and 
non-Euro Area respectively, averaged over the period 2002 – 2013 in tables 4.7 
4.8 and 4.9 below. 
In our baseline regression in the first columns of tables 4.4 and 4.5 
respectively the Boone indicator has a reducing impact on NIM within both the 
Euro and the non-Euro Areas at 1% and 5% statistical significance respectively. 
However, the magnitude of the impact within the Euro Area is higher, -0.118, 
than in the non-Euro Area, -0.088. These results clearly support our hypothesis 
that the level of competition within the Euro Area has a higher reducing impact 
on NIM than in the case of the non-Euro Area.  
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While column 3 of tables 4.4 and 4.5 which controls for the HHI supports 
the finding of a reducing effect on NIM as could be seen with the Boone 
indicator in both zones in column 1 of same tables, this is not the case when the 
Lerner index is controlled in our baseline specification in column 2 of tables 4.4 
and 4.5 respectively. We rather find that while the Lerner index was informative, 
that is, was able to pick up the competition effects, in the non-Euro Area and 
thus had a negative relationship with NIM, though not statistically significant, in 
the Euro Area it was not informative, and including it in the regression induces 
serial correlation in the errors which is absent with the other indicators. It has a 
positive sign, thereby suggesting a positive relationship with NIM, which may 
result from the close relationship between the net interest margin (which might 
be seen as price minus cost) and the ratio of price minus marginal cost to price.  
We do not find these inconsistencies in the picking up of competition 
effects in the different jurisdictions, that is, the Euro Area versus the non-Euro 
Area, by our different competition measures strange, as Carbo-Valverde et al 
(2009) note that it is not possible to use one or two measures of banking 
competition that seem to be informative in one jurisdiction and necessarily 
expect the same two measures to be equally informative when applied to 
another jurisdiction. What is more important is that the Lerner index is known to 
suffer major theoretical and practical limitations, and indeed a measure of 
pricing power as opposed to being a proxy for competition (Leon, 2015). To that 
extent it may not have been able to properly pick up the level of competition in 
the Euro Area, and thus indicate the wrong impact on NIM. For instance, recent 
studies abound to the effect that there have been scenarios where increases in 
competition as signalled by decreases in individual Lerner indices have been 
recorded in the presence of either increases or decreases or even stable 
average degree of market power as a result of reallocation effect from inefficient 
to efficient banks (Leon, 2015; Boone, 2008).  
Furthermore, Leon (2015) posits that efficient firms are known to have 
higher price-cost margin than their less efficient counterparts, in which case the 
weighted average Lerner index can increase even though there may be a 
decrease of the respective individual Lerner indices26. Since neither the HHI nor 
the Lerner index can pick up efficiency effects and possible contestability 
                                            
26
 He thus recommends partly eliminating the reallocation effect through the use of the 
unweighted Lerner index as a measure of competition 
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outcomes, reflecting competitive outcomes in a particular bank market in the 
presence of higher margins we would vouch for our results with the Boone 
indicator as the more robust one. And rightly so because the Boone indicator is 
the competition measure which can capture reallocation effects and 
contestability outcomes, even in the presence of higher margins. Indeed the 
Boone indicator is the only one of our three competition measures which has 
proved  consistent and informative as far as the effects on NIM in both the Euro 
and non-Euro Areas are concerned, as well as much touted as superior to the 
Lerner index and the HHI in the banking competition literature (van 
Leuvensteijn, 2009)27 Drawing our conclusions based on it; we find that the 
Boone indicator has a reducing effect on NIM within both the Euro and the non-
Euro Areas at 1% and 5% statistical significance, and as expected, the 
magnitude of the impact is bigger in the Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area as 
appears in column 1 of tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. This supports our 
hypothesis that the level of competition within the Euro Area has a higher 
reducing impact on NIM in the Euro Area than the non-Euro Area as a 
consequence of the competitive force generated by the establishment of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
Table 4.7. Degree of Consistency among the Three Competition Measures 
Using their Mean Values for the Euro Area and non-Euro Area 







Euro Area 0.23 (0.05) 0.36 (0.13) 0.15 (0.02) 
Non-Euro Area -0.49 (-0.98) -0.33 (-0.66) -0.03 (-0.06) 
 Notes:  Values not in parenthesis are correlation coefficients (r), next to them are their squared 
values (r
2
). Source: Eviews and own calculation with annual data over 2002 – 2013. 
 
As earlier mentioned we follow Carbo et al (2009) and investigate the degree of 
consistency among our three competition measures using cross-country 
correlations of the mean values of our competition measures averaged over the 
period 2002 – 2013, with a squared correlation coefficient, r2 in parenthesis, for 
the Euro and the non-Euro Areas respectively. The results are as presented in 
table 4.7 above. 
                                            
27
 Findings from studies in the Euro Area using the Boone indicator differ somewhat from recent 
empirical evidence from alternative measures of competition applied to the European banking 
sector, such as concentration and price-based measures. 
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As noted by Carbo-Valverde et al (2009) if any of the three pairwise correlation 
values equal 1.0, then it would be a perfect substitute for the other, that is, it 
would contain the same information and be perfectly consistent with each other. 
On the other hand, if the r2 value were to be equal to 0.50, then it would mean 
the variation in one competition measure can only be explained by 50% 
variation in the other, which suggests a lack of consistency between the two 
indicators. This means while there would be a degree of consistency between 
the paired competition measures if r2 =0.50, it would not be strong because 
some of the time one indicator could generate rather opposite results about the 
extent of banking competition. Lastly, if the pair-wise value is at or close to 0.0, 
then the paired competition indicators contain no similar information, are 
basically not correlated, and would only randomly generate similar information 
regarding competition. Using the foregoing criteria, it could be seen from table 
4.7 that the relationships between the three competition measures respectively 
in the Euro and Non-Euro Areas are not strong. Within the Euro Area only 5% of 
the information in the Boone indicator is also contained in the Lerner index, and 
13% in the HHI. For the Lerner index and HHI only 2% of the information in the 
Lerner index is also contained in the HHI. Since these values are close to 0 it 
could be concluded that these paired competition measures do not contain 
similar information, meaning they are basically not correlated and would only 
randomly give similar information about competition. Extending the same 
analysis to the Non-Euro Area we find that the relationship is negative across all 
the pairings of the competition measures which means there are no correlations 
at all between the three measures of competition. It is not surprising that we 
report mixed effects from our three competition measures in both the Euro and 
the Non-Euro Areas. Following on from the foregoing we extend our analysis to 
investigate the within country consistency for each of our studied country within 
the two zones namely, the Euro and the non-Euro Areas over our studied 
period, 2002 – 2013 in tables 4.8 and 4.9 respectively below. This time however 
we add NIM to the measures as the banking literature recognises it as a simple 
proxy of the level of market competition (Bikker and Bos, 2008). And it is 
expected to be smaller, the heavier competition is.  
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Furthermore, NIM is known to share the same base case with the Lerner index 
and other non-structural competition measures such as the H-statistic28, the 
manipulation of which yield all three competition measures (Carbo-Valverde et 




Where TR is total revenue, TC is total cost and TA total assets. 
For example, NIM = (interest income – interest expense)/TA 
= [(TR – non-interest revenue) – (TC – operating cost)]/TA 
= (TR -TC)/TA – (non-interest revenue – operating cost)/TA 
For the Lerner index, it is = (PC - MC)/P 
= (TR/TA – 𝜕TC/ 𝜕TA)/(TR/TA), holding input prices constant. 
Under constant returns to scale 𝜕TC/ 𝜕TA = TC/TA, we have  
= (TR -TC)/TA divided by TR/TA. 
 
Table 4.8. Within-country Consistency of Bank Market Competition 
Measures for the Euro Area. 
 
BOONE BOONE BOONE LERNER LERNER HHI 
 
LERNER HHI NIM HHI NIM NIM 
Austria -0.45 0.88 0.39 -0.41 -0.01 0.49 
Belgium 0.32 -0.38 0.59 -0.21 0.38 0.11 
Germany 0.19 0.23 -0.62 0.47 -0.31 -0.19 
France 0.27 0.56 -0.29 0.17 -0.12 -0.09 
Greece 0.15 -0.31 0.15 -0.02 0.20 0.18 
Italy -0.58 -0.64 -0.51 0.17 -0.16 0.47 
Luxembourg 0.45 -0.15 0.18 -0.22 -0.55 -0.01 
Netherlands -0.21 0.77 -0.37 -0.21 0.43 -0.78 
Portugal -0.16 -0.27 -0.12 0.22 0.50 0.06 
(+r value)/9 5/9 4/9 4/9 4/9 4/9 5/9 
Notes:  Only correlation coefficients (r) are shown here; Source: Own calculation and Eviews 
with annual data over 2002 – 2013. 
 
In table 4.8 above where we compare the degree of consistency between 
our competition measures within individual Euro Area countries we find that 
they are still weak even within individual countries. Out of the six pairings only 
                                            
28
 The H-statistic is a measure of the degree of competition in the banking market. It 
measures the elasticity of banks revenues relative to input prices. Under perfect competition, an 
increase in input prices raises both marginal costs and total revenues by the same amount, and 
hence the H-statistic equals 1. Under a monopoly, an increase in input prices results in a rise in 
marginal costs, a fall in output, and a decline in revenues, leading to an H-statistic less than or 




two of them show a positive relationship for a little over half of the countries, 
that is, Boone versus Lerner and HHI versus NIM. And even that, none of the 
countries with these pairings show a correlation coefficient above 50%. In 
Austria however we find a strong correlation between the Boone indicator and 
HHI, meaning 88% of the information in the Boone indicator is also contained in 
the HHI. Likewise, the Netherlands where the correlation coefficient is 77% and 
56% in France for the same pairing. Also for the paring between the Boone 
indicator and NIM we find a correlation coefficient of 59% for Belgium. 
Within the non-Euro Area however we see a relatively higher consistency 
across the pairings. Out of the six pairings three have over half of the 
correlation coefficients to be positive. Of all six however the Boone indicator 
versus the Lerner index show positive correlation across all countries, of which 
apart from Poland (26%), Croatia (35%), and Bulgaria (47%) the remaining four 
non-Euro Area countries show correlation coefficients well over 50%. 
 
Table 4.9. Within-country Consistency of Bank Market Competition 
Measures for the Non-Euro Area. 
 
BOONE BOONE BOONE LERNER LERNER HHI 
 
LERNER HHI NIM HHI NIM NIM 
Bulgaria 0.47 0.31 -0.24 0.34 -0.23 -0.39 
Czech Republic 0.85 -0.54 -0.08 -0.32 0.29 0.14 
Croatia 0.35 -0.07 0.38 -0.86 0.29 -0.07 
Hungary 0.68 -0.52 -0.92 -0.46 -0.54 0.50 
Lithuania 0.68 -0.52 0.23 -0.46 0.27 0.24 
Poland 0.26 -0.05 -0.60 -0.75 -0.51 0.12 
Romania 0.90 0.001 0.33 -0.001 0.43 -0.01 
(+r value)/9 7/7 2/7 3/7 1/7 4/7 4/7 
Notes:  Only correlation coefficients (r) are shown here; Source: Own calculation and Eviews 
with annual data over 2002 – 2013 
 
 
Overall, we can conclude that while the consistency between our competition 
measures do vary they also vary both between the Euro and the non-Euro 
Areas, and across countries, meaning per time information hardly do two of our 
competition measures carry the same information. This is consistent with the 
findings of Carbo Valverde et al. (2009), who find that consistency among 
competition measures across some selected 14 Euro Area and non-Euro Area 





We hypothesize that exchange rate has a more reducing effect on NIM in 
the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area. 
Across all our Euro Area specifications EXRATEPC which is the percentage 
change in US Dollar exchange rate has a consistently negative relationship with 
NIM and statistically significant at 1% and 5%, apart from our standard 
specification in the Euro Area when HHI is controlled in column 3, which has the 
expected negative sign but not statistically significant. This suggests that an 
appreciation of the Euro in terms of percentage change in US dollar exchange 
rate has a reducing effect on NIM in the Euro Area. This means with the 
elimination of transaction costs afforded by a single currency banks are able to 
pass on the cost savings on to customers in the shape of reduced NIM. While 
we observe the same reducing effects in the Non-Euro Area, rather surprisingly 
the magnitude of the reducing effect is higher in the Non-Euro Area than in the 
Euro Area. This finding in the Non-Euro Area may be attributable to the 
accession agenda of the constituent countries whereby because of this agenda 
their exchange rates may be converging to the Euro Area levels, thereby 
minimising/eliminating exchange rate risk to the levels in the Euro Area and 
therefore engendering a reducing effect on NIM. We investigate this by 
estimating the respective speed of convergence and half-lives, the results of 
which are reported in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 of chapter 3. That in these tables, the 
non-Euro Area average speed is closer to zero than the Euro Area average 
means the percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC) in the countries 
of the non-Euro Area are converging faster than those of the Euro Area. If the 
values are closer to one, it denotes a slow rate of convergence. Conversely if it 
is closer to zero then it denotes a faster rate of convergence. The speed of 
convergence is calculated by estimating equation 3.2 in chapter 3. Again we 
calculate the half-life of the convergence process for both zones by using the 
following formula: 
0.5 𝑙𝑛
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑛
   
As per our results for both zones in tables 3.9 and 3.10 while the Euro 
Area records a half-life of 0.43 the Non-Euro Area also records a half-life of 
0.39. This means it takes a shorter time for the gap between the Non-Euro Area 
countries and the sub-regional average to be cut into half than the countries in 
the Euro Area, thereby eliminating any foreign exchange rate risk. As indicated 
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earlier this may not be surprising as most of the sampled Non-Euro Area 
countries have an accession agenda, and therefore have been consistently 
converging. The negative relationship between exchange rate and net interest 
margin is consistent with Chortareas et al (2011) who find an equally negative 
relationship with net interest margin in Chile but a rather positive relationship in 
Colombia and Paraguay. 
CONTROL VARIABLES (Bank-specific) 
LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE (NIM)  
The lagged NIM across all our specifications for both the Euro and Non-
Euro Areas are significant at 1% confirming the dynamic nature of our model 
specification, and justifies the inclusion of lagged values of net interest margin 
to account for previous values of the NIM in the estimated regressions.  
Again across all specifications our results show that there is a relatively 
higher persistence of net interest margin across time in the Non-Euro Area than 
in the Euro Area, as the coefficients with the lagged net interest margin is 
relatively higher and significant. For instance, in our standard regressions for 
both zones where the Boone indicator is included as the competition measure in 
column 1 of tables 4.4 and 4.5 while the coefficient for the Euro Area is 0.11 
that for the Non-Euro Area is 0.34. This means within both zones although 
competitive forces are sufficiently powerful to ensure that no firm can 
persistently earn NIM above the norm these forces are more powerful in the 
Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area. This confirms the liberalised and 
harmonised financial regulation within the Euro Area which makes entry and 
exit into markets sufficiently free to bring abnormal NIM quickly into line with the 
competitive norm than it does obtain in the Non-Euro Area.  
Consistent with our results particularly with the Non-Euro Area are those 
obtained by Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) who find a relatively high persistence of 
NIM across time in their study of NIM in eleven Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) five of which are part of our sample countries for the non-
Euro zone.29 Also consistent with our results for the Euro Area are the results of 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) who study NIM in five banking 
sectors of the European Union (EU), three of which are part of our sample 
countries for the Euro Area, and find that factors which, in part, were driven by 
                                            
29
 The coefficient for the lagged NIM across the non-Euro zone being between 0.44 and 0.58 
across all specifications and significant at 5%. 
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several years of a favourable economic situation, due to, inter alia, convergence 
in the economies of the Euro Area, propitiating an environment of 
macroeconomic stability in which financial markets have shown low volatility 




The bank capital variable is significant at 1% in both the Euro and non-
Euro Areas across all our three baseline specifications in columns 1 – 3 of 
tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively, in which all three respective competition 
measures have been independently controlled. While the relationship between 
our capital adequacy variable (BCAP) and NIM in both the Euro and non-Euro 
Areas are positive for all three specifications, and even across the rest of the 
specifications, we observe higher magnitude of short term impact picked up in 
the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro area. In column 1 of tables 4.4 and 4.5, for 
example, when we control for the Boone indicator, while the coefficient is 0.093 
and statistically significant at 1% in the Euro Area, within the Non-Euro Area the 
coefficient is 0.068 and statistically significant at 1%.  
In our second specification when we control for competition with the 
Lerner index (HHI), in the Euro Area, the reported coefficient is 0.093, and 
0.107 when the HHI is used to control for competition. Similarly, in the Non-Euro 
Area the reported coefficients are 0.051 and 0.066 when the Lerner index and 
the HHI are respectively controlled and significant at 1%. The positive 
relationship between the equity capital and net interest margins in both zones is 
consistent with the hypothesis that while substituting equity for debt reduces the 
risk of insolvency, and therefore ought to have the effect of lowering the cost of 
borrowed funds, equity is a more expensive source of funding, and therefore an 
increase in equity capital by substituting equity for debt leads to higher required 
net interest margins (NIM) as these costs may be passed on to customers 
(Anbgazo, 1997).  
In practical terms what this means is that banks in both zones are subject 
to high regulatory capital and would ask for higher rents to compensate for it 
(Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). Nevertheless, the higher effects in the Euro 
Area than in the Non-Euro Area may be explained by the free movement of 
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capital facilitated by the monetary union. This translates into free excess capital 
with which banks in the Euro Area may be motivated to increase their portfolio 
of risky assets (Claeys and Vennet, 2008) which accrue higher rents than in the 
Non-Euro Area. The issue of high regulatory capital within both zones is 
particularly evidenced by the post-financial crisis response by the European 
Commission initiatives to create a safer and sounder financial sector for the 
single market culminating into a single rulebook for all financial actors, including 
banks in the 28 Member States of the European Union which is the foundation 
for the Banking Union. The single rule book lays down capital requirements 
aimed at executing a comprehensive and risk-sensitive framework to promote 
enhanced risk management amongst banks and other financial institutions 
(https://ec.europa.eu/). To this effect subsequent to the original capital 
requirements directives there have been several upward revisions to date. 
However, we should note that in the long run the effects of capital on the NIM is 
the same in both regions, as we discuss below. 
 
BCREDSK 
Extending the same analysis to our credit or default risk variable, the 
ratio of loan loss provision to net interest revenue (BCREDSK), we find that 
while credit risk is statistically significantly positive at 1% in the Euro Area 
across all our standard specifications, and consistent with the literature, in the 
Non-Euro Area it is only positive and significant at 5% when we control for the 
Lerner index leaving the other specifications in columns 1 and 3 of table 4.5 
rather inversely related. Nevertheless, these are hardly significant, 10% when 
the Boone indicator is controlled for and not at all significant when the HHI is 
controlled for. The more prevalent explanation in the extant literature for the 
positive relationship in both zones is that banks with riskier loans select higher 
net interest margins (Angbazo, 1997). We as well find a higher magnitude of 
impact on NIM when BCREDSK increases in the Euro Area than in the Non-
Euro Area. For example, in column 2 of tables 4.4 and 4.5 where the Lerner 
index is controlled for while we record a coefficient of 0.013 for the Eurozone 
0.002 is reported. The explanation of a higher magnitude of the impact in the 
Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area is that, in a monetary union 
macroeconomic instability is comparatively more contained than in a non-
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monetary union leading to a comparatively lower default risk rates; and 
therefore proportionately low provisions for loan losses reflecting in higher 
NIMs. This is in contrast to the Non-Euro Area as a non-monetary union where 
the incidence of higher loan loss provisions than in the Euro Area will have the 
effect of reducing bank NIMs within the Area. Gunter et al (2013) show that 
increasing loan losses or nonperforming loans relative to earning assets causes 
banks to lose interest income generated from these loans and to move funds to 
lower-yielding assets that are less prone to default. Both effects tend to 
negatively influence the NIM in the short run, in other words deteriorations in 
credit quality tend to decrease the NIM. This is as well consistent with the 
hypothesis that increased exposure to credit risk is normally associated with 
decreased firm profitability and considering NIM as a profitability/performance 
measure, the negative relationship between NIM and our credit risk variable 
within the non-Euro zone is not surprising and consistent with the findings of 
Athanasoglou et al (2008). Also consistent with our results for the Euro Area is 
the ECB’s (2013) claim in its financial stability report that the Euro area’s large 
and complex banking groups (LCBGs) outperformed smaller significant banking 
groups (SBGs) in recent years and quarters, largely because of their lower 
credit risk costs.  
 
BLIQ 
In respect of bank liquidity risk (BLIQ) our results largely indicate a 
positive relationship with NIM significant at 1% in both the Euro and Non-Euro 
Areas, across all our standard specifications, which is consistent with what 
obtains in the literature; meaning banks would charge higher rents as the cost of 
holding less profitable liquid assets in their bid to mitigate liquidity risk. The only 
exception is in the Eurozone where the sign turns negative once the Lerner 
index is controlled for. It must however be noted that the coefficients are 
consistently larger in the non-Euro Area than in the Euro Area. For example, in 
our baseline specification in column 1 of tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively where 
the Boone indicator is used to control for competition while the coefficient is 
0.011 in the Euro Area, within the Non-Euro Area the coefficient is 0.018. This 
means within the Euro Area liquidity risk is likely to reduce because of deeper 
and more liquid markets deriving from the free movement of capital afforded by 
the monetary union. As a result, banks factor in less liquidity risk premium in 
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their interest rates than banks in the non-Euro Area. Liquidity risk is again likely 
to reduce because as part of the banking union to reinforce the deeper 
economic and monetary union to support the single currency within the Euro 
Area, minimum liquidity requirements are set to ensure that banks hold a 
sufficient amount of liquid assets to withstand stress and to enhance short-term 
resilience of the liquidity risk profile of banks1. Our findings are consistent with 
the view of Athanasoglou et al (2008) who note that during periods of increased 
uncertainty, financial institutions may decide to diversify their portfolios and/or 
raise their liquid holdings in order to reduce their risk. They are as well 
consistent with Brock and Suarez (2000) who investigate the behaviour of bank 
spreads in Latin America using the ratio of short-term assets to total deposits as 
a proxy for liquidity ratio and find it positively correlated with the spread for all 
the Latin American countries under study, and statistically significant for Bolivia. 
Columbia and Peru. 
 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROL VARIABLES 
Almarzoqui and Naceur (2015) note that generally, a stable 
macroeconomic environment, with low inflation, low interest rate, and low 
reserve requirement, will support lower net interest margins. We consider that 
while the other macroeconomic variables may have a positive relationship with 
NIM in both the Euro and non-Euro Areas the magnitude of the coefficients will 
be higher in the Non-Euro Area due to incidence of higher convergence in the 
Euro Area than in the Non-Euro zone. 
 
GDP Growth Rate (GDPRGR) 
Across all specifications GDPRGR has a positive effect on NIM in the 
Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area, only where it is statistically significant, 
specifically in column 2 of table 4.5 where the Lerner index proxies as a 
competition measure. This means in both zones periods of high growth can 
result in higher net interest margins due to more intense credit activity and 
better loan quality. These findings are consistent with those of Dumicic and 
Ridzak (2013), and Claeys and Vennet (2008). According to Claeys and Vennet 
(2008) the positive association between the business cycle and bank margins is 
mainly a characteristic of the Western European bank markets. And this is what 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) explain by 
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suggesting that GDP serves as a general indicator of economic development by 
reflecting differences in banking technology and the mix of banking 
opportunities.  Therefore, it is only natural that an increase in GDP should be 
expected to increase bank’s income as a result of more lending and lower 
default rates (Brock and Suarez, 2000; Claeys and Vennet, 2008). And that for 
these markets, higher economic growth is associated with higher margins, as a 
reflection of more lending and lower default rates. We however note a higher 
magnitude in impact in the Non-Euro Area than in the Euro Area. For instance, 
in column 2 of table 4.5 where the reported coefficient is 0.027 within the Euro 
Area this is 0.019 in column 1 of table 4.4. That the increases are lower in the 
Euro Area than in the non-Euro Area can be explained by the relatively higher 
macroeconomic stability in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area reflected in 
for example, lower costs to financial firms integrating across the national 
boundaries (Clarke and Daley, 2010). The higher macroeconomic stability is 
further buttressed by the ability of the Euro Area as a monetary union to adopt a 
common approach to addressing shocks should they arise.  
 
Inflation Rate (INFRATE) 
INFRATE has a largely significantly positive impact on NIM in both the 
Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area across all specifications. In both zones the 
positive and significant effects of inflation on intermediation margins is possibly 
due to the ability of banks to at least satisfactorily, forecast future inflation, 
which in turn implies that interest rates have been appropriately adjusted to 
achieve higher margins. This may also be viewed as the result of bank 
customers’ failure (in comparison to bank managers) to fully anticipate inflation, 
implying that above normal margins could be gained from asymmetric 
information (Athanasoglou et al, 2008). That the magnitude of the effects is 
higher in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area can be explained by the 
relatively better ability of banks within the Euro Area to possibly fully anticipate 
and forecast future inflation, which in turn implies that interest rates have been 
appropriately adjusted to achieve higher margins than in the Non-Euro Area. 
Our results of positive relationship of inflation rate with net interest margins in 
both zones is consistent with Brock and Suarez (2000) who find a positive 





As expected real interest rate has a positive impact on NIM in both the 
Euro Area and Non-Euro Area, as banks would account for this as a marginal 
cost of funds to them. We observe however that, across all our specifications in 
tables 4.4 and 4.5 the magnitude of the coefficients is higher in the Non-Euro 
Area than in the Euro Area. For example, in the Non-Euro Area, in table 4.5, 
where REALINT is statistically significant at 1% across all our three baseline 
specifications in columns 1 - 3, while the coefficient is 0.073 in column 1, in 
column 1 of table 4.4 a coefficient of 0.068 is reported. The reason for these 
differences in effects between the two zones can be found in the very primary 
objective of a monetary union to maintain price stability. For instance, in the 
Euro Area the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability in the shape 
of keeping inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term 
through the appropriate level of short-term interest rates. And to the extent that 
this ECB interest rate is an important factor for banks in the Euro Area when 
setting the interest rates that they charge when they lend money it is reflected in 
their NIM. For example, by raising or lowering interest rates the ECB can 
exercise indirect influence over the interest levels that the banks apply to 
interbank transactions, business loans, consumer loans, mortgages and 
savings accounts, amongst other things. Therefore, with this kind of monetary 
policy it would be expected that the Euro Area interest rate which is really the 
price that banks pay to borrow funds from the European Central Bank would be 
lower than what obtains in the Non-Euro Area, where price stability is not 
guaranteed because of the heterogeneity in monetary policy. Our finding of a 
positive relationship of real interest rate with net interest margin is also 
consistent with Brock and Suarez (2000) who find a positive relationship in 
some countries in Latin America 
 
EFFECTS OF 2007/8 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
BCAP_DAFTER2008 
We consider that with the banks within the EU having gone through an 
episode of financial crisis which started in the summer of 2007 and having 
reached its peak in 2008, there might be a structural break with a potential 
impact on the way our regulatory capital variable (BCAP) might impact NIM. 
Motivated by Dumicic and Ridzak (2010) in Table 4.6 we test for the potential 
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structural break in this relationship by creating a crisis dummy 
DUMMY_AFTER2008, whereby years after 2008 take on the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. We also interact the aforementioned crisis dummy with our equity 
capital ratio (BCAP) in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. In so doing we get specific estimates 
for the partial relationship of BCAP with net interest margin in the 2008 financial 
crisis, which results we report across columns 4 – 6 of table 4.4 for the Euro 
Area, and columns 4 – 6 in table 4.5 for the Non-Euro Area. The results show 
that there is a structural change in the relationship between equity capital ratio 
and net interest margin. The relationship between the equity capital ratio and 
net interest margin is negative in the crisis period compared to normal times. In 
column 4 of tables 4.4 and 4.5 in which the Boone indicator proxies for 
competition in both the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area the interaction 
coefficient (BCAP_DAFTER2008) is significantly negative for both zones. This 
runs counter to the general hypothesis in the literature, which is that while 
substituting equity for debt reduces the risk of insolvency, and therefore has the 
effect of lowering the cost of borrowed funds, equity is a more expensive source 
of funding, and therefore increasing equity capital by substituting equity for debt 
leads to higher required net interest margins (NIM) as banks may pass on these 
costs on to customers, rendering a positive relationship between bank capital 
and NIM (Anbgazo, 1997). However, we should note that these regressions 
display significant serial correlation and hence the results have to be treated 
with care.  
Our findings are corroborated by Berger and Bouwman (2013) who note 
that the recent financial crisis has raised fundamental issues about the role of 
bank equity capital, and that various proposals have been put forward to the 
effect that banks should hold more capital. They further argue that the 
undergirding premise in all of these proposals is that there are externalities 
owing to the safety net offered banks and therefore for purposes of enhanced 
social efficiency banks must be seen to be operating with more capital, 
especially during financial crisis.  
 
DUMMY_AFTER2008 
This dummy variable captures the effect of the period in the run-up to the 
start of the financial crisis in up to its peak in 2008. The relationship between 
this variable and NIM is negative in both zones, only marginally significant at 
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10% in the Eurozone, and 1% in the Non-Euro Area with generally higher 
magnitude of the coefficients than in the Euro Area. These findings are 
consistent with those of Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) who find a reducing effect 
of the financial crisis on NIM in the CEEC. However, once again we have 
induced serial correlation in the errors with our step dummy and hence we have 
to treat our results with care.  
 
Long-run effects 
Below in tables 4.10 and 4.11 we present our results of the long-run 
impacts for our bank-specific and competition variables and discussion. In 
section 4.3.1 where we specify our model to be estimated we anticipated the 
display of a dynamic model in that previous values of bank margins may affect 
current values of those margins as banks need to match the random deposit 
supply function and the random demand of lending and non-traditional activities 
across periods (Carbo-Valverde and Fernandez, 2007). This means 
observations in one period are linked to those in some other period. Therefore, 
if one of the driving variables has an initial positive impact on the NIM we 
anticipate that in period 𝑡 + 1 NIM will continue to increase, since past NIM has 
a positive effect. This cumulative effect will continue whilst the driving variable 
remains higher than its initial value. This specification relies on the assumption 
that the effect of all explanatory variables on NIM initially reflects the short-run 
effects, and thereby underestimate the long-run effects of the explanatory 
variables. Estimation of long-run effects requires a dynamic structure where the 
full effect of changes in the explanatory variables on NIM may only come about 
with a lag (Farahani et al, 2009). Therefore, to estimate the long-run effects we 
have used the following dynamic model. 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿У𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵𝑆  +  𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵𝑀
   + 𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀
 
+    𝑖𝑡  
𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
(4.8) 
 
The long run effects can be seen as those that will be observed when 𝑦𝑖𝑡 
= У𝑖𝑡−1 so that in the long-run, an increase in an explanatory variable, say bank 






There are various ways to evaluate the significance of long run effects, 
as these may differ from the significance of the short run effect, and we use the 
relevant parameter restriction implied above to derive ‘t’ statistics which we 
report in tables 4.14 and 4.15 below. 
 
Results 
 As we would expect with positive and significant lagged dependent variables, 
long run impacts exceed short run ones, albeit by more in the non-Euro Area 
than in the Euro Area. In each case we report three regressions for each Area, 
and it is interesting to note that the long run effects of the Boone indicator are 
the same in the two regions, suggesting that the long run effects of the Single 
Market environment are the same, albeit with a slower impact outside the Euro 
Area than in it. The Lerner index is less appropriate for NIMs than elsewhere 
and in the Euro Area it induces serial correlation, and hence it is not surprising 
the effects differ noticeably. The HHI index has a small negative impact in both 
areas in the long run. The bank specific indicators outside of the influence of the 
regulators display smaller effects in the non-Euro Area than they do in the Euro 
Area, even given the slower speed of adjustment outside the Euro Area than in 
it, and hence all our comments on these indicators above continue to hold, with 
bank size having particularly noticeable long run effects in the Euro Area. 
Perhaps the most interesting long run results come from the two 
variables influenced by regulators, liquidity and importantly bank capital. In the 
non-Euro Area extra liquidity has a greater effect on bank NIMs than in the Euro 
Area, reflecting the higher cost of liquid assets to banks outside the Euro Area. 
The long run impacts of bank capital on NIMs are similar both across 
specifications and across regions, and this is important for policy evaluation 
purposes. Our preferred Euro Area specification uses the Boone index, and 
there a one percentage point increase in bank capital will raise net interest 
margins by 0.105 in the long run, whilst in the non-Euro Area specification using 
the Boone indicator a similar increase in bank capital will raise NIMs by 0.104 in 
the long run. In the non-Euro Area specification using the HHI index margins 
would rise by 0.103 in the long run. There are many ways that banks may 
finance their loan books, but the two most obvious sources of funds are equity 
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raising and deposit taking. If a bank pays 5 percent on its deposits and has to 
pay an equity yield of 15 percent then an increase in equity finance of one 
percentage point, reflected in an increase in BCAP of one percent will mean 
that net interest margins must rise by 10 basis points to cover the increase in 
costs. This is exactly the long-run figure we find for both areas we study, 
although the impact takes longer to come through in the less competitive non-
Euro Area. Hence if regulators wish to increase capital holding by banks they 
know that the impacts will be around the same in all European Union countries 
whether or not they are in the Euro Area. This is an important an interesting 







Table 4.10. Simultaneously Controlling for all Bank-Specific, Market 
Structure and Macroeconomic Variables for the Short-Run Effects, and for 
only Bank-Specific and Market Structure Variables for the Long-Run 
Effects in the Euro Area 
 




COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 COLUMN 6 












   















































































































   
J-Statistic 56.90 57.11 56.89    
Prob(J-Statistic) 0.178 0.199 0.178    
No. of Observations 2610 2900 2610    
AR (2) – P-Value 0.059 0.000 0.498    
No. of Banks 290 290 290    
Note:  Probability values ***1% **5% *10; standard errors in parentheses in core regressions in 
columns 1 to 3, and t-statistic in parentheses beneath long- run coefficients in columns 4 to 6. 
List of sample countries, studied period and diagnostic tests are the same as in table 4.4 notes 





Table 4.11. Simultaneously Controlling for all Bank-Specific, Market 
Structure and Macroeconomic Variables for the Short-Run Effects, and for 
only Bank-Specific and Market Structure Variables for the Long-Run 
Effects in the Non-Euro Area. 
 
Variable name Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
 BOONE LERNER HHI BOONE LERNER HHI 
    LONG-RUN LONG-RUN LONG-RUN 










































































LERNER  -0.007 
(0.007) 
  -0.010 
(-0.913) 
 
HHI   -0.060*** 
(0.011) 
 
  0.041*** 
(3.418) 





























   
J-Statistic 46.69 55.14 48.83    
Prob(J-Statistic) 0.567 0.254 0.48    
No. of Observations 710 710 710    
AR (2) – P-Value 0.773 0.269 0.219    
No. of Banks 71 71 71    
Note: probability values ***1% **5% *10; standard errors in parentheses in core regressions in 
columns 1 to 3, and t- statistic in parentheses beneath long- run coefficients in columns 4 to 6. 
List of sample countries, studied period and diagnostic tests remain the same as in table 4.5 









In this chapter we have attempted to analyse the effect of monetary union 
membership on bank net interest margins in the European Union for the period 
2002 - 2013, using a total sample of 361 banks, made up of 290 banks from the 
Euro Area and 71 banks from the Non-Euro Area, from across 16 countries of 
the Euro Area and Non-Euro Area. The studied countries for the Euro Area are, 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, for the Euro Area. And for the Non-Euro Area we study Bulgaria, The 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. We 
contrast our findings in the Euro Area with the those of the Non-Euro Area. Our 
objective has been to use our analysis for the European Union as a benchmark 
to extend the same level of analysis to evaluate the dynamics of the monetary 
union membership in the determination of net interest margins in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), and set out the policy implications and recommendations in the 
last chapter. Our choice of the EU was motivated by the fact that the EU has 
become the model of monetary union arrangements on which all SSA monetary 
union endeavours are modelled. We used the Arellano and Bover (1995) 
system GMM estimator which is robust to endogeneity problems and allows for 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity between banks. 
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Given the deregulation of financial services in the European Union, and the 
development of information technology catalysed by the establishment of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the advent of which set in motion a trend 
of internationalisation of the financial services market, intensified competition 
due in part to heightened disintermediation, and a trend of consolidation, all 
giving rise to a downward pressure on bank profitability within the Euro Area we 
consider that monetary union membership have implications for the following 
determinants of net interest margins (NIM): The degree of banking competition 
(BOONE, LERNER and HHI), Exchange rate Risk (EXRATEPC) Scale-
efficiency (BSIZE) and X-efficiency (BMQCI), that is Management efficiency. 
We therefore test the following hypotheses: 
1. Efficient Structure Hypothesis: We hypothesize the presence of X-
Efficiency (BMQCI) and S-Efficiency (BSIZE) 
2. The degree of banking competition (BOONE, LERNER and HHI) has a 
larger reducing impact on NIM in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro 
Area because of the effects of the EMU. 
3. We hypothesize that exchange rate has a more reducing impact on NIM 
in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area. 
We as well considered that the relatively lower interest NIM in the Euro Area as 
opposed to the Non-Euro Area were due to factors which, in part, were driven 
by several years of a favourable economic situation, due to convergence in the 
economies of the Euro Area, propitiating an environment of macroeconomic 
stability in which financial markets have shown low volatility (Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2004). So we conduct tests of unit root on our four 
macroeconomic variables, viz, EXRATEPC, GDPRGR, INFRATE and REALINT 
to determine the level convergence between the Euro and the Non-Euro Areas. 
While our results show that the variables are broadly converged in both zones, 
their average speed of convergence as measured by β is higher in the Non-
Euro Area than in the Euro Area, with the exception of GDPRGR which average 
speed is rather higher in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area, and also 
takes a shorter time for the gap between the Euro Area countries and the sub-
regional average to be cut into half than the countries in the Non-Euro Area. 
This shows how aggressive the European Union countries outside the Euro 
Area who have an accession agenda are in meeting the Euro Area 
convergence criteria as fast as possible.  
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Results for both management efficiency (BMQCI) and bank size (BSIZE) 
support the hypotheses of bank X-efficiency and S-efficiency respectively, with 
both variables having reducing impact on NIM in both the Euro Area and the 
Non-Euro Area, although this reducing impact is higher in the Euro Area than in 
the Non-Euro Area because of the effects of the monetary union. The policy 
implication therefore is for the relevant authorities to continue to promote 
efficiency savings via creating a congenial macroeconomic environment where 
banking firms could grow in sizes to be able to exploit economies of scale. 
For our second hypothesis on the effects of banking competition we find that 
there is a strong case for preferring the Boone indicator of competition as it 
takes account of the impact of cross country competition. In addition, its long 
run effect is the same in our two regions. We should note inconsistencies in the 
picking up of competition effects in the different jurisdictions by our different 
competition measures as all three competition measures did not appear to be 
equally informative in the Euro Area and Non-Euro Area respectively. The 
Lerner index, a price minus cost index divided by price, may be a poor indicator 
of competition in banking as it is closely related to the NIM by definition. Hence 
we are not surprised that, like others, we find it has the wrong sign in the Euro 
Area regressions and that it induces serial correlation in the errors there. This 
notwithstanding our results support our hypothesis that the level of competition 
within the Euro Area has a higher reducing effect on NIM in the Euro Area than 
the Non-Euro Area as a result of the effects of the EMU. This calls for banking 
competition authorities in both zones to maintain competition at levels that will 
force banks to maintain efficiency levels that will positively impact social welfare 
through reduced NIM. The coupling of our first and second hypotheses are 
indeed consistent with the findings of Chortareas et al (2009) who find that the 
reducing effect of an interaction between their competition measure, the 
Herfindhal index, and their X-efficiency measure on NIM is consistent with the 
hypothesis that increasing banking efficiency, in addition to fostering 
competition, can reduce interest rate margins. 
For our third and last hypothesis which is in reference to the effect of 
EXRATEPC on NIM in both zones we find that both the Euro Area and the Non-
Euro Area show a reducing effect of EXRATEPC on NIM, but the coefficients for 
the Euro Area are larger. We therefore conclude by suggesting that because of 
the accession agenda of the constituent countries their rates are converging to 
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the Euro Area exchange rates, thereby minimising exchange rate risk and 
therefore engendering a reducing effect on NIM. It is our recommendation that 
these efforts within the Non-Euro Area should not be relented to expedite their 
accession agenda to join the Euro Area to be able to enjoy a sustainable 
exchange rate risk elimination. 
In regard to the other macroeconomic variables we find the incidence of 
higher increases in NIM with an increase in GDPRGR in the Non-Euro Area 
than in the Euro Area attributable to the relatively higher macroeconomic 
stability in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area reflected in more lending 
and lower default rates. For the positive impact of INFRATE on NIM in both 
zones but relatively higher increases of NIM in the Euro Area than in the Non-
Euro Area we extend the same argument as aforementioned. That is, the 
macroeconomic convergence in the economies of the Euro Area, propitiating an 
environment of macroeconomic stability in the form of price stability where 
banks within the Euro Area have a relatively better ability to possibly fully 
anticipate and forecast future inflation, which in turn implies that interest rates 
have been appropriately adjusted to achieve higher margins than in the Non-
Euro Area. Again the higher magnitude of the coefficients of real interest rate 
(REALINT) in the Non-Euro Area than in the Euro Area seems to suggest a 
higher price stability in the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area where interest 
rates reflect higher and volatile inflation rates than in the Euro Area, and 
reflected in policy rates. It is our considered view that this gap will close up once 
the countries of the Non-Euro Area finally accede. 
Overall we find reducing impact of our explanatory variables on NIMs in 
the Euro Area than in the Non-Euro Area reflecting, inter alia, a more 
competitive environment, greater scale and management efficiencies and a 
higher macroeconomic stability generated by the establishment of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). The implication for the managers of the economies 
within the two zones is to formulate and implement policies geared towards 
enhancing the convergence of their respective economic fundamentals to 
ensure macroeconomic stability. Again to extent that competition has a reducing 
effect on NIM in both zones policies must aim at ensuring the sustainability of 
competition in the banking sectors of both the Euro and the Non-Euro Areas as 
the European Commission has in its own wisdom already championed a lot of 
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regulatory changes aimed at fostering competition in the financial services 





5 CHAPTER FIVE 
DETERMINANTS OF NET INTEREST 
MARGINS IN THE WEST AFRICAN 
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
(WAEMU) VERSUS THE NON-MONETARY 
UNION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we draw on our conclusions in the fourth chapter on the 
European Union (EU), that competition and efficiency are more important 
drivers of lower net interest margins in a monetary union than in a non-
monetary union environment, and we extend the analysis to the Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) region where we compare the banking sectors of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the non-monetary Union 
SSA. In chapter 4 we observe that the main drivers responsible for the generally 
lower net interest margins in the Euro Area than the Non-Euro Area were the 
prevalence of higher levels of banking competition and efficiency within the 
Euro Area as a dynamic of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on the 
European banking industry. In this connection we extend our analysis in chapter 
4, namely, competition and efficiency effects of economic and monetary union 
to the Sub-Saharan African banking industry, specifically, on the cost of 
intermediation. We do this by contrasting our findings in 20 non-monetary union 
Sub-Saharan African countries with 7 banking sectors out of the 8 WAEMU 
countries respectively. For the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African 
countries, we study Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mauritania, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and South 
Africa. And also for the WAEMU the following countries are studied: Burkina 
Faso, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 
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The results show that in the context of Sub-Saharan African monetary 
union, specifically the WAEMU, the generally lower net interest margins 
observed, in the order of 5.4% mean for the WAEMU and 9.0% for the non-
monetary union SSA, cannot be attributed to the competitive forces and Scale 
and management efficiencies, as well as a stable macroeconomic environment 
known to be generated in a monetary union environment. The empirical results 
show that the most important factor driving the relatively lower net interest 
margins in the WAEMU is the lower real interest rates that obtain in the region. 
And that the lack of competition has masked any gains that could have been 
made from the single currency and the relatively lower inflation.  
Again as in our fourth chapter on Europe our focus here is on 
commercial banks which seem to dominate the financial systems of the sub-
Saharan African region and are as a result the main channels for deposit 
mobilisation.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section, which is 
Section 5.2 reviews the empirical literature on banking competition in the Sub-
Saharan Africa. Section 5.3 describes the methodology and data, followed by 
Section 5.4 which also discusses the empirical results. And lastly Section 5.5 
concludes with policy implications and recommendations.   
We test the following hypotheses as was done in our studies on Europe 
being our benchmark region in this chapter. 
5.1.1 Tested Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1 
We hypothesize that the two efficient structure hypotheses, that is, 
the X-efficiency, proxied by bank cost-to-income ratio (BMQCI) and S-
efficiency, also proxied by log of bank total assets (BSIZE), both have a 
greater reducing effect on NIM in the WAEMU than in the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
We recognise that since the mid-2000s the WAEMU has attracted 
new banks from Africa mainly the burgeoning multi-national banks from 
Nigeria and North Africa, far earlier than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa in 
addition to the already existing Western European ones (Leon, 2014). These 
cross border banks come with a comparative advantage like economies of 
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scale and management expertise, and therefore lower marginal cost. And as 
a result we would expect them to have a greater reducing effects on NIM in 
the WAEMU than in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan. 
 Hypothesis 2 
The degree of banking competition, respectively using the Boone 
indicator, the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), has a 
larger magnitude of reducing impact on NIM in the WAEMU than in the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, because of the effects of the economic 
and monetary union in the way of the single market in combination with free 
capital movement, free open borders and the single banking licence 
supposedly affording market contestability. 
 Hypothesis 3 
We hypothesize that exchange rate has a more reducing effect on 
NIM in the WAEMU than in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Exchange rate stability between countries within the WAEMU should 
enhance the effectiveness of the Single Market as a source of competitive 
pressure. 
5.1.2 Immediate Post-Independence Banking Industry in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Historically, the immediate post-independence banking industry in Sub-
Saharan Africa was seen to be characterised by massive government 
interventions in the operations across the Sub-region. This took the form of 
directed credit allocation according to what governments thought to be the 
national development agenda as opposed lending according to commercial 
criteria; and nationalisation of previously foreign-owned banking institutions and 
the newly-established government-owned banks set-up from the scratch 
(Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998). Furthermore, this era in the sub- Saharan 
Africa’s banking industry was characterised by negative consequences of 
unwarranted government interventions manifesting as low deposit levels, 
leading to low levels of lending, stifled competition, attended by poor service 
quality, accumulation of bad debts on a scale which resulted in the insolvency of 
most commercial banks, especially the state-owned ones. Also documented in 
the post-independence Sub-Saharan African banking history is the lack of 
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professionalism and commercial lending expertise on the part of commercial 
banks as well as inadequate prudential regulation and supervision capacity on 
the part of the central banks. Other interventions embarked on by the immediate 
post-independence Sub-Saharan African governments were the use of 
exchange controls to discourage investment in foreign assets in order to shore 
up savings in domestic assets. For the commercial banks this meant that it 
became easier for them to attract deposits, and at lower interest rates than 
would otherwise have been. Similarly, nominal interest rate controls were the 
order of the day in a bid to keep cost of borrowing low in order to encourage 
investment.  
Nevertheless, all of the above scale of government intervention in the 
Sub-Saharan African banking industry with their negative consequences were 
to see an end in the early 1980s, not by design on the part of the governments 
but as a side effect in the search for solutions to the acute economic crisis, 
indeed a crisis similar to the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, which 
engulfed the region in the 1980s. The economic crisis deriving from combined 
adverse external shocks, and in the words of Brownbridge and Harvey (1998), 
anti-export and anti-agricultural biases in governments’ policy formulation. 
Specifically, in the quest for solutions to their economic woes by Sub-Saharan 
African governments the only option that was left to them was to resort to 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). And as part of the conditions demanded by these 
international financial institutions African governments were to adopt structural 
adjustment programmes the main objective of which was to reduce the 
magnitude of state intervention in markets, including financial markets. These 
led to the implementation of a programme of financial sector liberalisation in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, according to Brownbridge and Harvey (1998). The 
objectives of the programme were inter alia: 
 To remove government control of interest rates to allow the mechanism 
of market forces to eliminate the negative effects of negative real interest 
rates.  
 To remove all government controls over bank lending to allow for 
efficiency in credit allocation. 
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 To lower entry barriers in the shape of licensing of new banks in to 
engender competition in order to reduce the cost of financial 
intermediation and also increase the available range of bank services. 
 To strengthen prudential regulation and supervision 
 To reduce state ownership of banks 
 And to develop securities markets 
It must be said however that the pursuit of a programme of financial 
liberalisation did not see much success for reasons bordering on the lack of 
commitment on the part of commercial banks to embrace change, as well as the 
lack of the political will on the part of governments to implement the programme 
to the letter. For example, due to the anticipated high cost impact on 
government budgets most African governments were reluctant to allow for the 
raising of nominal interest rates over and above the prevailing high inflation 
rates. Overall, it would be said that the anticipated growth of efficient financial 
intermediation and efficient allocation of credit on commercial lines did not 
materialise in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Again to the extent that the reform 
implementation was being made in the midst of economic crisis and unstable 
macroeconomic environment where real sector borrowers had difficulty with 
their investments resulting in bad/non-performing loans, it made bank lending 
on strict commercial principles very difficult. 
5.1.3 Current developments in Sub-Saharan African banking  
Two to three decades after the reform, the region can boast of a 
relatively stable macroeconomic and financial environment, with expected 
strong economic growth in many countries in the region, which augurs well for 
further development of the banking system (EIB, 2013). This notwithstanding, 
financial and banking systems of Sub-Saharan Africa remain underdeveloped. 
The banking systems in the region are highly concentrated and generally 
inefficient at financial intermediation; they are characterized by their small size 
and low intermediation, and despite little barriers to entry and exit, as evidenced 
by the dominant market share of foreign banks, competition is still limited (EIB, 
2013; IMF, 2013; Beck and Hesse, 2009). The foregoing is also re-echoed by 
Mlachila et al (2013) who note that the scale of financial intermediation in Sub-
Saharan Africa remains significantly lower than in other developing regions of 
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the world, while access to financial services is also relatively low, which is a 
reflection of a combination of low income levels, small absolute size, and 
infrastructural weaknesses. In this context, access to finance in sub-Saharan 
Africa is among the lowest in the world and presents one of the key obstacles to 
the activity and growth of enterprises.  This in turn constrains the region from 
achieving its full growth potential. Talking about the generally inefficient financial 
intermediation in the region what readily stands in relief is the generally high net 
interest margins which obtain in the region. To this effect, Beck and Cull (2013) 
note that net interest margins as well as interest rate spreads are higher in 
Africa than in less developed countries outside Africa in the order of the median 
African country net interest margin standing at 5.9 per cent in 2011, and 4.7 per 
cent outside Africa; while the interest rate spread between lending and deposit 
rate stand at 10.3 per cent in Africa and 8.2 per cent outside. Beck and Cull 
(2013) blame the high net interest margins on the lack of competition in most 
Sub-Saharan African banking sectors. Again they note that the small size of 
many African economies constrains African banking firms from benefiting from 
economies of scale.  Again the dispersion of population in most African 
countries means banking operations outside of urban centres are not effective. 
Amidu (2011) also note that in 2005, the average interest margin in low-income 
African banking sectors was three times that of higher-income banking sectors, 
12.75% against 3.89%; a development he attributes to the absence of scale 
economies, high risks and political volatility. We also observe that the mean net 
interest margin over the period 1999 – 2013 for Sub-Saharan Africa region 
outside of a monetary union was 9.0% which is about twice as much that of the 
non-Euro Area over 2002 – 2013, 4.2%.  
5.2 Review of empirical literature on banking competition in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
While in the wider empirical literature on bank interest margins 
determinants the role played by the structure of the bank market in cross-
country studies such as this are inconclusive (Leon, 2015) the generally high 
bank interest spreads and margins that obtain in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
variously blamed among other factors on lack of competition in the various 
banking sectors of the region (for example, Beck and Cull, 2013 and Chirwa 
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and Mlachila, 2004). In view of this we find it appropriate to review the empirical 
literature on banking competition in SSA in this section in order to put further 
analyses of our data and findings in subsequent sections in a proper context, 
the scarcity of banking competition literature on Africa notwithstanding.  
The literature on banking competition has it that foreign bank entry, 
especially through greenfield investments would normally spur competition 
because it increases the number of industry participants who come on board 
with comparative advantages in the form of better access to capital, skill and 
management expertise, scale economies and so on (Leon, 2015). In the post-
reform Sub-Saharan African banking industry such has been the experience 
which is further enhanced by the influx of indigenous African banks, who also 
come on board armed with added competitive advantage in the form of local 
knowledge and services adapted to the African markets. Leon (2014), find an 
intensification of banking competition in countries outside of WAEMU over the 
second part of the 2000s. For the countries of the WAEMU however Leon 
(2015) find that while they have experienced a structural change with the entry 
of banks from other West African and North African countries, the industry is 
characterised by imperfect competition, and that bank concentration only eased 
up in the second half of the 2000s. Beck and Cull (2013) also describe African 
banking sectors as highly concentrated and characterised by low degree of 
competition. They for example find that while the share of the five largest bank 
was 81 percent in the median African country in 2011, it was 64 percent outside 
Africa during the same period. 
For the review of empirical literature on the determinants of net interest 
margin in Africa we refer back to the literature review chapter which is the 
second chapter.  
5.3 Methodology and Data description 
Our model specification, variable description, and data sources sections 
are virtually the same as in Chapter 4 on Europe, however, for completeness 
we repeat them here with the relevant modifications. 
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5.3.1 Model Specification 
The application of the single-step, static approach which incorporates all 
the determinants of net interest margins in a single estimation is the norm in the 
literature (Agoraki, 2009). We would however argue that the static model cannot 
be justified either for advanced countries or as in emerging markets. This is 
because in emerging economies information opacity is rife, banks’ assessment 
of net interest margins and its determinants is based on clear information that 
changes only slowly over time. Not all the relevant information can be updated 
based on new information each period, so that NIMs could be systematically 
related each period, which provides enough justification for a dynamic 
specification as opposed to a static, one for advanced economies. The 
existence of inertia may also reflect the inability to observe all determinants of 
the NIM, and some may evolve slowly over time. The need for a dynamic 
approach is a testable proposition, and if serial correlation exists in a static 
evaluation of NIMs it is almost certainly the case that a lagged dependent 
variable is the omitted variable that causes the serial correlation. 
The static approach has been applied in several studies including 
McShane and Sharpe (1985), Angbazo (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), Claeys and Vander Vennet 
(2007), and Carbo-Valverde and Fernandez (2007). The basic framework for 
this model involves the estimation of the following linear equation which brings 
together all the determinants of NIMs in a single stage as follows: 
 
 
    𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 +  𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀
   + 𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀
 +    𝑖𝑡    
    𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
(5.1) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the bank net interest margin for bank 𝑖, at time  𝑡, α is a 
constant term, 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 denotes the effects of a the vector of bank-specific 
explanatory variables, where it indexes bank 𝑖, at time 𝑡, 𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀 is the effects 
of a vector of market/industry characteristics variables,  𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀 is the effects of a 
vector of macroeconomic control variables, and 𝑖𝑡  is the error term capturing all 
other omitted factors, with 𝜇𝑖 being the unobserved bank-specific effect and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
the idiosyncratic error.  Such static models in the literature are commonly 
estimated using least squares methods on fixed effects (FE) or random effects 
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(RE) models. However, in dynamic relationships as is the case in our study 
these methods produce biased and inconsistent estimates, particularly with a 
large N and smaller T, which does not augur well for the accurate estimation of 
N-invariant regressors, mostly macroeconomic regressors (Batalgi, 2001, 
Garcia-Herrero et al, 2007), in which case the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator may be employed. 
The display of a dynamic model in this particular study is our anticipation 
that previous values of bank margins may affect current values of those margins 
as banks need to match the random deposit supply function and the random 
demand of lending and non-traditional activities across periods (Carbo-Valverde 
and Fernandez, 2007). Indeed, Carbo-Valverde and Fernandez (2007) posit 
that the maximization of bank wealth considers both initial and end-of-period 
information. Therefore, within the empirical literature NIMs are known to display 
a tendency to persist over time. In this regard, we state the following dynamic 




 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿У𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 +  𝛽𝐵𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀
   + 𝛽𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀
 +    𝑖𝑡    
𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
(5.2) 
 
The three vectors of variables represent the bank-specific (𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆), bank 
market-specific (𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑀) and macroeconomic variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀), and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents 
the net interest margin. Subscripts 𝑖  and 𝑡 are for 𝑖-th bank and 𝑡-th time 
period. The error term has an unobserved bank-specific (𝜇𝑖), and the 
idiosyncratic error (𝜈𝑖𝑡) components.    У𝑖𝑡−1 is the one-period lagged NIM and 𝛿 
the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. A value of 𝛿 between 0 and 1 implies 
that NIMs persist, but they will eventually return to their normal (average) level 
after a temporary shock, that is, mean-reverting. A value close to 0 means that 
the industry is fairly rapidly competitive (high speed of adjustment), while a 
value of 𝛿 close to 1 implies less immediate competitive structure (very slow 
adjustment).  
In the econometric literature because the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term by construction using OLS with fixed effects in the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors gives rise to 
dynamic panel bias and inconsistent estimates (Nickel, 1981; Roodman, 2006). 
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The combination of this problem and the challenges of unobservable 
heterogeneity across banks, as well as the potential endogeneity with some of 
our regressors warrant that we move away from the methodology of OLS with 
fixed or random effects and employ the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator following Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
We anticipate that the challenge of unobservable heterogeneity in this 
study could be reflected in for example differences in ownership structure 
across banks and jurisdictions, Management quality, and so on. With regards to 
potential endogeneity we consider that banks with higher NIM may be able to 
increase their equity more easily through profit retention30. Again they would 
also be able to afford more advertising to increase their market share and 
consequently their size, of which they might take advantage to increase their 
NIM. Such reverse causality is not difficult to find in banking operations, and the 
use of OLS for estimation yields biased and inconsistent results in the presence 
of such problems.   
To overcome the problem of endogeneity the meticulous use of 
instrumental variables is suggested in the literature as they are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the error term. Nevertheless, if the instruments are poorly 
correlated with the explanatory variables they are meant to replace they render 
the regression results biased and inconsistent. To eliminate the time-invariant 
bank-specific effects emanating from unobservable heterogeneity, as well as 
the problem of endogeneity Arellano and Bond (1991) initially suggest first-
differencing the regression equation for a GMM estimator for panel data, and 
also instrumenting the endogenous explanatory variables with suitable lags of 
their own levels.  Nonetheless, given that the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator was flawed to the extent that if the lagged levels to be used as 
instruments were weakly correlated with the differences of the explanatory 
variables because they may be highly persistent then the included 
supplementary instruments may not be useful and thus yield large sample bias.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) therefore propose an improved panel data GMM 
estimator. This GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is the system GMM. Their position is 
                                            
30
 Athanasoglou et al. (2008) suggest that capital ratio is better modelled as an endogenous 
determinant of bank profitability in econometrical models. 
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that lagged levels are often poor instruments for variables in first differences. 
Thus, the original equations in levels can be added to the system, whereby 
predetermined and endogenous variables are instrumented with their own 
lagged first-differences, in which case the system GMM estimator is proven to 
have dramatic efficiency gains over the basic first-difference GMM (Batalgi, 
2001). To this effect, in this study, we treat all bank-specific variables in section 
5.3.2.1 as endogenous and instrument them with their orthogonal 
transformations. We also test whether the instruments, as a group, are 
exogenous and indeed valid by performing the Hansen J. specification test of 
over-identifying restrictions. The test examines the lack of correlation between 
the instruments and the error term. Serial correlation has to be tested carefully 
in this context, and as Roodman (2009) explains, we expect to see first order 
serial correlation and not second order given the techniques we are using. All 
our results do display first order serial correlation, and we only report our test for 
second order.  We obtain the AR 2 statistics which measure the presence of 
second-order serial correlation with the null hypothesis that there is no serial 
correlation in the residuals. So in all we deem the methodology followed, that is, 
the system GMM estimator capable of controlling for potential endogeneity, 
unobserved heterogeneity and the persistence of the dependent variable, to 
yield consistent unbiased estimators.  
5.3.2 Variable Construction 
Following the empirical literature in Chapter two we implement model 5.2 
in section 5.3.1 above by considering the following bank-specific, 
market/industry specific, as well as macroeconomic variables 
5.3.2.1 Bank-specific variables 
Dependent variable 
 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
We define NIM and decompose it into its constituent parts following 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998). NIM is an accounting ratio which reflects 
bank efficiency in its intermediation role31. It is defined as a bank’s interest 
                                            
31
 While net interest margin can indicate bank efficiency or inefficiency, it is not always the case 
that a reduction in net interest margins means improved bank efficiency, as a reduction in net 
interest margins can, reflect a reduction in bank taxation or, alternatively, a lower loan default 
rate (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998 
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income minus the total interest expense over its total earning assets, thus 
having the following accounting identity:  
 
𝑁𝐼𝑀 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 −  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
   
 The accounting decomposition of a bank’s interest margin from a bank’s 
accounting identity of profits was first developed by Hanson and Rocha (1986), 
and followed by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Beck and Fuchs 
(2004). The starting point is to establish what constitutes a bank’s before-tax-
profits-t-assets (BTP/TA). Before tax profits to assets (BTP/TA) equals after-tax 
profits to assets (ATP/TA) plus taxes to assets (TX/TA). Therefore, BTP/TA is 
decomposed as follows: 
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Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).  
From the foregoing accounting decomposition, it is clear that NIM as a 
summary measure of banks’ net interest return is also an important component 
of bank profits (Angbazo,1997). Also according to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) 
while NIM reflects the efficiency with which a bank intermediates, it is also an 
indicator of the competitive nature of the banking markets. This is supported by 
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Bikker and Bos (2008) who note that while competition and efficiency describe 
two different things they are often seen as almost synonymous, in that heavy 
competition forces banks to improve efficiency. As a result, like profitability 
measures as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) NIM is 
expected to be smaller, the heavier competition is, thereby establishing a 
negative relationship between NIM and competition.  
 
Independent variables 
 Bank Capital 
Our bank capital variable proxies for risk aversion and regulatory 
requirements which is the norm in the empirical literature investigating the 
determinants of net interest margins. To this effect we use the ratio of equity to 
assets, hereafter abbreviated as BCAP, to proxy the bank capital variable. By 
Bankscope’s definition this ratio measures the amount of protection afforded to 
the bank by the equity they invested in it, as equity is a cushion against asset 
malfunction. And that the higher this figure the more protection there is. Our 
choice of this ratio as a proxy for this variable is particularly motivated by 
McShane and Sharpe (1985), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), 
Claeys and Vennet (2008).  According to the theoretical model, a positive 
relationship is expected between our bank capital variable and net interest 
margin, as banks that are most risk averse will require a higher margin to cover 
the higher costs of equity financing compared to external financing, ceteris 
paribus. As well because these banks are seen to have lower bankruptcy and 
funding costs they are more likely able to charge higher margins. In addition, 
increases in regulatory capital requirements will also increase the NIM as banks 
are forced to fund their loan book using more expensive capital rather than 
lower cost debt and deposits. Boutin-Dufresne et al (2013) in their study of 
banking sector efficiency across regional blocks of Sub-Saharan Africa also find 
a positive relationship between bank capital, proxied by equity-to-assets ratio, 
and NIM to be positive. 
 
 Bank Credit Quality 
Flamini et al (2009) claim that the main source of bank-specific risk in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is credit risk, and that the exposure of banks to high credit 
risk is due to poor enforcement of creditor rights, weak legal environment, and 
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insufficient information on borrowers. Schweiger and Liebeg (2009), Saad and 
El-Moussawi (2010) in Dumicic and Ridzak (2010) note that credit risk belongs 
to the group of factors with the highest impact on banks’ interest margins. 
Nassreddine et al (2013) also assert that the impact of deterioration of the credit 
quality on the NIM seems positive as banks seek to increase their margins to 
compensate, on the one hand the risk of default, and on the other additional 
costs necessary to monitor these credits. Following Bankscope’s categorisation 
of asset quality ratios our bank credit quality variable, abbreviated to BCREDSK 
hereafter, is the ratio of loan loss provision to net interest revenue32. It is the 
relationship between provisions in the profit and loss account and the interest 
income over the same period. While this ratio should ideally be as low as 
possible, in a well-managed bank if the lending book is fraught with a higher risk 
it should be reflected by higher margins. We would therefore, as it broadly 
obtains in the empirical literature expect its relationship with NIM to be positive. 
Ahokpossi (2013) in his study of 41 countries across Sub-Saharan Africa find 
credit risk to be positively and significantly associated with net interest margins. 
 
 Bank liquidity (BLIQ) 
We follow Ahmad and Matemilola (2013); and Dumicic and Ridzak 
(2013) and proxy our bank liquidity variable as the ratio of net loans to customer 
deposit and short-term funding, which we abbreviate hereafter as BLIQ. The 
understanding is that to the extent that banks’ relatively illiquid loans are largely 
funded by relatively stable customer deposits they must ensure they have 
sufficient liquidity resources to be able to pay depositors in the event that a 
large number of them and investors may wish to withdraw their savings, that is, 
the bank’s funding at once, leaving the bank short of funds which may have 
inimical consequences for critical services banks contribute to the economy. In 
order to compensate for this risk, known as liquidity risk, a premium dependable 
on the level of risk, is charged to the interest income. A high liquidity ratio 
means that a bank has adequate liquid assets to be able to meet unexpected 
deposit withdrawals or to fund increased loan demands and vice versa. We 
would therefore expect that banks with high levels of liquid assets, either 
                                            
32
 Ideally, the credit quality should be proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans 
as is predominant in the empirical literature. The Bankscope database however only has these 
variables for a limited number of banks in our sample 
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voluntarily or for prudential reasons or as a result of regulation, may receive 
lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets, in which case, and 
given that the market for deposits is reasonably competitive, the relationship 
with net interest margin is expected to be negative (Angbazo, 1997; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2004). Conversely, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) state that the 
liquidity ratio may have a positive impact on interest margins to the extent that 
banks are able to transfer this opportunity cost to borrowers. In a cross-country 
study of 41 Sub-Saharan African countries Ahokpossi (2013) find that the 
liquidity ratio negatively and significantly affects interest margins, 
 
 Bank Size (BSIZE) 
The inclusion of the bank size variable accounts for possible scale 
economies, where average cost declines as bank output rises, resulting from 
spreading fixed costs over a greater volume of output. Whether or not this 
happens in reality, that is, if indeed just based on their size larger banks are 
more efficient than small banks has spanned a lot of empirical literature. Allen 
and Liu (2007) note that broadly, most studies on economies of scale in 
financial institutions find only small economies of scale in a firm’s cost structure.  
Also within the empirical literature there exists the general feeling that 
economies of scale rise up to a certain level with size, beyond which financial 
institutions become too complex to manage and diseconomies of scale sets in. 
We therefore anticipate that the effect of size could be nonlinear, meaning that 
NIM is likely to increase up to a certain level by achieving economies of scale 
and decline from a certain level in which banks become too complex to 
manage. We would thus use the logarithm of total asset to capture the potential 
non-linear effect of bank size on NIM and thus expect the sign of the coefficient 
of bank size to be ambiguous based on the literature. Athanasoglou et al (2008) 
use real assets in logs and their square to capture the possible non-linear 
relationship between bank size and profitability in their analysis of the 
determinants of bank profitability in Greece over the period 1985 – 2001. Also, 
Flamini et al (2009) find a positive and significant coefficient of the size variable 
in its relationship with bank profitability in their study of commercial bank 





• Bank Management Quality (BMQCI) 
This variable is proxied by the cost to income ratio, defined as operating 
expenses of a bank as a share of sum of net-interest revenue and other 
operating income. It effectively measures the operating cost incurred to 
generate one unit of gross income or revenue. It is included as an indicator of 
the management’s contribution in interest margins, to the extent that 
management quality is reflected in the composition of a bank’s portfolio through 
providing, inter alia, profitable composition of assets and low-cost liabilities. A 
variety of measures have been used to proxy for management quality in the 
empirical literature. Angbazo (1997) for example uses ratio of earning assets to 
total assets, while Maudos and Fernandez De Guevera (2004); Dumicic and 
Ridzak (2013) use cost-to-income ratio. Our choice of cost-to-income ratio is 
motivated by Maudos and Fernandez De Guevera (2004) posit that an increase 
in this ratio implies a decrease in the efficiency or quality of management, which 
will translate into a lower interest margin. And thus a negative sign is expected. 
In this study we use this management quality proxy to test for the hypothesis of 
X-efficiency as delineated in section 5.1.1 above. The X-efficiency (X-ES) 
version of the efficient structure hypothesis (ESH) states that banks with 
superior management or production technologies have lower costs and 
subsequently can offer more competitive interest rates on loans and/or 
deposits, leading to a negative relationship between operational efficiency and 
interest margins (Claeys and Vennet, 2008).  
5.3.2.2 Industry-specific variables 
We capture the effect of the degree of banking market competition with 
three proxies for the robustness of competition: 
 The use of the Lerner index which is common in the empirical 
literature 
 The use of the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI) 




 The Lerner index 
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Data for the Lerner index is taken from the World Bank’s Global Financial 
Development Database. And is calculated from the underlying bank-by-bank 
data from the Bankscope by World Bank and Bankscope staff using annual data 
from 1996-2010. The estimations follow the methodology described in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2010) 33. The index is one of the non-
structural measures of competition used in the banking competition literature to 
infer competitive behaviour of banks. It directly measures pricing power by 
examining the price markup over marginal cost34. It is the difference between 
the price and the marginal cost, divided by the price, which measures the 
capacity to set prices above the marginal cost, being an inverse function of the 
elasticity of demand and of the number of banks (Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevera, 2004). Higher values of it indicate greater market power and lower 
levels of bank competition. Simply put the Lerner index is a level measure of the 




𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  





where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price charged by bank 𝑖̇ at time t on their assets and 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the 
marginal cost. The calculation of marginal costs is also based on the following 
specification of a trans logarithmic cost function, where the estimated 
coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost: 
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33
 They also follow Fernandez de Guevera et al (2005, 2007) and Berger et al (2008). 
34
 That is, the extra cost of producing an additional unit of output. 
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where 𝐶𝑖 is the bank’s total costs, including financial and operating costs; and 
total assets (𝑇𝐴𝑖) proxies as a measure of bank output. Prices of the production 
factors are defined as follows:   
w1. Price of labour, defined as the ratio of labour costs to total assets. 
w2. Price of capital, which is the ratio of operating costs (excluding 
personnel costs) / Fixed assets. 
W3. Price of deposits, defined as financial Costs / Customer and short-
term funding 
 The costs function (and hence of the marginal costs) is estimated 
separately for each country. This allows the parameters of the cost function to 
vary from one country to another to reflect different technologies. Fixed effects, 
are as well incorporated, aimed at capturing the influence of variables specific 
to each bank. Also included is a trend (Trend) to reflect the effect of technical 
change, which translates into movements of the cost function over time. 
Empirical studies that have used the Lerner index include, Boutin-Dufresne et al 
(2013) in Sub-Saharan Africa, who find a significantly positive relationship of the 
Lerner index with NIM. Other studies include Fernandez de Guevera et al 
(2005), Carbo et al (2009), and Maudos and Fernandez de Guevera (2004). 
Following Fernandez de Guevera et al (2005) we dissect the index into its 
constituent parts as follows, first, with the assumption that the production of 
goods and services by a bank is proportional to its total assets, and therefore 
their prices can be calculated by estimating the average price of bank 
production, proxied by total assets, as a quotient of total revenue35. 
 
 The Boone Indicator of Competition 
The Boone indicator is a new approach to measuring competition 
recently introduced by Boone (2008). Data for the indicator is taken from the 
World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database. And is calculated from 
the underlying bank-by-bank data from the Bankscope by World Bank and 
Bankscope staff using annual data from 1997-2010. The estimations follow the 
methodology described in Schaeck and Cihák (2010) with a modification to use 
marginal costs instead of average costs. This new measure of competition is 
based on the notion that in a competitive market more efficient companies are 
                                            
35
 Includes both interest income and non-interest income, and total assets. 
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likely to be rewarded in terms of profits than their less efficient counterparts. 
This notion was motivated by Demsetz’s (1973) efficiency hypothesis which has 
it that more efficient firms achieve superior performance in the way of higher 
profits than their less efficient competitors. It is this reallocation effect from 
inefficient to efficient firms which the Boone indicator exploits. The Boone 
indicator is the profit elasticity estimating the percentage decrease in profits 
resulting from a 1 percent increase in the marginal cost as follows (Clerides et 
al, 2013): 
 





The effect being intensified when the least efficient firms exit the market. 
Boone (2008) demonstrates that the reallocation effect increases in monotone 
with the degree of competition; with competition resulting from a decrease in 
entry costs or to goods becoming closer substitutes. By this Boone (2008) 
indicates the difference between profits will increase when the market is more 
competitive, as the more efficient market will severely punish the least efficient 
bank. So that  
the profit elasticity establishes a link between firm performance with 
differences in efficiency, measured by marginal cost, leading to the following 
estimable regression-based empirical model: 
 




where 𝛼, 𝛽𝑡 and 𝛾 are parameters and 𝜋𝑖𝑡 denotes the profit of firm i in year t. 
Relative profits 𝜋𝑖𝑡/𝜋𝑗𝑡 are defined for any pair of firms and depend, inter alia, 
on the relative marginal costs of the respective firms, 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡/ 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑡 . The variable 
𝜏𝑖 is a time trend and 𝑖𝑡 an error term. The parameter of interest is 𝛽𝑡. It is 
expected to have a negative sign, because relatively efficient firms make higher 
profits. For example, if β = -0.2, a 1% increase in the marginal cost, due to a 
decrease in the efficiency level) of bank I will decrease its profits by 0.2 %. If β = 
-0.5, a 1% increase in the marginal cost of bank will decrease its profits by 0.5 
%.  And the 𝛽𝑡 is referred to as the Boone indicator. Boone shows that when 
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profit differences are increasingly determined by marginal-cost differences, this 
indicates increased competition. As marginal cost 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 cannot be observed 
directly, it is derived from a trans-logarithmic cost function similar to the 
estimable cost function for the Lerner index above and commonly used in the 
banking literature. Empirical application to banking of the Boone indicator is 
limited and can be found in studies including Schaeck and Cihák (2012) and 
Amidu and Wilson (2014). Given the much touted banking competition resulting 
from the single market and currency we would expect it to have a negative 
relationship with NIM in both the WAEMU and the non-monetary union Sub-
Saharan Africa, but of a higher magnitude in the WAEMU than the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the most widely treated 
summary measure of concentration in the theoretical literature and often serves 
as a benchmark for the evaluation of other concentration indices (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002). In the United States, the HHI plays a significant role in the 
enforcement process of antitrust laws in banking. It is often called the full-
information index because it captures features of the entire distribution of bank 
sizes, as it takes into account all banks and not only the largest ones, and 
considers the inequality of market shares (Garcia-Herrero, 2009). It takes the 
form:   






That is the HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual 
market shares of all the firms in the market. The HHI gives proportionately 
greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms. The HHI   index ranges 
between 1 𝑛⁄   and 1, reaching its lowest value, the reciprocal of the number of 
banks, when all banks in a market are of equal size, and reaching unity in the 
case of monopoly. Davies (1979) analyses the sensitivity of the HHI to its two 
constituent parts, that is, the number of banks in the market and the inequality 
in market shares among the different banks and finds that the index becomes 
less sensitive to changes in the number of banks the larger the number of 
banks in the industry. Bikker and Haaf (2002) note that just as the index is 
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widely treated in the theoretical literature so is it also about the most widely 
applied banking competition/concentration measure in the empirical literature on 
banking competition. As with the competition measures we would expect it to 
have a negative relationship with NIM in both the WAEMU and the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa. Ahokpossi (2013) in a cross-country study 
of 41 Sub-Saharan African countries, however, find that banks’ market power, 
proxied by the HHI, explains the observed high interest margins. 
We would like to argue that of the three foregoing competition variables 
the Boone indicator might seem to better reflect the competitiveness emanating 
from the single currency and market conditions in the WAEMU. This is because 
firstly, the Boone indicator is monotonically related to competition, and that with 
no activity restrictions and no entry barriers and costs in the WAEMU, which are 
the theoretical bases of the indicator these would be captured more 
appropriately by it. Secondly the Boone indicator, unlike the Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index (HHI), is a non-structural competition measure reflecting 
individual bank behaviour and therefore can capture cross-country competition 
effects than the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which is a structural 
measure, making it country-specific and therefore not particularly appropriate 
for a cross-country study as ours where we expect effective cross border 
competition. The Lerner index while it is a non-structural competition measure, 
not requiring the relevant market to be defined, unlike the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), and would therefore also be appropriate for a cross-country study 
like this, is also bedevilled by some shortcomings. Leon (2015) note that 
although the Lerner index is a measure of pricing market power and not a proxy 
for competition an increase of average market power over time may reflect an 
increase in the intensity of competition36. So overall, we argue here that while 
the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) is country-specific, the Lerner index and 
the Boone indicator could reflect conditions across countries. 
5.3.2.3 Macroeconomic variables 
We consider that the macroeconomic environment may as well impact 
NIM through a variety of channels. For instance, credit risk is influenced by 
                                            
36
 Leon (2015) makes reference to recent studies which show that there have been situations 
where in the presence of decreases in individual Lerner indices as a result of competition, the 
average degree of market power either increases or decrease or remain stable owing to the 
reallocation effect from inefficient firms to efficient ones (Boone, 2008). 
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economic growth, inflation and the level of real interest rates to the extent that 
they affect the borrower’s repayment ability and the value of collateral (Garcia-
Herrero et al, 2009). Again as macroeconomic instability heightens the risk 
faced by commercial banks it may have consequences for social welfare 
through increased NIM. Following most studies in the empirical literature we 
capture various aspects of the macroeconomic environment using percentage 
change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), inflation 
rate (INFRATE), and real interest rate (REALINT). Percentage change in 
exchange rate is defined as the real exchange rates growth rates (EXRATEPC), 
that is, the percentage change in the CFA Franc in the case of the WAEMU and 
the respective relevant national currencies in the case of the non-monetary 
union SSA to the US Dollar exchange rate. Given the elimination of transaction 
costs through the single currency we would expect a reducing effect on NIM in 
the case of the WAEMU, and also in the non-monetary union SSA because of 
their respective preparatory work towards the formation of economic and 
monetary union. Today almost every Sub-Saharan African country belong to a 
regional economic block. WAMZ for example is another West African economic 
block made up of the Anglophone West African countries aiming at adopting a 
single currency, the Eco in the near future, with the eventual aim of merging 
with the WAEMU.  GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) is measured as the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency and aggregates based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Evidence 
abound in the extant literature that a positive relationship exists between rapid 
economic growth, measured by GDP growth rate and NIM as demand for credit 
increase during periods of economic boom and thus widen NIM (Athanasoglou, 
2008).  Chortareas et al (2011) also used GDP growth as a control variable in 
their study of the determinants of NIM in Latin American banks and found a 
rather negative relationship with NIM. We would similarly expect the same result 
for real interest rates as shown in the empirical literature. The real interest rate 
variable is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. It is defined as the 
lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator 
(World Bank National Accounts data). Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) used 
real interest rate as well as government short term securities in their study of 
commercial bank interest margins and profitability in 80 countries from 1988 to 
1995 and arrived at a negative relationship between real interest rate and NIM. 
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Finally, our inflation rate variable (INFRATE) is measured by the CPI 
percentage change (World Bank National Accounts data). In line with the 
literature we expect a positive relationship between inflation rate and NIM. Beck 
and Hesse (2009) in their testing of the four sets of hypotheses for high margins 
in the Ugandan banking sector find that faster GDP growth and rising inflation 
were positively associated with interest spreads. Also Mlachila and Chirwa 
(2002) in their study of the financial reforms and interest rate spreads in the 
commercial banking system of Malawi find Price instability, proxied by inflation, 
positively related to interest spreads. 
5.3.3 Data sources 
For our analysis we use a total sample of 185 banks, made up of 45 
banks from the WAEMU and 140 commercial banks from the non-monetary 
union Sub-Saharan Africa, from across 27 countries of the WAEMU and non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, for the WAEMU; and Botswana, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mauritania, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa, for the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan 
Africa, over the period 1999 – 2013.  
We did not include Guinea Bissau in the WAEMU countries for lack of 
data covering the whole period under consideration. Being a comparator region 
to the Euro Area in our analysis we made sure that the WAEMU was a region 
with a mix of core and periphery countries as obtains in the Euro Area. To this 
effect   Kireyev, A. (2016) note that the WAEMU has a large core and a small 
periphery in regional trade. Similarly, we applied the same criteria in the 
selection for the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African countries, ensuring a 
mix of core and periphery countries, and that none of the countries were 
necessarily in an economic and monetary union in the strictest sense.  
As could be gleaned from the previous section our explanatory variables 
are divided into three groups being: bank specific variables, banking market-
structure variables, and country-specific macroeconomic characteristics. Our 
bank-specific variables were extracted from the Bankscope database 
maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk. The financial information therein is 
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provided by Fitch Ratings and compiled predominantly from the filed balance 
sheet and income statement as well as notes from the audited annual reports. 
To ensure comparability across countries the Bankscope financial data is based 
on the standardized global accounting format, and for same purposes we also 
limit our analyses to commercial banks of all sizes which were active under the 
period of study. Also to serve our purposes of focusing on financial 
intermediation we use only unconsolidated financial data so that our analysis is 
not distorted by information from other non-bank subsidiaries not engaged in 
financial intermediation. Data on our country-specific macroeconomic variables, 
namely, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, and real interest rate were taken from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; while our percentage change 
in exchange rate variable was compiled by Dr Matthew Shane and obtained 
from the United States Department of Agriculture website. For data on our 
market structure variables we extracted data for the Boone Indicator and the 
Lerner Index from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database 
compiled by Demirguc-Kunt et al (2009), and subsequently updated in 2013, a 
country-level bank dataset, which underlying data is the Bankscope database; 
and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Data for the HHI was the 
author’s own computation using total assets data from the Bankscope.  
5.3.4 Summary Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we look at the dynamics of net interest margins (NIM) and 
the independent variables in a monetary union vis-à-vis a non-monetary union. 
Specifically, we compare the behaviour of NIM and its determinants, 
respectively, within the WAEMU and the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
In Table 5.1 we present the variables that are employed in the empirical 
analysis of WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA, averaged by 
region/zone over the period 1999 - 2013. In figure 5.1 below we also present a 
graph comparing the respective NIM means of the WAEMU and the non-
monetary union SSA to that of the entire SSA.  From table 5.1 above WAEMU 
has a lowest mean NIM overall, 5.4 percent, than the non-monetary union SSA 
mean of 9.0 percent, and again lower than the overall SSA mean of 8.1 percent. 
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The evolution of NIM in all three regions is graphically represented in figure 5.1 
below. 
Table 5.1. Summary Descriptive Statistics of the WAEMU, Non-Monetary 
Union SSA the Overall SSA. 
Variable WAEMU 
(675 obs.) 










NIM 5.4 4.5 9.0 7.9 8.1 7.4 
BCAP 9.9 6.7 18.7 17.8 16.5 16.3 
BCREDSK 18.8 63.2 20.8 57.6 20.4 59.1 
BLIQ 54.6 79.6 62.5 88.9 54.6 79.6 
BMQCI 79.1 53.3 64.7 38.1 68.5 43.3 
BSIZE 333244.7 304469.1 777480.5 4079194. 667665.0 3550473. 
BOONE -0.02 0.1 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.09 
LERNER 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
HHI 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 
EXRATEPC -1.1 8.3 -0.7 9.3 -0.8 9.0 
GDPRGR 3.7 3.1 5.0 3.1 4.7 3.2 
INFRATE  2.7 2.7 8.9 6.0 7.4 6.1 
REALINT 1.8 2.8 9.7 8.5 7.7 8.3 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eviews.  
Notes: Variable names in first column are the acronyms for the various elected variables 






Figure 5.1. Year-on-Year Means of Net Interest Margins (NIM) of WAEMU, 




In figure 5.1 above we observe that over the period under consideration, 
that is, from 1999 to 2013, NIM in WAEMU has been consistently far lower than 
the non-monetary union SSA, as well as the overall SSA mean as might be 
expected, even though all three means rise somewhat together up to 2003, fall 
briefly up to 2005 and then rise again from 2006. Interestingly after 2006 when 
the overall SSA NIM as well as the non-monetary union NIM begins to creep up 
that of WAEMU falls consistently 2013 when a slight rise is observed. Again in 
table 5.1 WAEMU has the least volatile NIM as per the standard deviation of 4.5 
compared to 7.4 for the overall SSA and 7.9 for the non-monetary union SSA. 
The most likely explanation for this picture at this stage when we have not yet 
engaged in any econometric estimation is that banks operating within WAEMU 
can be said to be operating in a more stable macroeconomic environment in 
which, first, there is no foreign exchange risk because of the elimination of 
transaction and accounting costs associated with bid-ask spreads and 
commissions on foreign exchange transactions;  the effect of this being a 
reduction in systemic risk and the concomitant lowering of real interest rate, 
evidenced by the means and standard deviations of the macroeconomic 
indicators in table 5.1 above (Alkholifey and Alreshan, 2010; De Grauwe, 2012). 
A similar picture was also observed in the case of the Euro Area and the non-



























































Figure 5.2. Trends in Maintenance of Bank Capital (%) for the WAEMU, 
Non-Monetary Union SSA and the overall SSA. 
 
We also observe in table 5.1 above that the mean equity-to-assets ratio 
(BCAP), our bank capital proxy, in WAEMU, is 9.9 percent, which is about half 
of what obtains in the non-monetary SSA, and SSA overall. While the generally 
lower systemic risk which obtains in a monetary union may readily lend itself in 
explaining this it appears the lower level of financial/capital market development 
is also a plausible explanation37. Another likely explanation may be that 
because of the comparative smallness of the WAEMU bank market indicated by 
the relatively lower GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) WAEMU banks tend to be 
credit expansion averse. This proposition could further be supported by the 
lower mean bank credit risk ratio (BCREDSK) of 18.8 percent in WAEMU as 
compared to 20.8 and 20.4 percent for the non-monetary union and the overall 
SSA respectively, meaning WAEMU banks maintain capital commensurate with 
their level of credit risk. Looking at trends in levels of bank capital over the 
period 1999 – 2013 as graphically represented in Figure 5.2 above we see a 
relatively less volatility in both WAEMU and non-monetary union SSA as we 
hardly observe significant peaks and troughs. In terms of bank liquidity WAEMU 
banks appear to be holding less liquid assets than their counterparts in the non-
monetary union SSA, with a mean of 54.6 percent as compared to the 62.5 
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 The IMF notes that the WAEMU regional financial markets remain a marginal source 
of funding except for the governments. The regional stock market, based in Abidjan had 37 






















































percent for the non-monetary union SSA. While this may mean banks in the 
non-monetary union SSA are able to provide depositors with the reassurance 
that they will be able to meet their obligations when they fall due to forestall any 
possible runs than their counterparts in WAEMU, it may also imply a lower 
systemic risk obtains in WAEMU than in the non-monetary union SSA and that 
regulators may not place as high liquidity requirements as they would in the 
case of the non-monetary union SSA38.  
This is also reflected graphically in the trends over the period 1999 – 
2013 in figure 5.3 below, where while the non-monetary union SSA liquidity 
trends seem to be displaying peaks and troughs those of WAEMU show a 
consistent fall towards end of the observed period, that is, 2013. 
Rather contrary to our expectation and to what was observed in the Euro 
Area WAEMU has a higher mean cost-to-income ratio (BMQCI) of 79.1 percent 
compared to the non-monetary union SSA mean of 64.7 percent, and the 
overall SSA mean of 68.5 percent. In pretty much the same fashion the 
standard deviations of these mean values indicate a higher volatility in WAEMU, 
with a standard deviation of 53.3 percent, than the non-monetary union SSA 
standard deviation of 38.1 percent, and the overall SSA value of 43.3 percent. 
What this means is that banks in WAEMU have a higher management/cost 
efficiency. This may be down to lack of comparatively lower competition in the 
region as indicated by the means of our competition measures in table 5.1 
above and as also alluded to in the brief review of the competition literature on 
the region in Section 5.1 above, as well as the smallness of the bank market 
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 For the same prudential reasons which explain the relatively lower equity-to-assets ratio 
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Figure 5.3. Trends in the Maintenance of Bank Liquidity for the WAEMU, 
Non-Monetary Union SSA and the Overall SSA. 
 
 
The mean for individual bank size (BSIZE) by total assets in the WAEMU 
in thousands of US dollars (USD) is 333244.7, far lower than the non-monetary 
union SSA mean of 777480.5 and 667665.0 for the overall SSA. That the 
WAEMU has a far lower mean bank size can be interpreted as a case of the 
small bank market which cannot support large banks. Again the relatively high 
level of market concentration in the WAEMU, with the 3 largest banks taking up 
60 percent of the market, and the five largest bank, 80 percent of assets (Leon, 
2014), means the average bank size will diminish. This is at variance with what 
was observed in the Euro Area and what would have been expected in a 
monetary union for that matter. While this is also reflected in the year on year 
trends in bank size over the period 1999 – 2013 as appears in figure 5.4 below 
mean bank size consistently crept up over time to converge with the non-


























































Figure 5.4. Trends in Bank Size in Total Assets (BSIZE) for WAEMU, Non-
Monetary Union SSA and Overall SSA 1999 – 2013. 
 
 
The mean bank concentration as measured by the Herfindhal-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is 0.3 for the WAEMU, less than that of the non-monetary union 
SSA of 0.4 but about the same as the 0.3 mean for the overall SSA mean. 
While this reflects a slightly more competitive banking sector in the WAEMU 
than in the non-Euro Area, an inference which is at variance with the empirical 
findings noted in section 5.2 above that the WAEMU banking industry is 
characterised by imperfect competition and highly concentrated as compared to 
the non-monetary union SSA. The same evidence of putting competition in the 
WAEMU at par with its non-monetary union SSA counterpart is also given by 
the Lerner index mean of 0.2 across board. Evidence given by the means of the 
Boone indicator tend to be rather on the contrary; rather pointing to a higher 
competitive bank market in the non-monetary union SSA than the WAEMU 
which is in line with the empirical literature of banking competition in the SSA. 
Given the theoretical rigour of the Boone indicator as indicated in the variable 
description section above and in more elaborately in our discussion of empirical 














































































giving a more credible picture than those indicated by the Lerner index and the 
HHI. 
In regard to our macroeconomic variables table 5.1 indicates that while 
inflation and real interest rates in the WAEMU are lower than those of the non-
monetary union SSA and the overall SSA mean values the GDP growth rate 
mean is lower for the WAEMU than for the rest of the non-monetary union SSA. 
That the inflation and real interest rates are lower in the WAEMU, with lower 
volatility as per the respective standard deviations, is because it is a monetary 
union. These trends in inflation and real interest rates are graphically 
represented below in tables 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. Similarly, per the 
respective standard deviations for the percentage change in exchange rate 
variable (EXRATEPC) we find more stability in the WAEMU than in the non-
monetary union SSA because of the single currency, that is, the CFA Franc. 
And we would expect that in our discussion of our empirical results this will have 
a more negative impact on NIM in the WAEMU than in the non-monetary union 
SSA, as was observed between the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area in 
chapter 4. 
In figure 5.5 below while a strong volatility is observed in all three 
indicators mean of inflation rates is consistently lower in the WAEMU over the 
period considered. Below is a graph showing trends in real interest rates over 
the considered period. It shows a consistently lower real interest rate over the 
considered period in WAEMU than the rest of SSA and even dipping to the 
















Figure 5.5. Inflation Rates (%) for all SSA, WAEMU and Non-Monetary 


























































Figure 5.6. Real Interest Rate (%) for All SSA, WAEMU and Non-Monetary 




5.3.5 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
In this section we use pairwise correlation coefficients as appear in 
tables 5.2 and 5.3 below to test the relationship between our chosen variables 
and also to test for the level of multicollinearity among the independent 
variables in the WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA respectively. It is 
evidently clear from these tables, that all the variables show low pairwise 
correlation coefficients between them. This rules out the possibility of any 
considerable multicollinearity which warrants attention, meaning none of the 
independent variables is a perfect linear function of one or more independent 
variable. 
In terms of the relationships between NIM and the independent variables 
we see NIM we see the expected signs for all the variables for the WAEMU, 
with the exception of the GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) and the credit risk 
(BCREDSK) variables, both of which have negative signs. Similarly, for the non-
monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa we observe all the variables are correctly 
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5.4 Empirical Results 
The objective of this chapter has been to investigate the dynamic of 
monetary union membership in the determination of net interest margins in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), contrasting our findings in the WAEMU with the rest 
of non-monetary union SSA, with the eventual aim of ascertaining whether the 
dynamics in the EU as a benchmark region are replicated in the SSA; and if not 
make recommendations as to how both the existing and the many prospective 
monetary unions in SSA can benefit from the positive impact of monetary union 
membership on net interest margins, that is inter alia, competition, x-efficiency 
and s-efficiency as it obtains in the Euro Area. In this section we report and 
discuss the results of the tested hypotheses delineated in section 5.1.1.  
Below in tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 are the regression results for the 
WAEMU and non-monetary SSA, with the different specifications reflecting the 
different empirical approaches to testing for banking competition (the Boone 
indicator, Lerner index and the Herfindhal-Hirschmann index), in the 
determination of net interest margins. We as well test for how GDP growth rate 
affects management efficiency proxied by cost-to-income ratio to impact on the 
variation in net interest margin by controlling for the interaction term 
BMQCI_GDPRGR in table 5.6. 
We first look at a basic indicator, and then we compare estimators with 
each of the competition indicators in them. Only the Boone indicator passes a 
serial correlation test, and for this reason, amongst others we then use that 
indicator when looking for macro-economic indicators in the next table. Although 
as we can see from the correlation tables these variables are not strongly 
related we can only add them one at a time. The process will not be biased in 
this case. We also look at the role of Bank Management Efficiency and interact 
it with GDP growth to see if NIMs fall. In all cases we do not find WAEMU 
regression that do not display serial correlation, and hence our results have to 
be treated with care. We have also investigated long run results, derived from 
the long run steady state for our equations, as we discuss in chapter four 
above. The long run results are consistent and, unlike in chapter 4, there are no 




Table 5.2 . Non-monetary SSA Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
 
NIM  BCAP  BCREDSK  BLIQ  BMQCI  BSIZE1  BOONE1  LERNER1  HHI1  EXRATEPC  GDPRGR  INFRATE  REALINT  
NIM  1.000 
            BCAP  0.331 1.000 
           BCREDSK  -0.058 -0.044 1.000 
          BLIQ  0.092 0.399 -0.023 1.000 
         BMQCI  0.024 -0.132 0.302 -0.080 1.000 
        BSIZE1  -0.272 -0.095 -0.069 0.161 -0.197 1.000 
       BOONE1  -0.108 0.067 0.152 0.083 0.053 -0.006 1.000 
      LERNER1  -0.105 -0.019 0.068 -0.032 -0.042 -0.032 -0.186 1.000 
     HHI1  0.011 0.170 -0.062 0.260 -0.056 0.213 0.022 -0.106 1.000 
    EXRATEPC  0.034 -0.018 0.048 -0.034 0.007 -0.071 0.009 -0.037 0.101 1.000 
   GDPRGR  0.046 -0.072 -0.044 -0.039 -0.010 0.053 -0.026 0.123 -0.077 -0.075 1.000 
  INFRATE  0.090 -0.014 -0.015 0.010 0.015 -0.039 -0.148 0.087 0.029 -0.160 -0.053 1.000 
 REALINT  0.036 -0.099 0.064 -0.040 0.072 -0.158 0.109 -0.201 -0.060 0.103 -0.056 -0.253 1.000 
Notes: No of observations is 2100. The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of all our chosen variables: Net interest Margin (NIM), Bank 
Equity Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size 
(BSIZE), Boone Indicator, Lerner Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Percentage change in Exchange Rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate 
(GDPRGR), Inflation Rate (INFRATE), and Real Interest Rate (REALINT) for 20 countries of the Non-monetary Union SSA, over the period 1999 – 
2013, to test the relationship between the key variables and also to test for the level of multicollinearity among the independent variables. A higher 
coefficient means there is a linear correlation and vice-versa to infer multicollinearity or otherwise. The sample countries are Botswana (BW), Burundi 
(BI), Ethiopia (ET), Ghana (GH), Gambia (GM), Kenya (KE), Lesotho (LS), Madagascar (MG), Mauritius (MU), Mauritania (MR), Malawi (MW), 






Table 5.3. WAEMU Pairwise Correlation Matrix. 
 NIM  BCAP  BCREDSK  BLIQ  BMQCI  BSIZE1  BOONE1  LERNER1  HHI1  EXRATEPC  GDPRGR  INFRATE  REALINT  
NIM  1.000             
BCAP  0.522 1.000            
BCREDSK  -0.013 -0.253 1.000           
BLIQ  0.629 0.562 -0.005 1.000          
BMQCI  -0.164 0.007 -0.246 0.048 1.000         
BSIZE1  -0.390 -0.436 0.071 -0.645 -0.203 1.000        
BOONE1  -0.030 0.050 0.072 0.086 -0.002 -0.100 1.000       
LERNER1  -0.001 -0.095 0.008 -0.105 0.011 0.153 -0.575 1.000      
HHI1  -0.052 0.065 0.023 0.080 0.019 -0.163 0.802 -0.607 1.000     
EXRATEPC  -0.016 0.004 0.021 -0.011 0.016 -0.078 0.075 0.051 0.136 1.000    
GDPRGR  -0.064 -0.067 0.029 -0.088 -0.119 0.054 -0.215 0.118 -0.134 -0.032 1.000   
INFRATE  0.013 0.016 -0.022 0.019 0.031 0.019 -0.028 -0.120 -0.014 -0.257 -0.070 1.000  
REALINT  0.012 -0.019 0.055 0.022 -0.019 -0.150 0.067 0.138 0.145 0.255 -0.027 -0.826 1.000 
Notes: No of observations is 675. The table presents pairwise correlation coefficients of all our chosen variables: Net interest Margin (NIM), Bank Equity 
Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size (BSIZE), 
Boone Indicator, Lerner Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Percentage change in Exchange Rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), 
Inflation Rate (INFRATE), and Real Interest Rate (REALINT) for 7 countries of the WAEMU, over the period 1999 – 2013, to test the relationship 
between the key variables and also to test for the level of multicollinearity among the independent variables. A higher coefficient means there is a linear 
correlation and vice-versa to infer multicollinearity or otherwise. The sample countries are Burkina Faso (BF), Benin (BJ), Cote d’Ivoire (CI), Mali (ML), 







Table 5.4. Controlling for Bank-Specific Variables only and the Successive Inclusion of the Three Competition 
Measures in the Non-Monetary Union SSA and the WAEMU respectively  
 Non-Monetary Union SSA  WAEMU  




























































































































J-statistic 90.77 93.50 102.86 91.68 40.62 40.07 39.42 41.80 
AR (2) 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Probability (J-statistic) 0.457 0.351 0.150 0.402 0.399 0.379 0.406 0.309 
No. of observations 1820 1820 1820 1820 585 585 585 585 
No. of Banks 140 140 140 140 45 45 45 45 
Note: The table presents regression results of all our chosen variables: The dependent variable is Net Interest Margin (NIM). The independent variables 
are: Bank Equity Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank 
Size (BSIZE), Boone Indicator, Lerner Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), for 20 countries of the Non-Monetary Union SSA, and 7 countries of 
the WAEMU, over the period 1999 – 2013. Columns 1 - 4 report the results of for the Non-Monetary Union SSA. Columns 5 – 8 report the results of for 
the 7 WAEMU countries. Probability values indicating statistical significance: ***1% **5% *10. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. AR (2) is 
the test of second order serial correlation in the residuals, which null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. The J statistic is the Hansen test of 





Table 5.5. Simultaneously Controlling for Bank-Specific Variables and the Boone Indicator with the Successive Inclusion of 
Macroeconomic Variables in Both the Non-Monetary Union SSA and the WAEMU. 
Non-Monetary Union SSA   WAEMU  







































































































































































J-statistic 93.40 91.04 99.94 94.15  36.59 39.89 41.34 38.41 
Probability (J-statistic) 0.327 0.391 0.181 0.308  0.488 0.343 0.287 0.405 
AR (2) 0.237 0.544 0.000 0.119  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 1820 1820 1820 1820  585 585 585 585 
No. of Banks 140 140 140 140  45 45 45 45 
Note: The table presents regression results of all our chosen variables: The dependent variable is Net Interest Margin (NIM). The independent variables are: Bank Equity Capital (BCAP), Bank Credit risk 
(BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size (BSIZE), Boone Indicator, Percentage change in exchange rate (EXRATEPC), GDP growth rate 
(GDPRGR), Inflation Rate (INFRATE), and Real interest rate (REALINT) for 20 countries of the Non-Monetary Union SSA, and 7 countries of the WAEMU, over the period 1999 – 2013. Columns 1 - 4 
report the results of for the Non-Monetary Union SSA. Columns 5 – 8 report the results of for the 7 WAEMU countries. Probability values indicating statistical significance: ***1% **5% *10. Standard 
Errors are reported in parentheses. AR (2) is the test of second order serial correlation in the residuals, which null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. The J statistic is the Hansen test of over-
identification restriction which null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous    
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Table 5.6. Controlling for the Interaction Between Bank Management Efficiency (BMQCI) and GDP Growth Rate 
(GBPRGR) respectively in the Non-Monetary Union SSA and the WAEMU.  
                         Non-Monetary Union SSA  The WAEMU 
VARIABLE Column 1 Column 2 Column 3  Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 




















































































GDPRGR   0.521*** 
(0.033) 
   -0.837*** 
(0.217) 
BMQCI_GDPRGR   -0.007*** 
(0.0004) 
   0.012*** 
(0.003) 
J-statistic 90.06 92.71 98.00  35.61  37.30 
Probability (J-statistic) 0.419 0.345 0.197  0.534  0.409 
AR (2) 0.637 0.415 0.778  0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 1820 1820 1840  585  585 
No. of Banks 140 140 140  45  45 
Note: The table presents regression results of all our chosen variables: The dependent variable is Net Interest Margin (NIM). The independent variables are: Bank Equity Capital 
(BCAP), Bank Credit risk (BCREDSK), Bank Liquidity (BLIQ), X-efficiency, proxied by Cost-to-Income Ratio (BMQCI), Bank Size (BSIZE), Boone Indicator, and the interaction term 
between x-efficiency (BMQCI) and GDP growth rate (GDPRGR), that is, BMQCI_GDPRGR for 20 countries of the Non-Monetary Union SSA, and 7 countries of the WAEMU, over 
the period 1999 – 2013. Columns 1 - 4 report the results of for the Non-Monetary Union SSA. Columns 5 – 8 report the results of for the 7 WAEMU countries. Probability values 
indicating statistical significance: ***1% **5% *10. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. AR (2) is the test of second order serial correlation in the residuals, which null 
hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. The J statistic is the Hansen test of over-identification restriction which null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous    
 





In section 5.1.1 we outlined the hypothesis to be tested but for 
completeness we repeat them as we report the results here in this section. 
We hypothesize that the two efficient structure hypotheses, that is, the X-
efficiency, proxied by bank cost-to-income ratio (BMQCI) and S-efficiency, also 
proxied by bank total assets (BSIZE), both have a reducing effect on NIM in the 
WAEMU than in the non-monetary union SSA. Indeed, taking a cue from the EU 
we recognise that the WAEMU has attracted and will continue to attract large 
Pan-African banks from outside the union, particularly large ones from Nigeria 
that might only be viable above a certain size resulting in: a) economies of scale   
b) the lowering of marginal cost, all with reducing effects on NIM in the WAEMU 
than in the rest of the non-monetary union SSA 
 
BMQCI 
BMQCI, our management efficiency variable which tests the X-efficiency 
hypothesis and proxied by cost-to-income ratio, is statistically negatively 
significant at 1% across all our specifications in both the West African CFA zone 
(WAEMU) and the non-monetary SSA, in tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 respectively. 
This lends credence to the X-efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure-
Hypothesis. The X-efficiency version states that banks with superior 
management or production technologies have lower costs and subsequently 
can offer more competitive interest rates on loans and/or deposits, leading to a 
negative relationship between operational efficiency and interest margins 
(Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). It could thus be inferred from our results 
that, in both WAEMU and the non-monetary SSA, banks have lower levels of 
operating cost per unit of gross income, implying efficient management where 
more profitable assets and low-cost liabilities are selected by management of 
banks. In these two regions therefore banks are able to pass the lower costs on 
to their customers in the form of lower loan rates and/or higher deposit rates, 
thereby lowering the interest margin. Our results are consistent with those of 
Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) who find cost to income ratio as a proxy for 
management efficiency negatively correlated with net interest margin. It is again 
consistent with Maudos and Solis (2009) who find a significantly negative 
relationship between net interest margin and efficiency in bank management 
proxied by cost to gross income ratio. Also consistent with our results are 
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Sharma and Gounder (2012) who also used the ratio of operating expenses to 
gross income to proxy management quality in their study of the determinants of 
bank interest margins in Fiji and find a significantly negative relationship 
between Management quality and NIM.  
Notwithstanding the negative relationship between NIM and 
management efficiency (BMQCI) within both WAEMU and the non-monetary 
union SSA differences lie in the magnitude of the effect, where for example 
across our standard specifications controlling for all three competition measures 
in columns 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 in table 5.4 the magnitude of the reducing impact 
of Management efficiency (BMQCI) on NIM is higher in the non-monetary union 
SSA than in WAEMU. For example, looking at our baseline specification in 
columns 2 and 6 of table 5.4 in which the Boone indicator proxies for 
competition, while within WAEMU the coefficient BMQCI is -0.013, this is -0.042 
in the case of the non-monetary union SSA. This level of differences in the 
reducing effects is rather surprising as it would have been thought that the most 
savings in costs would come from a monetary union environment. And it is at 
variance with the results for the Euro Area and the Non-Euro Area, where 
possible efficiency savings, industry competition and macroeconomic stability 
resulting in a higher negative relationship was recorded for the Euro Area. We 
investigate this by looking at the means and volatility39 of some of the factors 
that are likely to affect banks’ costs of operations within the two regions in which 
case we elect to look at the average bank sizes by total assets, levels of 
competition, percentage change in exchange rates, the level of real interest 
rates and its volatility, and GDP growth rates. Using the Boone indicator while 
our summary statistics put the mean level of competition at -0.023 in WAEMU, 
this is -0.062 in the non-monetary SSA. This means the level of competition is 
higher in the non-monetary SSA than in the WAEMU and can naturally reduce 
management cost of operation in the non-monetary SSA than in WAEMU. 
However, in terms of the average bank size in the two respective regions while 
the figure is 333244.7, measured in millions of US dollars, for the WAEMU, this 
is 767091.5 in the non-monetary SSA, meaning economies of scale are more 
likely to be enjoyed by the banks in the non-monetary union SSA banks than 
their counterparts in the WAEMU.  We also find that the volatility of exchange 
rate as per their standard deviations is higher in the non-monetary union SSA 
                                            
39
 We use standard deviation to infer the level of volatility 
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than the WAEMU, 9.2 and 8.3, meaning more foreign exchange transaction 
costs are likely to be incurred by banks in the non-monetary union SSA than in 
the WAEMU, soaring the total cost of operations. Similarly, while the mean real 
interest rate (REALINT) is 1.8% and a standard deviation of 2.8 obtain in the 
WAEMU, the figures in the non-monetary union SSA are 9.7% for the mean real 
interest rate and 8.6 standard deviation. In this case we would expect far higher 
costs in interest rates to be incurred in the non-monetary union SSA than in the 
WAEMU. This is even more so where we observe a mean inflation rate of 8.9% 
and a standard deviation of 6.1 in the non-monetary union SSA as against a 
modest mean inflation rate of 2.7% and a standard deviation of 2.7 in the 
WAEMU. Finally, while the mean GDP growth rate in the WAEMU is 3.7% and 
a standard deviation of 3.1, these are 4.9% and 3.1 in the non-monetary union 
SSA. This shows a generally higher growth and development in the non-
monetary union SSA than the WAEMU affording the banks in the non-monetary 
union SSA a more vibrant business atmosphere to grow bigger than their 
counterparts in the WAEMU and enjoy economies of scale40. It is clear from the 
foregoing analysis that while real interest rates, inflation rates, percentage 
change in exchange rates appear to be more favourable in the WAEMU for the 
banks ought to have been able to contain costs of operations for it to have had 
a more reducing effect on net interest margins than in the non-monetary union 
SSA, our intuition is that the effect is neutralised by level of competition and 
GDP growth rate, which, as already stated has a better outlook in the non-
monetary union SSA than the WAEMU. We test this by interacting GDP growth 
rate (GDPRGR) with the cost-to-income ratio, our management quality (BMQCI) 
proxy to see if it would be significant. The results are shown in columns 3 and 6 
of table 5.6. As could be seen the coefficients in both regions are both 
statistically significant at 1%, however while in the non-monetary union SSA the 
interaction term has a reducing effect on NIM, it has an increasing effect on NIM 
in the WAEMU, thereby supporting our intuition. For the level of competition 
impacting on the X-efficiency proxy, cost-to-income, to have a higher magnitude 
                                            
40
 “The growth take-off in Africa has been one of the salient facts of the global economy in the 
last two decades. However, while per capita GDP has more than doubled in faster-growing Sub-
Saharan economies during this period, it has increased only moderately on average in the 
WAEMU……. Political instability, challenging business and legal environments, a substantial 
infrastructure gap, and weak institutional and public investment management capacity have 
affected both the level of investment and even more its efficiency, and prevented most WAEMU 
countries from achieving sustainable high growth. Limited structural transformation also seems 
to have played a role” (IMF Country Report (2014) No.14/84 on WAEMU) 
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of negative impact on NIM in the non-monetary SSA than in the WAEMU we do 
not interact our competition measure with the X-efficiency proxy, cost-to-income 
as apart from the HHI, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index have marginal 
cost measures embedded in them therefore already imply cost efficiency. 
 
BSIZE 
Again with Bank size (BSIZE) while we find a significantly positive 
relationship with NIM at 1% is observed across all our specifications within the 
WAEMU, a statistically significantly inverse relationship with NIM at 1% is 
observed in the non-monetary union SSA as appear in tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. 
For example, in our baseline regression in column 5 of table 5.4 where we 
control for only bank-specific variables while in the WAEMU the coefficient for 
bank size is 0.671, that for the non-monetary union SSA in column 1 of table 5.4 
is -0.934. That the coefficient of the bank size variable, BSIZE, is negatively 
signed in the non-monetary SSA supports the efficient structure hypotheses, 
specifically scale efficiency, as in the presence of positive scale effects, larger 
banks are expected to operate at and are associated with lower margins (De 
Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). This is presumably as a result of economies of 
scale and the ability to invest in technology that would enhance efficiency. 
Specifically, in the context of non-monetary union SSA this means in the non-
monetary union SSA cost reduction resulting from scale economies afford the 
banks the ability to pass on part of their efficiency savings in the form of lower 
NIMs than their counterparts in the WAEMU. Gelos (2006) in his study of bank 
spreads in Latin America finds that in an imperfectly competitive environment, 
larger banks may be able to exploit economies of scale and lower interest 
margins. Also consistent with our results are the results of Chirwa and Mlachila 
(2002) who capture a negative relationship between bank size and spreads in 
their bid to test the efficient market hypothesis or existence of economies of 
scale and concluded that the negative relationship suggests economies of 
scale. However, their proxy for size differs from ours in that they used the 
market share of each commercial bank in the deposit market as an indicator of 
size. Also consistent with the WAEMU results is Flamini et al (2009) who study 
the determinants of commercial bank profitability in Sub-Saharan Africa, using 
the two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) approach, and find a 
significantly positive relationship of the bank size variable (BSIZE) with net 
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interest margin, and explain that it gives support to the economies of scale 
market-power hypothesis where larger banks make efficiency gains that can be 
captured as higher earnings due to the fact that they do not operate in very 
competitive markets. Also consistent are the results of Aboagye et al (2008) 
who find bank size to have a significantly positive impact on net interest margins 
in Ghana, which supports the relative market power (RMP) hypothesis. We can 
therefore conclude that larger banks in the WAEMU, unlike their counterparts in 
the non-monetary union SSA may not be passing on part of their efficiency 
gains to the customer due to the uncompetitive nature of the bank market in the 
WAEMU. Confirming our hunch of the imperfections in the banking sector 
competition in the WAEMU as opposed to the non-monetary union SSA, Leon 
(2015) note that the recent substantial structural changes in competition in the 
WAEMU precipitated by the entry and expansion of banks from West Africa and 
from North Africa notwithstanding banks operate under imperfectly competitive 
market in the WAEMU. And that while data exploration shows that 
concentration in the WAEMU's banking industry decreased over the second part 
of the 2000s the trend is less marked than in other African economies. For 
example, between 2000 and 2009 the three largest bank in the WAEMU took up 
60.79% of the total market. 
With the foregoing results for both management efficiency (BMQCI) and 
bank size (BSIZE) the conclusion can then be drawn that the hypothesis of 
bank X-efficiency having reducing effects on NIM, while it can be supported in 
both the WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA, its incidence is higher in 
the non-monetary union SSA than in the WAEMU because of the better GDP 
growth rate outlook in the non-monetary union SSA than the WAEMU. In the 
case of S-efficiency while the hypothesis is supported in the non-monetary 
union SSA it is not supported in the WAEMU due to a relatively better 
competitive environment in the non-monetary union SSA than in the WAEMU. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
The degree of banking competition (BOONE, LERNER and HHI) has a 
larger reducing effect on NIM in the WAEMU than in the non-monetary union 
SSA because of the effects of the EMU. 
As the generally accepted hypothesis goes a more competitive banking 
market is expected to drive down bank loan rates/increase deposit rates, adding 
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to the welfare of households and enterprises (Van Leuvensteijn, 2009). Within 
the context of the WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA as is in the case 
the Euro Area and the non-Euro Area in chapter 4, a reducing effect of our three 
elected competition variables would have been expected given the continuous 
structural changes that the WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA markets 
have undergone over the last decade or so (Leon, 2015). More so, it would 
have been thought that the WAEMU as a monetary union would have 
engendered a lot of cross-border operations, in particular when since 2007 the 
entry of new Pan-African banking groups spurred competition in WAEMU (Leon, 
2015). Our results in columns 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of table 5.4 however show that 
while two of our thee competition measures, namely, the Boone indicator and 
the HHI are significantly negative at 1% in the non-monetary union SSA with the 
exception of the Lerner index which is significantly positive, all three measures 
are positively related with NIM at 1% for the Boone indicator and the HHI, and 
5% for the Lerner index in the WAEMU. These results suggest the presence of 
market power in the WAEMU, giving banks the license to charge higher loan 
rates and paying lower deposit rates. This may be explained by the level of 
concentration present in the WAEMU as alluded to by Leon (2015). In the case 
of the non-monetary union SSA, Leon (2015) note that the recent entry and 
expansion of banks from the West and North Africa have decreased the hitherto 
concentration in the banking markets. It is therefore natural for these 
competitive trends in the non-monetary union SSA to be reflected in lower NIM 
compared to the WAEMU where the market is regarded as concentrated. 
Regarding the positive sign on the coefficient of the Lerner index for the non-
monetary union SSA we refer to our detailed analysis in section 4.4 of chapter 
4, under hypothesis 2 where we test the effects of competition in the Euro and 
the Non-Euro Areas. In this section, following Carbo et al (2009) we note that 
since different competition measures belong to different measurement 
classifications they measure different things and do not provide the same 
inferences about competition our results seem mixed (Carbo-Valverde et al, 
2009; Liu et al, 2013 in Leon, 2015). The choice of a particular competition 
measure in this context influences conclusions regarding the implications of 
competition (Leon, 2015). For example, the HHI belong to the class of 
measures that infer competition from the structural characteristics of the bank 
market and specifically measures the level of market concentration, while the 
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Lerner index which is based on bank behaviour measures the level of market 
power of a firm identified by the divergence between the firm’s price and its 
marginal cost. The Boone indicator which is also another non-structural 
measure of competition and based on bank behaviour, infers the degree of 
competition from the effect of reallocation of market share or profits from 
inefficient firms to efficient ones. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 
We hypothesize that exchange rate has a more reducing effect on NIM in 
the WAEMU than in the non-monetary union SSA. 
In our specification controlling for the Boone indicator in columns 1 and 5 
of table 5.5 while our percentage change in exchange rate variable 
(EXRATEPC) is negatively related to NIM in the non-monetary union SSA, but 
not statistically significant, it is positively signed in WAEMU and significant at 
1%. That EXRATEPC is significantly positive in the WAEMU may be because 
the majority of the banks operating in the WAEMU are foreign banks who, 
unlike the Euro Area, might be exposed to a significant currency induced credit 
risk emanating from the fact that their clients’ assets and liabilities are usually 
not denominated in the same currency as the WAEMU. Therefore, should the 
domestic exchange rate depreciate significantly, the loan quality might 
deteriorate and banks might charge higher margins for the foreign exchange 
risk exposure. This is in stark contrast to the dynamics in the EU, where in the 
case of the Euro Area the relationship was found to be a negative one because 
of the elimination of foreign exchange risk deriving from the fact that most of the 
foreign banks engaged in cross-border operations were Euro Area banks whose 
domestic currency was the Euro and could have a reducing impact on net 
interest margins. Our results overall are similar to those of Chortareas et al 
(2011) who find exchange rate effect on net interest margins to be positive for 
Colombia and Paraguay but negative in Chile 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES (Bank-specific) 
LAGGED NIM  
The lagged NIM across all our specifications for both the WAEMU and 
the non-monetary union SSA are significantly positive at 1% confirming the 
dynamic nature of our model specification, and justifies the inclusion of lagged 
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values of net interest margin to account for previous values of the NIM in the 
estimated regressions. Again across all specifications our results show that 
there is a relatively higher persistence of net interest margin across time in the 
WAEMU than in the non-monetary union SSA, as the coefficients are relatively 
higher. For instance, for both regions where the Boone indicator is included as 
the competition measure in columns 2 and 6 of table 5.4 while the coefficient for 
the WAEMU is 0.464 that for the non-monetary SSA is 0.297. This means within 
both zones although competitive forces are sufficiently powerful to ensure that 
no firm can persistently earn NIM above the norm these forces are more 
powerful in the non-monetary union SSA than in the WAEMU. This confirms the 
higher competitive pressure, inferred from the means of our competition 
variables, as well as the magnitude and signs of their coefficients in the 
regression results in table 5.1, within the non-monetary union SSA are sufficient 
to bring abnormal NIM quickly into line with the competitive norm than it does 
obtain in the WAEMU. For example, while the mean of the Boone indicator for 
the WAEMU is -0.02, that for the non-monetary union SSA is -0.06. Consistent 
with our results for the WAEMU are those obtained by Dumicic and Ridzak 
(2013) who find a relatively high persistence of NIM across time in their study of 
NIM in eleven Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC).  
 
BCAP 
The bank capital variable is significant at 1% in both the WAEMU and 
non-monetary SSA across all specifications in tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
respectively. While the relationship between our capital adequacy variable 
(BCAP) and NIM in both the WAEMU and the non-monetary SSA are 
significantly positive at 1% for all specifications, we observe higher magnitude 
of effects picked up in the WAEMU than in the non-monetary SSA. In columns 2 
and 6 of table 5.4, for example, when we control for the Boone indicator, while 
the coefficient is 0.223 in the WAEMU, within the non-monetary SSA the 
coefficient is 0.029. In our second specification when we control for competition 
with the Lerner index, in the WAEMU, the reported coefficient is 0.268, and 
0.221 when the HHI is used to control for competition. Similarly, in the non-
monetary SSA the reported coefficients are 0.016 and 0.021 when the Lerner 
index and the HHI are respectively controlled and significant at 1%. The positive 
relationship between the equity capital and net interest margins in both regions 
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is consistent with the hypothesis that while substituting equity for debt reduces 
the risk of insolvency, and therefore ought to have the effect of lowering the cost 
of borrowed funds, equity is a more expensive source of funding, and therefore 
an increase in equity capital by substituting equity for debt leads to higher 
required net interest margins (NIM) as these costs may be passed on to 
customers (Anbgazo,1997). In practical terms what this means is that banks in 
both the WAEMU and the non-monetary SSA are subject to high regulatory 
capital and would ask for higher rents to compensate for it (Saunders and 
Schumacher, 2000). Nevertheless, the higher magnitude of the impact on NIM 
in the WAEMU than in the non-monetary SSA may be explained by looking at 
the lower mean equity capital to assets ratio (BCAP) of 9.9% in WAEMU 
against 18.7% in the non-monetary SSA which is a reflection of lower capital 
market development in the WAEMU compared to the non-monetary union SSA 
as explained in section 5.3. Judging from these numbers it appears banks in 
WAEMU are subject to more insolvency risk than banks in the non-monetary 
union SSA, and therefore may demand higher rents in the shape of higher NIM 
to compensate for it.  
Our results of a positive relationship are consistent with those of Boutin-
Dufresne et al (2013) who use pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to obtain a statistically significant 
positive relationship, in their study of NIMs in SSA; Angbazo (1997); Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000); Maudos and Solis (2009) and Khediri and Khedhiri 
(2011), all find a positive and significant relationship between bank capital and 
NIM, in line with the theoretical and empirical literature. Sharma and Gounder 
(2012) also find a rather negative and not statistically significant relationship 
between bank capital and NIM across all model estimations using pooled 
ordinary least squares, fixed effects and random effects models, in their study of 
bank net interest margins in Fiji.  
The fact must however be alluded to that the determinants of NIM and 
their influence vary across countries as well as regions of the world (Doliente, 
2005; Hawtrey and Liang, 2008; Maudos and Solis, 2009, in Sharma and 
Gounder, 2012). For example, while bank capital and credit risk are found to be 
significantly and positively related to NIM in developed countries (e.g. Saunders 
and Schumacher, 2000 in Sharma and Gounder, 2012), the relationship has 
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been found to be significant but negative in some Latin American countries 
(Brock and Suarez, 2000 in Sharma and Gounder, 2012). 
 
BCREDSK 
Extending the same analysis to our credit quality variable, the ratio of 
loan loss provision to net interest revenue (BCREDSK), we find that it is 
statistically significantly positive at 1% in both the WAEMU and non-monetary 
union SSA, across all the specifications in table 5.4 where we only control for 
the bank-specific variables, and where we subsequently control for all three 
competition measures in succession, except where we control for the Lerner 
index in the WAEMU, which is not statistically significant.  The results of a 
positive sign are consistent with the extant literature which means that banks 
with riskier loans select higher net interest margins (Angbazo, 1997).  
While the sign is positive in both regions we however find a higher 
magnitude of the impact on NIM in the non-monetary union SSA than in the 
WAEMU. For example, in columns 1 and 5 of table 5.4 where only the bank-
specific variables are controlled for, while we record a coefficient of 0.007 for 
the WAEMU, 0.024 is reported for the non-monetary union SSA. The 
explanation of a higher magnitude of the effect in the non-monetary SSA than in 
the WAEMU may be summed up in the following statement of the IMF (2014), 
that “while economic performance has significantly improved in faster-growing 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries over the last two decades, it has changed 
only modestly, on average in the WAEMU” (IMF, 2014). This may imply a 
comparatively lower default risk rates; and therefore proportionately low 
provisions for loan losses reflecting in higher NIMs in the non-monetary union 
SSA than in the WAEMU where a relatively poor economic performance may 
reflect a higher default risk rates and hence a proportionately higher provisions 
for loan losses reflecting in lower NIMs.  
Gunter et al (2013) show that increasing loan losses or nonperforming 
loans relative to earning assets causes banks to lose interest income generated 
from these loans and to move funds to lower-yielding assets that are less prone 
to default. Both effects tend to negatively influence the NIM in the short run, in 
other words deteriorations in credit quality tend to decrease the NIM.  
Our results of a positive sign are however consistent with those of 
Ahokpossi (2013) who find the importance of credit risk for the determination of 
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interest margins in SSA, because credit risk is positively and significantly 
associated with net interest margins. Also consistent with our results are those 
of Agoraki (2009), who find credit risk to significantly raise margins when she 
uses both static and dynamic models in her study of the Greek banking system.  
Dumicic and Ridzak (2013) use reserves for impaired loans as a proxy 3 
for asset quality in their study of net interest margins in the Central and Eastern 
European banking systems and find it significantly negatively correlated with net 
interest margin, and take the view that it most probably derives from the fact 
that the banks are not allowed to accrue interest on bad loans. 
BLIQ 
In respect of bank liquidity risk (BLIQ) our results largely indicate a 
positive relationship with NIM significant at 1% in the WAEMU, while broadly 
significantly negative at 5% in the non-monetary union SSA.  These are across 
all our specifications in table 5.4, where we only control for the bank-specific 
variables, and subsequently control for all three competition measures in 
succession, except where we control for the Lerner index in the non-monetary 
union SSA, which is not statistically significant. That the results are negative in 
the non-monetary union SSA means that within the non-monetary union SSA 
liquidity risk is likely to be relatively reduced because of deeper and more liquid 
markets deriving from the free movement of capital41. As a result, banks factor 
in less liquidity risk premium in their interest rates than banks in the non-
monetary union SSA. Looking at the means of our liquidity risk variable, 62.5% 
for the non-monetary union SSA against 54.6% for the WAEMU, it is evident 
that banks in the non-monetary union SSA hold sufficient amount of liquid 
assets to withstand stress and to enhance short-term resilience of the liquidity 
risk profile of banks. On the other hand, it is clear from the results that banks in 
the WAEMU rather charge a premium for the liquidity risk they face, thereby 
increasing their net interest margins. Our results of a negative sign in the non-
monetary union SSA is consistent with Doliente (2005) who finds a statistically 
significant negative relationship between net interest margins and liquid assets 
in Thailand and Malaysia in his study of South-East Asia. Also consistent are 
those of Sharma and Gounder (2012) who employ a cocktail of different 
                                            
41
 the IMF (2014) notes that investors in frontier markets in the UK and the US for example find 
the WAEMU domestic debt market as illiquid and unattractive compared to markets like Ghana 
and Nigeria, and therefore remain small, indeed constituting a meagre 8% of the WAEMU GDP. 
206 
 
methodologies including fixed and random effects models, random effects 
model with period clustered standard errors (PCSE) and pooled least squares, 
using the ratio of total liquid assets to total assets to denote liquidity risk and 
find a negative but a statistically not significant relationship in their study of 
NIMs in Fiji. Other studies include Ahokpossi (2013) who also find that in Sub-
Saharan Africa liquidity ratio negatively and significantly affects interest 
margins. Studies which also find a rather positive relationship include 
Chortareas et al (2011) also find a significantly positive relationship between 
liquidity risk and net interest margins in some Latin American countries, which 
result they deem consistent with the literature since banks tend to pass their 
liquidity risks to consumers through increasing interest rate margins.  
 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROL VARIABLES 
Almarzoqui and Naceur (2015) note that generally, a stable 
macroeconomic environment, with low inflation, low interest rate, and low 
reserve requirement, will support lower net interest margins. This we consider 
will be in the interest of welfare and therefore now turn to look at the impact of 
the macroeconomic actors on NIM in both regions.  
 
GDP Growth Rate (GDPRGR) 
GDP growth rate (GDPRGR) is our cyclical output proxy and captures 
the economic performance of the respective banking jurisdictions and the 
relationship is indeterminate in the literature since NIM is deemed to be 
procyclical. Athanasoglou et al (2008) for example posit that lending could 
decrease during periods of economic slowdown, since such periods are 
normally synonymous with increased risk. Similarly, loan loss provisions during 
such periods will be higher due to the deterioration of asset quality. Naturally 
during such periods banks would charge higher margins for higher default risk. 
Dietrich et al (2015) on the other hand assert that the risk premium can be lower 
in times of economic booms. Furthermore, Dietrich et al (2015) find that 
developing countries with higher GDP growth are likely to exhibit higher default 
probabilities compared to developed countries. Putting all the arguments 
together it is thus à priori unclear which effect will dominate. 
In column 6 of table 5.5 the reported sign of the GDPRGR coefficient 
while positive with a magnitude of 0.015 in the WAEMU is not statistically 
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significant. This means in the WAEMU GDPRGR does not matter in the 
determination of net interest margins. It may be that due to the substantial 
economic volatility over the last two decades, as put by the IMF (2014), 
WAEMU banks have not been able to keep track of the cyclical output to be 
able to factor it into the determination of their net interest margins. The 
statistical non-significance of our results are consistent with Hovarth (2009) who 
also finds a rather positive but statistically not significant relationship for GDP 
growth in the Czech bank market. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) also find 
no statistically significant impact of GDP on NIM in their eighty-country study. 
They are also consistent with those of Beck and Hesse (2009) who find a 
negative relationship between GDP growth and interest spreads in Uganda but 
not statistically significant. Within the non-monetary union SSA nevertheless 
GDPRGR is significantly positively related to NIM at 1% in the specification in 
column 2 of table 5.5 with a coefficient of 0.061. This means in the non-
monetary union SSA periods of high growth can result in higher net interest 
margins due to more intense credit activity and better loan quality. This 
explanation is corroborated by the assertion made by Brock and Suarez (2000); 
Claeys and Vennet (2008) to the effect that an increase in GDP per capita 
should be expected to increase bank’s income as a result of more lending and 
lower default rates. And that for these markets, higher economic growth is 
associated with higher margins, as a reflection of more lending and lower 
default rates. Our results in the non-monetary union SSA are also consistent 
with those of Gunter et al (2013) who find GDP growth has a positive influence 
on NIM in the Austrian banking sector. Our results are however inconsistent 
with those of Chortareas et al (2011) for Argentina and Chile where GDP growth 
has a statistically significantly negative impact on NIM.  
 
Inflation Rate (INFRATE) 
INFRATE has significantly positive impact at 1% on NIM in both the 
WAEMU and the non-monetary union SSA as appear in columns 3 and 7 of 
table 5.5 specifically. In both regions the significantly positive effect of inflation 
on intermediation margins is possibly due to the ability of banks to at least 
satisfactorily, forecast future inflation, which in turn implies that interest rates 




Figure 5.7. Year-on-Year Comparison of Inflation Rates for the WAEMU 
and Non-Monetary Union SSA 1999 - 2013  
 
However, that the magnitude of the impact is lower in the non-monetary 
union SSA than in the WAEMU appears a paradox given that while the mean 
inflation rate over the period for the WAEMU is as low as 2.7%, this is 8.9% in 
the non-monetary union SSA; For example, in column 7 of table 5.5 while the 
coefficient for the WAEMU is 0.211, it is 0.110 in column 3 of table 5.5 for the 
non-monetary union SSA. Indeed, Figure 5.7 above shows that the mean 
inflation rate has been consistently higher in the non-monetary union SSA than 
in the WAEMU over the studied period. This finding is also supported by the 
IMF (2014) who project that inflation (percentage in the CPI) to 2018 will remain 
modest in the WAEMU than the rest of SSA. 
The higher magnitude in impact on NIM in the WAEMU than in the non-
monetary SSA can be explained by the probably relatively better ability of banks 
in the non-monetary union SSA to possibly fully anticipate and forecast future 
inflation correctly, which in turn implies that interest rates have been 
appropriately adjusted to achieve lower impact on margins than in the WAEMU. 
Athanasoglou et al (2008) also posit that the extent to which future inflation can 
be accurately forecasted so that banks can manage their operating costs 
depends on an economy’s maturity. And therefore our results may also lie in the 






























































union SSA. Consistent with our findings is Flamini et al (2009) who find that 
inflation has a positive effect on bank profits, suggesting that banks in Sub-
Saharan Africa forecast future changes in inflation correctly and promptly 
enough to adjust interest rates and margins. Also consistent with our results is 
Beck and Hesse (2009) who find that a higher rate of inflation is associated with 
higher margins and spreads in the Ugandan bank market. They are as well 
consistent with Brock and Suarez (2000) who find a positive relationship of 
inflation rate with bank spreads in Bolivia, Chile, Columbia and Peru. They are 
however inconsistent with Chortareas et al (2011) who find a negative 
relationship between inflation and NIM in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, but 
not statistically significant. 
 
REALINT 
Unexpectedly real interest rate has a significantly negative impact on 
NIM in both the WAEMU and non-monetary union SSA. This suggests that 
banks in the WAEMU, as per the mean real interest rate (REALINT) of 1.8%, 
operate in a relatively low interest environment and are able to charge lower 
interest rates. For the non-monetary union SSA it may be that banks may not be 
pricing interest rate risks adequately, given that banks in the region operate in a 
relatively high real interest rate environment, as the mean real interest rate is 
9.7%. Either way, we however observe that across all our specifications the 
magnitude of the negative impact as per the coefficients is higher in the 
WAEMU than the non-monetary union. For example, in column 8 of table 5.5 for 
the WAEMU while the coefficient for REALINT is -0.229 and significant at 1%, in 
column 4 of table 5.5 for the non-monetary union SSA this is -0.021 and 
significant at 1%. The higher magnitude of the reducing effect on NIM in the 
WAEMU than the non-monetary SSA is not surprising as the mean real interest 
rate is far lower in the WAEMU than it obtains in the non-monetary SSA, in the 
order of 1.8% in the WAEMU, and 9.7% in the non-monetary union SSA, clearly 
because of monetary union effects, where the monetary authorities’ primary 
objective is to maintain price stability by keeping inflation low. Our finding of a 
negative relationship of real interest rate with net interest margin is consistent 
with Chortareas et al (2011) who find a negative relationship between average 
annual interest rate and interest rate margins in Argentina. Also contrary to our 
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findings are Brock and Suarez (2000) who find a positive relationship in some 
countries in Latin America. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have attempted to analyse the effect of monetary 
union membership on bank net interest margins in Sub-Saharan Africa for the 
period 1999 - 2013, using a total sample of 185 banks, made up of 45 banks 
from the WAEMU and 140 banks from the non-monetary union SSA, from 
across 7 countries of the WAEMU and 20 non-monetary union SSA. These are 
Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote D’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo for the 
WAEMU; and Burundi, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa for the 
non-monetary union SSA. Contrasting our findings in the WAEMU with those of 
the non-monetary SSA, our key objective has been to use our findings in the 
European Union as a benchmark against which to evaluate the dynamics of the 
monetary union membership in the determination of net interest margins in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), and set out the policy implications and recommendations 
in the last chapter. We used the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM 
estimator which is robust to endogeneity problems and to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between banks, as well as allowing for the inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable  
The following hypotheses were tested as was done in Chapter 4 for our 
benchmark European Union analysis: 
4. Efficient Structure Hypothesis: We hypothesize the presence of X-
Efficiency (BMQCI) and S-Efficiency (BSIZE) 
5. The degree of banking competition (BOONE, LERNER and HHI) has a 
larger reducing effect on NIM in the Euro zone than in the non-Euro zone 
because of the effects of the EMU. 
6. We hypothesize that exchange rate has a more reducing effect on NIM in 
the Euro zone than in the non-Euro zone. 
We find that while lower net interest margins generally obtain in the 
WAEMU than in the non-monetary union SSA, with a mean of 5.4 for the 
WAEMU and 9.0 for the non-monetary union SSA, this cannot be attributed to 
the level of competition and the relatively more stable macroeconomic 
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landscape, depicted by first and foremost the pegging of its currency to the 
Euro, the lower inflation rate, in the order of 2.7% mean as opposed to the non-
monetary union SSA’s mean of 8.9%, and lower real interest rate, also in the 
order of 1.8% for the WAEMU, and 9.7% for the non-monetary union SSA, as in 
the case of the Euro Area in Chapter four and would be expected in a typical 
monetary union for that matter.  
While in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa our results for both 
management efficiency (BMQCI) and bank size (BSIZE) variables support the 
hypotheses of bank X-efficiency and S-efficiency respectively, with both 
variables having reducing effects on NIM, within the WAEMU only the X-
efficiency is supported. Nevertheless, for the X-efficiency the reducing effect is 
higher in the non-monetary union SSA than in the WAEMU. We attribute this to 
the higher levels of competition and GDP growth rate in the non-monetary union 
SSA than in the WAEMU. This means in the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan 
Africa banks are afforded a faster growing economic and a more competitive 
environment to be able to compete, operate efficiently, and gain the critical 
mass in size to be able to realise scale economies to be able to reduce cost of 
financial intermediation. These findings therefore have policy implications for 
both regions. For the WAEMU it requires the relevant authorities to continue 
create a congenial macroeconomic environment to foster economic growth 
where banking firms in the WAEMU could grow in sizes to be able to exploit 
economies of scale, while also promoting policies aimed at enhancing 
competition, with the effect of reducing intermediation cost and enhancing social 
welfare. This will also have the effect of enabling the bank market to flourish 
and expand to economically viable sizes. This is especially where WAEMU is 
known to have a relatively small and underdeveloped financial market. For the 
non-monetary union SSA pursuing these same policies would further enhance 
the already noted positive effects. 
For our second hypothesis on the effects of banking competition we find 
the presence of market power in the WAEMU, giving banks the license to 
charge higher loan rates and paying lower deposit rates; while in the non-
monetary union SSA the presence of reducing impact of our competition proxies 
on NIM is evident. These findings are corroborated by the findings of Leon 
(2014) which establish the presence of concentration in the WAEMU, while in 
the case of the non-monetary union SSA, he notes that the recent entry and 
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expansion of banks from the West and North Africa have decreased the hitherto 
concentration in the banking markets. It is therefore natural for these 
competitive trends in the non-monetary union SSA to be reflected in lower NIM 
compared to the WAEMU where the market is regarded as concentrated. These 
findings are at variance with what is generally assumed, that competition in a 
monetary union drives down NIM than in a non-monetary union, as was seen in 
the case of the Eurozone versus the non-Eurozone in chapter four. So in terms 
of policy interventions it behoves the relevant financial services competition 
authorities to set an agenda geared to setting in motion competitive pressures 
within the WAEMU for the region to be able to enjoy the theoretically and 
empirically proven effects of competition on the efficiency with which banks 
intermediate in the region.     
For our third and last hypothesis which is in reference to the effect of 
EXRATEPC on NIM in both zones while we find a significantly positive impact in 
the WAEMU, the opposite is the case in the non-monetary union SSA. We 
considered that this may be because the majority of the banks operating in the 
WAEMU are foreign banks who, unlike the Eurozone, might be exposed to a 
significant currency induced credit risk emanating from the fact that their clients’ 
assets and liabilities are usually not denominated in the same currency. 
Therefore, should the domestic exchange rate depreciate significantly, the loan 
quality might deteriorate and banks might charge higher margins for the foreign 
exchange risk exposure. This we find in stark contrast to the dynamics in the 
EU, where in the case of the Eurozone the relationship was found to be a 
negative one because of the elimination of foreign exchange risk deriving from 
the fact that most of the foreign banks engaged in cross-border operations were 
Eurozone banks whose domestic currency was the Euro and could have a 
reducing impact on net interest margins. We may therefore find it prudent to 
recommend that WAEMU formulates policies that will foster the establishment 
of regional banks whose assets and liabilities will be significantly denominated 
in the CFA Franc in order to reduce their transaction costs with the eventual 
reducing effect on bank intermediation efficiency. 
Across the gamut of the macroeconomic variables the following 
conclusions are made. While GDP growth rate is positively related with NIM in 
both regions, it is not significant in the WAEMU, but significant in the non-
monetary union SSA. This means in the non-monetary union SSA periods of 
213 
 
high growth can result in higher net interest margins due to more intense credit 
activity and better loan quality. This explanation is corroborated by the assertion 
made by Brock and Suarez (2000); Claeys and Vennet (2007) to the effect that 
an increase in GDP per capita should be expected to increase bank’s income 
as a result of more lending and lower default rates. And that for these markets, 
higher economic growth is associated with higher margins, as a reflection of 
more lending and lower default rates. 
 For the positive impact of INFRATE on NIM in both regions but of a 
higher magnitude in the WAEMU than in the non-monetary zone we find a 
relatively better ability of banks in the non-monetary union SSA to possibly fully 
anticipate and forecast future inflation correctly, which in turn implies that 
interest rates have been appropriately adjusted to achieve lower impact on 
margins than in the WAEMU. Again drawing on Athanasoglou et al (2008) 
assertion that the extent to which future inflation can be accurately forecasted 
so that banks can manage their operating costs depends on an economy’s 
maturity we may conclude that our results may also lie in the dichotomy of the 
level of economic development between the WAEMU and the non-monetary 
union SSA, which calls for the WAEMU to develop strategies to enhance the 
region’s economic development to catch up with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
extend the same argument of macroeconomic convergence in the economies of 
the Euro zone, propitiating an environment of macroeconomic stability in the 
shape of price stability where banks within the Euro zone have a relatively 
better ability to possibly fully anticipate and forecast future inflation, which in 
turn implies that interest rates have been appropriately adjusted to achieve 
higher margins than in the non-Eurozone. %. For the effect of real interest rate 
(REALINT), we however observe that the magnitude of the negative impact as 
per the coefficients is higher in the WAEMU than the non-monetary union. We 
find this higher magnitude of the reducing effect on NIM in the WAEMU than in 
the non-monetary SSA not surprising as the mean real interest rate is far lower 
in the WAEMU than it obtains in the non-monetary SSA, in the order of 1.77% in 
the WAEMU, and 9.68% in the non-monetary union SSA. This is clearly 
attributable to the monetary union effects where the primary objective of the 
WAEMU monetary authorities is to maintain price stability by keeping inflation 
low. In this regard while we will encourage the WAEMU monetary authorities to 
be rigorous with their approach to continually maintaining price stability, for the 
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non-monetary union SSA it is our recommendation that the region expedite their 
various monetary union agenda to be able to collectively and rigorously pursue 
price stability across the region. 
Overall, rather unexpectedly we find higher magnitude of impact, both in 
increasing and reducing effects, of our explanatory variables on net interest 
margins in the non-monetary union SSA than in the WAEMU, which is puzzling 
and begs the question what then might be responsible for the generally lower 
NIM in the WAEMU than the non-monetary union SSA. To this we note that 
lower real interest rates in the WAEMU is the single most important factor 
driving the generally lower NIM in the WAEMU than it obtains elsewhere in the 
SSA. On this basis we can then conclude that in a monetary union while 
competition may immensely contribute to maintaining comparatively lower 
interest margins, as in the case of the Euro Area, the union’s ability to pursue 
vigorously its primary objective of maintaining price stability by maintaining 
lower interest rates is key. As could be gleaned from chapter four on Europe, in 
a typical monetary union, competition is the major force that ignites efficiency of 
the two forms, that is scale and management efficiencies, for the achievement 
of lower cost of financial intermediation and social welfare in turn. It is therefore 
important that bank regulatory authorities in the WAEMU and the non-monetary 
union SSA at large consciously formulate policies geared to enhancing 
competitive bank behaviour, while the respective governments also ensure a 
sound macroeconomic environment within which banks operate in the regions. 
Nonetheless referring back to the sub-optimality of the Euro Area in 
chapter three it is important to note here that if the Euro Area like the WAEMU 
scores low on the criteria for a monetary union and that it is a currency union 
rather than a fully-fledged monetary union (Mullineux, 2014), then the source of 
the competitive pressures within the Euro Area which impacts net interest 
margins negatively may be attributable to the presence of a well-developed 
single market rather than it being a monetary union. This is even further given 
credence by Andor (2014) who assert that the European economic and 
monetary union was an incomplete one. On that note we can then conclude that 
the lack of a well-developed single market in the WAEMU may well explain the 
puzzle of why competition did not have the same effect in the WAEMU as in the 






6 CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we note that the efficiency with which banks discharge their 
primary function of intermediating between savers and borrowers has consumer 
welfare implications; for which reason it has generated a lot of studies 
investigating the factors that are likely to impact the efficiency outcomes of this 
primary function of a bank, specifically the net interest margin. Among the key 
of such factors being the role played by a bank market structure. Within a 
monetary union we anticipate that the dynamics of these impacting factors, 
particularly the role played by a bank market structure, may be different from a 
non-monetary union jurisdiction. We therefore set out to contribute to the 
banking literature by looking at whether membership of a monetary union does 
matter in explaining the variation in net interest margin (NIM).  
In this final and concluding chapter we highlight the main findings of each 
chapter, their limitations, offer public policy implications and recommendations 
and sign-post areas for likely future research. 
Chapter one sets the tone by introducing our main motivation and 
contribution to knowledge. In chapter two we set out to review the theoretical 
literature on the two theoretical models which underpin most of the empirical 
studies into the determinants of net interest margins, namely, the Klein-Monti 
(1972) model, and the Ho and Saunders (1980) dealer model. We also review 
the main empirical studies using the Ho and Saunders (1980) dealer model, 
both on the African continent and the rest of the world where both individual 
country and cross-country studies are identified. We note that while studies on 
both advanced and other emerging economies abound those on Africa are 
scanty. Overall, we find that findings in different jurisdictions with respect to the 
various determinants of net interest margin are mixed. 
In chapter three we recognise that since our contribution to knowledge 
borders on the contribution of monetary union membership towards the 
determination of bank net interest margins we look at the theory of the Optimum 
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Currency Area (OCA) as the relevant theory in any discourse on monetary 
union formation, and find support for the OCA endogeneity hypothesis in the 
literature. We as well in the same chapter look at the historical background to 
the formation of the European Economic and monetary union. This is intended 
to give context to our discussion in Chapter four, which looks at whether 
monetary union membership matter in the determination of net interest margin. 
Lastly in chapter three, recognising that the level of macroeconomic 
convergence in a monetary zone has risk implications for the determination of 
NIMs we also endeavour to establish the level of macroeconomic convergence 
and therefore the level of macroeconomic stability within the Euro and non-Euro 
Areas respectively. For example, we believe that the Euro and the non-Euro 
Areas’ respective abilities to deal with economic shocks harmoniously will 
impact on the cost of financial intermediation. Therefore using the tools of 
graphical analysis, pairwise correlation analysis, sigma convergence analysis 
and finally tests of panel unit root we find that while both the Euro Area and 
non-Euro Area may be converging to their respective regional averages as well 
as their EU average on all our four macroeconomic variables, that is, 
percentage change in exchange rate, GDP growth rate, inflation rate and real 
interest rate, we generally find the speed of convergence higher in the non-Euro 
Area than in the Euro Area. Similar findings are also recorded for the WAEMU 
versus the non-monetary union Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Motivated by the fact that the EU has become the model of monetary 
union arrangements on which all SSA monetary union endeavours are 
modelled, we use bank-level data to study the determinants of net interest 
margins in the European union in chapter four, contrasting our findings in the 
Euro Area with those of the non-Euro Area. Overall, we find higher reducing 
impact of our scale and X-efficiency variables on NIMs in the Euro Area than in 
the non-Euro Area reflecting inter alia a stronger competition and a higher 
macroeconomic stability in the Euro zone than in the non-Euro Area. The 
implication for the managers of the economies within the two zones is to 
develop policies geared towards enhancing the convergence of their respective 
economic fundamentals to ensure macroeconomic stability. Again, to extent that 
competition has a reducing effect on NIM in both zones policies must aim at 
ensuring the sustainability of competition in the banking sectors of both the Euro 
and the non-Euro Areas as the European Commission has in its own wisdom 
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already championed a lot of regulatory changes aimed at fostering competition 
in the financial services market.  
We however consciously attempt to locate the source of the competition 
and efficiency in the Euro Area so that we could extend it to our comparator 
region in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that the competition and efficiency effects 
that reduce net interest margins in the Euro Area derive from there being a well-
developed single market with a strong socio-economic cohesion underpinning 
rather than the economic and monetary union which was found to be 
incomplete, because it lacked a fiscal and a political union, and therefore 
contributed to the European sovereign debt crisis. Our conclusion therefore is 
that it is rather the presence of a well-developed single market that engenders 
competition and efficiency to reduce bank net interest margins and not 
membership of a monetary union per se. 
In our last main chapter which is chapter five we extend our analysis of 
the Euro versus the non-Euro Areas to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where we 
contrast our findings in the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) with some selected non-monetary union Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries. Our findings here in this chapter reveal some interesting insights. 
Overall, rather unexpectedly we find higher magnitude of effects, both 
increasing and reducing, of our explanatory variables on NIMs in the non-
monetary union SSA than in the WAEMU. This is puzzling and begs the 
question what then might be responsible for the generally lower NIM which 
obtains in the WAEMU than the non-monetary union SSA; the presence of 
market power in the WAEMU, which gives banks the license to charge higher 
loan rates and paying lower deposit rates; while on the other hand there is the 
presence of reducing effects of our competition proxies on NIM within the non-
monetary union SSA.  To this we note that lower real interest rates in the 
WAEMU is the single most important factor driving the generally lower NIM in 
the WAEMU than it obtains elsewhere in the SSA.  
Comparing our European and Sub-Saharan African results we can 
conclude that it is the presence of a well-developed single market which 
generates the level of competition and efficiency which has the effect of 
lowering bank net interest margin in the Euro Area rather than it being a 
monetary union. And that by extension it is the absence of a well-developed 
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single market in the WAEMU which explains the unexpected effect of 
competition and efficiency on net interest margins in the region.   
Therefore, in the final analysis the conclusion is that it is rather the 
presence of a well-developed single market that engenders competition and 
efficiency effects to reduce bank net interest margins rather than membership of 
a monetary union per se. 
Given these findings, in terms of policy interventions it behoves the 
relevant authorities in the WAEMU to speedily complete the single market 
programme which has not yet been fully functional, although it constitutes a 
priority objective under the WAEMU Treaty (Claeys and Sindzingre, 2003).   
 
Limitations of Thesis 
While we are convinced that the thesis presents robust results about the 
impact of monetary union membership on variations in the mean of net interest 
margins, and as well offers very insightful implications and useful 
recommendations likely to benefit regulatory authorities, monetary union 
agencies responsible for financial integration and the establishment of central 
banks for prospective monetary unions, policy makers, governments, bank 
owners and managers, investors, and the general public at large it is not without 
a few limitations which we highlight here. 
Firstly, for our European analysis in chapter four, due to limited data for a 
good number of banks we left Spain out of the discussion. Our intuition is that 
we would have had improved results if we had included Spain since it is one of 
the largest Euro Area countries with a good number of banks. Again, in 
choosing a comparator group of countries to complete our European analysis 
we thought it would have served our purposes better if we chose a group of 
countries whose special characteristics and features are similar to those in the 
Euro Area. However, the number of such EU countries outside the Euro Area 
like the UK and Sweden were very limited. 
Similarly, for purposes of comparative analysis of the role played by 
monetary union membership in the determination of net interest margins while 
we could have arrived at more robust findings by including other monetary 
union unions in Africa like the CEMAC we were again constrained by limited 
bank-level data and thus limited ourselves to the WAEMU. And even in the 
WAEMU Guinea Bissau was left out for the same reason of data constraint.  
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Our results for both Europe and Africa in chapters four and five 
respectively failed to elicit the expected impact of competition on net interest 
margin, particularly for the Euro Area, in the specifications where the Lerner 
index is used. The reason may be found in the literature on methods of banking 
competition measurement where the Lerner index is fraught with a number of 
limitations. For example, Oliver et al (2006) posit that the Lerner index could 
overestimate market power in banks where their risk-taking is not accounted for. 
This is because banks which spend relatively more of their resources granting 
loans reap higher rents in terms of margins. Furthermore, Leon (2014) point out 
that the Lerner index cannot distinguish between bank markets with high 
margins owing to inelastic demand and those with high margins because they 
are less competitive or collusive. To deal with this shortcoming he recommends 
the use of the conjectural-variation method developed by Iwata (1974), 
Bresnahan (1982), and Lau (1982), which we intend to employ in future.  
 
Areas for Future Research 
Having introduced the role of monetary union membership into the 
debate and academic discourse on the determinants of net interest margin it is 
refreshing to sign post a few areas that can stimulate further research. In terms 
of methodology while the nature of our data set warranted a dynamic model and 
therefore elected to use the Arellano and Bover (1985) GMM we would 
recommend the inclusion of the difference GMM by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
for robustness in future research, its underscored weakness in the literature 
notwithstanding. We similarly for the same purposes of robustness recommend 
the addition of Fixed and Random effects methodologies for future research.  
Also to the extent that there is a growing importance of bank fee income 
as a complement to net interest income we could have fully completed our 
analysis by bringing it into the discussion. For example, Hanweck and Ryu 
(2005) note that aggregate industry statistics point to an increasing prominence 
of noninterest income as a source of bank earnings. They make reference to 
the FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile which shows that noninterest income rose 
from 31 percent of quarterly net operating revenue in first quarter 1995 to 41 
percent in second quarter 2003. We would therefore like to note its impact as an 
area future research could investigate. 
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Lastly, for future research, we would recommend going beyond the 
shores of Africa to include the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and 
the CEMAC for purposes of comparative analysis. Again, future research could 
also use the United States of America, being the oldest monetary union, instead 
of the European Economic and Monetary Union as the benchmark monetary 
union. 
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